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1 General introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Maternal mortality remains high in Ghana, a lower middle income country, although 
maternal health indicators have improved over the past 20 years. Between 1990 and 
2003, the maternal mortality rate decreased from 740 per 100,000 live births to 503 per 
100,000, and then to 451 per 100,000 live births in 2008 (Ghana Statistical Service 
(GSS) et al., 2009). This slow pace reduction of maternal mortality was inadequate for 
Ghana to attain its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) target of 185 maternal 
deaths per 100,000 live births by 2015 (Ministry of Health et al., 2011). As in Ghana 
maternal mortality also remains high in many other Low and Middle Income 
Countries (LMICs) with little evidence of progress (Bhutta et al., 2010, Lozano et al., 
2011, Waage et al., 2010, 2008). 
Over the years, policy makers at national level have formulated a wide range 
of public policies and programmes to increase financial and geographical access to 
maternal care; space child birth; provide essential obstetric care; expand midwifery 
coverage; and make equipment and health facilities available and many more to 
improve maternal health outcomes and reduce maternal deaths in Ghana 
(Government of Ghana, 2006, Ministry of Health, 2011b, Ministry of Health, 2007, 
Ministry of Health et al., 2011, Witter et al., 2009, Ofosu-Amaah, 1981). 
These national level policy decisions are of great importance for maternal 
health because they influence which concrete measures are put in place and how 
they are implemented to improve maternal health outcomes. This thesis aims to 
advance our understanding of how maternal health policy decisions are made at 
national level in Ghana, and present potential lessons for policy actors out of these 
explanations and understanding to engage in making better informed policy 
decisions to improve maternal health. 
To understand who makes policy and why, one must understand the 
characteristics of the policy actors, what roles they play, what authority and other 
powers they hold, and how they deal with and control each other (Lindblom, 1980) 
and the processes by which they are able to do so. However, the development path of 
policy decisions whether intent as articulated in policy documents or practice as 
implemented can be difficult to predict and study because policy making is a 
complex process and does not follow a particular format. 
A simplified framework – the stage heuristic framework - for studying public 
policy processes separates it into four stages: (1) agenda setting, (2) policy 
formulation, (3) policy implementation and (4) evaluation (Lindblom, 1980, Sabatier, 
2007). Some have justifiably argued that the framework is oversimplified and a 
rather mechanical representation of a complex and essentially non-linear process 
(Sabatier, 2007, Nakamura, 1987). Others have argued that policy intent may be 
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different from what is implemented and are often not connected at all (Mosse, 2005). 
However, the stage heuristic framework is still useful for purposes of organizing 
research and ordering the overload of information obtained during data collection. 
This study will focus on the first two stages of the framework that is agenda setting 
and policy formulation because as suggested by Kingdon (2003) and Parson (1995) 
public policy is ultimately made by how policy actors define issues and put them on 
the policy agenda and subsequently formulate policy contents and alternatives.  
Agenda setting refers to how and why some issues come to prominence and 
receive serious attention from decision makers rather than others. Policy formulation 
refers to the process of detailing out how to address issues that are on the agenda 
(Buse et al., 2005). To understand national level maternal health policies through the 
agenda setting lens I explored policy actors involved in getting, maintaining and 
removing maternal health issues from the national agenda and the processes by 
which they were able to influence the agenda. And through the lens of policy 
formulation explored how and why policy actors influencing each other arrived at 
and agreed upon policy contents and alternatives. Given the complexity of policy 
making, exploring how and why some policy issues were considered, maintained or 
removed from the agenda and the accompanying policy content can give insights 
into the power dynamics of agenda setting and policy formulation, the powers that 
policy actors hold and how they deal with and control each other and give answers 
to questions like who makes policy and the processes by which these policy actors 
are able to do so.  
1.2 Research problem, objective and questions 
Despite the importance of understanding how public maternal policies are 
formulated, and how policy actors within specific context use their power to 
influence agenda and define policy issues, there is no empirical research on this topic 
in Ghana. There is, however, limited literature from other LMICs, on national level 
maternal health agenda setting and formulation and examination of power in health 
policy (Gilson and Raphaely, 2008). For example, generating political will for safe 
motherhood in Indonesia (Shiffman, 2003), the state of political priority for safe 
motherhood in Nigeria (Shiffman and Okonofua, 2007), the emergence of political 
priority for safe motherhood in Honduras (Shiffman et al., 2004), and actors practise 
of power in a South African community health programme (Lehmann and Gilson, 
2013). Most empirical research on maternal health in Ghana and other LMICs (Travis 
et al., 2004, Borghi et al., 2006, Adam et al., 2005, Gupta et al., 2011, Asamoah et al., 
2011, Phillips et al., December 2006, Witter et al., 2009) focused more on 
implementation challenges such as scarcity of resources, shortage of skilled health 
personal, inadequate quality of care, and recommendations of potential policies that 
should improve maternal health, and less on how the implemented policies came 
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onto the national agenda and formulated. Studying how those implemented policies 
were put on the agenda and formulated may give additional insights into why the 
policies face several implementation challenges. Additionally, there is little guidance 
available to health practitioners who wish to understand how and why some issues 
make their way on to policy agendas, get formulated and implemented whilst others 
languish and some issues do not even get discussed (Buse et al., 2005).  
This thesis provides an analysis of national level maternal health agenda 
setting and formulation in Ghana by exploring the power dynamics in: (1) how and 
why some policies have long life and are maintained over time despite periodic 
threats to their existence, (2) why policy agenda items appear and evolve in the 
framework of the health sector programme of work, (3) why certain problem 
definitions and policy options can become prominent and endorsed at high level as 
public policy agenda item and yet fail to subsequently move swiftly into 
implementation and (4) why certain issues get on to the policy agenda, move into 
policy formulation and implementation and later drop off in the process. The thesis 
also contributes to agenda setting and policy formulation literature and the use of 
power concepts in health policy analysis. Findings from this research will therefore 
contribute in filling the knowledge gap and provide decision makers and analysts 
with information on four main issues. First, given the complexity of public policy 
making, lessons from how policy actors used their power and the processes by which 
they were able to influence policy decisions can help decision makers to strategize 
and engage in making better informed policy decisions. Second, the research 
presents empirically grounded understanding of national level policy actors’ 
decision making processes and their use of power within a dynamic health sector. 
Third, the research highlights entry points into decision making processes domains, 
and how policy actors can actively participate in these domains to influence national 
level decisions. Finally, the research highlights how policy making for maternal 
health happens in reality instead of what should be. 
The research objective is to explore who formulates maternal health policies 
and the agenda setting and decision making processes through which policy actors 
operate, in Ghana. 
The research objective is further expanded into four main questions. 
1.  Which policy actors have been involved in maternal health policy agenda 
setting and formulation and what roles did they play and why? 
2. What are the decision making processes related to maternal health policy 
agenda setting and formulation? 
3. How did contextual factors influenced maternal health policy agenda setting 
and formulation and why? 
4. How did policy actors define maternal health issues and why? 
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1.3 Theoretical perspectives  
1.3.1 Public policy and decision making 
Public policy refers to government policy. Dye (2001) notes that public policy is 
whatever governments choose to do or not to do. He argues that government’s 
failure to decide or act on a particular issue also constitutes policy (Dye, 2001). Dye’s 
simple definition of public policy being what governments do, or do not do, 
contrasts with the assumption that all policy is made to achieve a particular goal or 
purpose (Buse et al., 2005). Public policy decisions are usually statements or formal 
positions issued by a government, or a government department, national laws and 
legislations in order to achieve or containing the intent to achieve certain goals that 
are deemed desirable for the public good or a specific target population. At the basis 
of decisions to design such public policies there is always a specific definition of the 
problem that has to be solved. 
In this thesis decision is defined as a specific commitment to action, which is 
assessed by the factual relationship between decisions (non-decisions) and its final 
aims – action or inaction (Mintzberg et al., 1976, Simon, 1961). Decision making 
therefore is the process in which choices are made or preferred option is selected at a 
point or series of points in time when national level decision makers consider public 
problems that has to be solved. In the public policy making process, decision making 
extends throughout the policy stages and the different levels of the health system. 
For example decisions about what to define as a problem, what knowledge to use in 
the problem definition, and choice about how to implement policies may be 
considered at different levels (Parsons, 1995). 
1.3.2 Power approaches to decision making 
The thesis draws on a pluralist approach to decision making which focuses on the 
way in which power is distributed and an elitist approach which focuses on the way 
in which power is concentrated perspectives for interpretation (Parsons, 1995). The 
pluralist and elitist power approaches to decision making perspectives view 
decisions as something which is shaped and determined by the structures of power 
such as, wealth, bureaucratic and political arrangements, pressure groups, and 
technical and professional knowledge (Parsons, 1995). Its use here is not to establish 
the validity of these approaches but rather to help explain what happened and as a 
result develop theoretical understanding of how maternal health policy decisions are 
made at national level. The thesis draws on elitist and pluralist power approaches, 
because the Ghanaian health sector is pluralist with many policy actors involved in 
decision making (Ministry of Health, 2007), and at the same time there are situations 
where only few policy actors have taken decisions (Agyepong and Adjei, 2008, 
Seddoh and Akor, 2012).  
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The elitist approach to decision making presents a hierarchical power 
structure and argues that power is concentrated in the hands of a few groups and 
individuals (Rushefsky and Patel, 1998). Decision making according to this approach 
is a process which works to the advantage of these powerful elites. In the real world 
there are, it is argued, those at the top with power and the ‘mass’ without power 
(Parsons, 1995). On the other hand, the pluralist approach to decision making takes 
the view that power is dispersed throughout the society and no individual or group 
holds absolute power and the government arbitrates among competing interest in the 
development of policy. For the pluralists, policy emerges as the result of conflict and 
bargaining among large number of group organized to protect the specific interest of 
their members. According to the pluralist approach the government selects from 
initiatives and proposals put forward by interest groups according to what is best for 
society. However, pluralism has been subject to considerable scepticism for its 
portrayal of the government as a neutral umpire in the distribution of power (Buse et 
al., 2005). Proponents of the pluralist approach modified their view and according to 
the revised view decision making therefore is – biased in favour of the powerful, and 
functions to the disadvantage of the less-powerful and less-well resourced (Parsons, 
1995).  
1.3.3 Analytical concepts and framework  
To understand factors and processes that influence national level maternal policy 
agenda and formulation decisions, public policy decision making for maternal health 
is conceptualised as a process predominately influenced by how policy actors within 
specific context use their power sources to define problems, set the agenda and 
formulate accompanying policies. Therefore power, problem definition, context and 
policy actor concepts were explored to analyse the research findings. 
Power  
Power is relational and a highly contested concept (Parsons, 1995). In analysing how 
and why policy actors at national level use power in setting maternal health agenda 
and formulating specific policies, Mintzberg’s (1983) concept of organizational power 
was adopted. Mintzberg (1983) refers to power as the capacity to effect (affect) 
outcomes – decisions and actions. This concept of power is built on the premise that 
organizational behaviour is a power game in which various players, called 
influencers seek to control the organization’s actions and decisions. To be an 
influencer, one essentially requires some source of power, coupled with the will to 
use the power in a politically skilful way that is to convince those to whom one has 
access. Mintzberg notes that to understand an organization’s decisions and actions, it 
is necessary to understand which influencers are present, what needs each seeks to 
fulfil in the organization, and how each is able to use power to fulfil them. Mintzberg 
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proposes five sources of power: the control of (1) a resource, (2) a technical skill (3) a 
body of knowledge. To serve as a source of power - the resource, skill or body of 
knowledge must be essential to the functioning of the organization. The fourth 
power source stems from legal prerogative, that is exclusive rights or privileges to 
impose choices. The fifth power source derives simply from access to those who can 
rely on the other four power sources (Mintzberg, 1983). 
To further understand the fifth power source that derives from access to 
others with power, the Ribot and Peluso (2003) theory of access was adopted. The 
theory of access facilitates grounded analysis of who actually benefits from things 
and the processes by which they are able to do so. They define access as the ability to 
benefit from things including persons, institutions, symbols and material objects 
(Ribot and Peluso 2003 p, 153). A policy actor’s ability to benefit from the powers of 
others for example funds from a different actor can augment his/her influence and 
importance to establish networks with others. The established networks can facilitate 
the spread of a particular problem definition to move a policy agenda and 
formulation decision in a specific direction.  
Problem definition 
The concept of problem definition concept is closely linked to policy agenda setting. 
Hogwood and Gunn (1984 p,109) describe the concept of problem definition as 
encompassing “the processes by which an issue (problem, opportunity or trend) 
having been recognized as such and placed on the policy agenda, is perceived by 
various interested parties, further explored, articulated, and possibly quantified, and 
in some but not all cases, given an authoritative definition at least provisionally 
acceptable definition in terms of its likely causes, components, and consequences” 
(Hogwood and Gunn as cited in Rochefort and Cobb, 1993). The problem definition 
description relates to issue framing which is the way individuals give meaning to a 
certain problem situation (Arts and Buizer, 2009). 
The problem definition (framing) description relates the way an issue is 
defined to how it is placed on the agenda, and how policy actors debate and interpret 
the issue for decision. Hence, knowing how a problem has been defined is essential 
to understanding the process of agenda setting (Parsons, 1995). There is however no 
one fixed problem definition for a particular policy issue and as such policy issues 
are subject to the interpretative manoeuvres and discursive strategies of policy actors 
who can influence the decision making processes (Mosse, 2005). Problem definitions 
are not simply ‘given’ or facts of a situation but crafted out of debates and 
interpretations of past and current situations (Portz, 1996, Rochefort and Cobb, 1993, 
Schön and Rein, 1995). Therefore it matters who is defining the problem and when 
and in which context. A problem definition process is dynamic and sets the stage for 
policy decision making and the most likely way of policy formulation in defining the 
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best way to solve the problem, and therefore issue definition and redefinition can 
serve as tools to gain advantage over the decision making process and what policies 
to formulate (Peters, 2005, Mosse, 2005, Rochefort and Cobb, 1994). Policy actors 
therefore can direct decision making by controlling the interpretation of the problem 
and shaping the final resolution of the problem. The concept of problem definition is 
therefore useful in analysing how policy actors during discursive discussions define 
issues to set maternal health agenda and formulate specific policies. 
Policy Actor 
Policy actors as influencers have power and engage in problem definition processes 
and there is the need to differentiate between them to analyse the power they hold 
and how they deal with and influence each other and policy decisions. 
Differentiating policy actors and their collective or individual influence on national 
level policy decision is particularly important in the Ghanaian pluralistic and 
sometimes elitist decision making health sector. Here we draw on Buse et al. (2005) 
broad description of policy actors as government and non-government to 
differentiate national level policy actors. In the Ghanaian health sector, government 
policy actors include the President, the Parliament, political appointees, bureaucrats, 
public institutions and service providers. On the other hand, non-government actors 
include the donors (multi-lateral and bilateral), professional bodies and associations 
of various categories of health workers, private self-financing (for profit) providers, 
mission based (private not-for-profit) providers, non-governmental organizations, 
media, interest groups and the general public. 
These policy actors - whether as individual, organization or group - do not 
usually act alone and sometimes depend on each other through consultation, 
negotiation, consensus building (Hill and Hupe, 2002) and sometimes conflict 
(Grindle and Thomas, 1991) to take and influence decisions. Policy actors depend on 
each other not only through formal institutional structures but also through informal 
structures and relationships such as interpersonal communications (Marin and 
Mayntz, 1991, Parsons, 1995). Policy actors’ interactions within the formal and 
informal institutional structures create a policy making system with plurality of 
separate policy actors with separate vested interest, power, goals, and strategies, as a 
polycentric system of governance and collective action towards problem solving 
(Ostrom, 2005, Ostrom, 2008). The polycentric system of governance (Ostrom, 2005, 
Ostrom, 2008) does not take power differences into account, however, power analysis 
is necessary to understand who influences the agenda and who finally puts the issue 
onto the agenda given that policy actors hold power. This thesis draws on policy 
actors’ characteristics as government and non-government and the idea of 
interactions among plurality of policy actors to, firstly identify the policy actors’ 
different roles in specific policy decisions, and as we will see in chapters 3 to 6 
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distinguish main categories of actors as final decision makers and policy influencers. 
And secondly explore the linkages and networks among policy actors and power 
relations that result from their interactions. 
Context 
To ascertain factors that shape policy actors’ actions and decisions, the thesis took 
into account role of context on policy actors’ actions. Policy actors’ actions are never 
fully autonomous but are embedded within the context in which decisions are made. 
Context confronts policy actors with issues they need to address, set limits on what 
solutions can be considered and determine what options are politically, economically 
and administratively feasible (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). 
Policy actors relate to context differently and it is important to distinguish 
between policy actors and their different interaction with context. This thesis draws 
from Grindle and Thomas (1991) conceptualization of context based on their work on 
public choice and policy change in developing countries, to study how context 
shaped policy actors’ action and decisions. Grindle and Thomas (1991) categorize 
context broadly as international, national, institutional and individual factors. 
International contextual factors include global targets and agendas, and a country’s 
relationship to international economic and political conditions. Domestic economic 
and political conditions, administrative capacity of the country, historical experiences 
and conditions, structure of class and interest groups, mobilization in the society – 
are identified as national context. The institutional context includes administrative 
capacity of institutions, the impact of prior or similar pursued policies. They also 
include in individual context: ideological predispositions, professional expertise and 
training, memories of similar policy situations, position and power resources, 
political and institutional commitments, loyalties, and personal attributes and goals.
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Figure 1.1: Analytical framework 
The interactions among the concepts of - power, problem definition (framing), policy 
actor, and context form the basis for the thesis analytical framework. Figure 1.1 
illustrates the presumed relationship among them. National level maternal health 
agenda and formulation decisions result from the interactive and connected 
processes of policy actors’ use of power to define issues within a specific context. The 
agenda and policy formulation decisions made whether implemented or not 
feedback as a contextual factor of prior or similar pursued policy to inform the 
ongoing decision making process. A policy actor’s ability to consistently rely on 
power sources from one’s resources, knowledge, skills or access to others; and 
context to define issues and influence decisions is central to this framework. 
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Figure 1.2: Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organised into seven chapters as illustrated in figure 1.2. After the 
general introductory chapter, chapter 2 present the Ghanaian geographical, political, 
economic and health sector context, and research design, process and data collection 
methods. Because the empirical chapters (3-6) based on papers published or in the 
process of being published in international peer reviewed journal contain detailed 
methodological and context sections, chapter 2 provides a general overview. The 
research questions are explored through a series of 4 case studies of agenda setting 
and formulation related to maternal health. Chapter 3 seeks to answer the questions: 
which policy actors have been involved and how contextual factors influenced 
maternal health policy agenda setting and formulation and why. This chapter 
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discusses the role of policy actor’s power sources and context in maternal fee 
exemption policy agenda setting and formulation decisions between 1963 and 2008. 
The concepts of policy actor, context and power were applied to analyse the maternal 
fee exemption case. Chapter 4 focuses on policy actors, decision making processes 
and the evolution of maternal health policies within the institutionalised policy 
dialogue structures of the Ghanaian health sector. In this case, the concept of 
problem definition and power were applied to analyse policy actors’ influence on the 
evolution of maternal health policies between 2002 and 2012. Chapter 5 seeks to 
answer the question: which policy actors have been involved and how policy actors 
defined maternal health issues and why. This chapter discusses how and why ‘free 
family planning as part of national health insurance scheme’ policy appeared on the 
government agenda and failed to move swiftly into programme formulation and 
implementation. The concepts of power and problem definition were applied to 
analyse the case. Chapter 6 discusses how less than three months into the 
implementation of a pilot per capita provider payment policy prior to upscaling to 
national level, antenatal, normal delivery and postnatal services those were initially 
included as part of the basket of services dropped off the policy agenda. The concept 
of context and the use of power to resist a policy change were applied to analyse the 
case. Chapter 7 presents the general synthesis and conclusions of the research. The 
chapter highlights the main findings based on the research questions, discusses 
theoretical and methodological issues emerging from the study, and policy 
implications and issues for further research. 
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Chapter 2 
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2 Ghana context and research methodology  
2.1 Ghana context 
Geographical and population context 
The Republic of Ghana is situated on the Gulf of Guinea in the south of the West 
African sub region. It is bordered by Togo in the east, by Ivory Coast in the west and 
by Burkina Faso in the North. The country covers a land area of 238,533km2. 
Administratively, it is divided in ten regions. Accra, in the Greater Accra region is 
the capital and seat of Government. The population according to the 2010 national 
census is 24,658,823 with an average annual growth rate of 2.5 percent between 2000 
and 2010. On average 50.9 percent of the population lives in urban areas. However, 
the level of urbanization varies from region to region. The Greater Accra Region has 
the highest proportion of urban population (90.5 percent), followed by the Ashanti 
Region (60.6 percent) while Upper West Region has the lowest proportion of urban 
population (16.3 percent). The concentration of industries and commercial activities 
in the Greater Accra and Ashanti Regions may partly account for the relatively high 
urban population in these regions. The remaining eight regions are predominantly 
rural, with the level of urbanisation below the national average of 50.9 percent 
(Ghana Statistical Service, 2012). 
Political context 
The fifty-nine years of Ghana’s independence have been characterised by short-lived 
governments and frequent instability, the incursion of military in national politics 
and a recent more stable multiparty democracy. Ghana gained independence on 6th 
March 1957 from British rule and became a Republic 1st July 1960. After 
independence, due to the overwhelming majority of the Convention People's Party 
(CPP) in Parliament, Ghana was made a socialist one-party state in which the CPP 
became the most dominant and powerful political group. The Nkrumah government 
initiated several socialist policies in health, education and housing. The National 
Liberation Council, a military government overthrew Dr Nkrumah in 1966. The 
National Liberation Council handed power to a democratically elected Prime 
Minister – Dr Busia in 1969 in the second Republic. Between 1972 and 1979 Ghana 
experienced a series of military takeovers. In 1979, the People’s National Party won 
the presidential election and Dr Limann became the President of the third Republic. 
There was a military coup by the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) in 
1981 that overthrew Dr Limann (Rimmer, 1992). The PNDC military government 
headed by Flight-Lieutenant Rawlings, reorganise itself into a political party – the 
National Democratic Congress (NDC) and contested and won the 1992 multiparty 
presidential and parliamentary elections under the fourth Republican Constitution of 
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1992. The NDC claims a center left social democratic ideology (National Democratic 
Congress 2016). 
Since then, presidential and parliamentary elections are held every four years. 
Transitions of power between political parties have taken place smoothly in 2000, 
2004, 2008 and 2012 with a handover of government from one political party to 
another in two instances. Ghana has now twenty seven registered political parties 
but the NDC and New Patriotic Party (NPP) are the dominant ones, having 
leadership of governance of the country rotating between them since 1992. The NPP 
is the new face of the Danquah-Busia tradition which was the party in opposition at 
independence in 1957 and had briefly ruled the country from 1970 to 1972 before it 
was ousted in a military coup. The NPP claims a center right liberal democratic / 
liberal conservative ideology (New Patriotic Party, 2016). In practice the NDC and 
NPP have tended to support social policies for universal health and education access 
such as national health insurance, family planning, female education and free 
universal and compulsory education etc. Responding to the social and economic 
challenges of Ghana is perhaps more important than strict ideology in Ghana’s 
multiparty democratic politics. 
Economic Context 
Ghana is a lower middle income country with $1590 gross national income per capita 
and a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth of 1.6 percent in 2014 (World 
Bank). The GDP value of Ghana represents 0.06 percent of the world economy. 
Ghana's has one of the highest GDP per capita in West Africa. The country has a 
diverse and rich resource base with gold, timber, cocoa, diamond, bauxite, and 
manganese being the most important source of foreign trade. In 2007, an oil field 
which may contain up to 3 billion barrels of light oil was discovered. Yet, in spite of 
abundance of natural resources, a quarter of the population lives below the poverty 
line (Trading Economics). The health expenditure was 5.4 percent of GDP in 2013 the 
highest value over the past 18 years while its lowest value was 3.0 percent in 1997 
(World Bank). Due to government health sector budget cut, 3.2 percent of the GDP is 
projected as the total health expenditure for 2016 (GhanaMyjoyonline, 2016). 
Maternal and child health context 
Antenatal care (ANC) from a skilled provider is important to monitor pregnancy and 
reduce morbidity and mortality risks for the mother and child during pregnancy, at 
delivery, and during the postnatal period (within 42 days after delivery). The 2014 
Ghana Demographic Health Survey (GDHS) results show that 97 percent of women 
who gave birth in the five years preceding the survey received ANC from a skilled 
provider at least once for their last birth. Almost nine in ten women (87 percent) had 
four or more ANC visits. Urban women are slightly more likely than rural women to 
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have received ANC from a skilled provider (99 percent and 96 percent, respectively) 
and notably more likely to have had four or more ANC visits (93 percent and 82 
percent, respectively). The percentage of women receiving ANC from a skilled 
provider has increased steadily over the past two and a half decades, from 82 percent 
in 1988 to 97 percent in 2014. 
Under-five mortality indicators have also improved over the years. The 2014 
GDHS documents a pattern of decreasing under-five mortality during the 15 years 
prior to the survey. Under-five mortality rate decreased from 111 per 1,000 for the 
five-year period preceding the 2003 GDHS to 60 per 1,000 during the same period 
prior to the 2014 GDHS (Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) et al., 2015). 
Between the mid-1980s and the 1990s total fertility rate (TFR) declined from 
6.4 births per woman in 1988 to 4.4 births by 1993. TFR over the past six years 
increased slightly from 4.0 births per woman in 2008 to 4.2 births in 2014. Over the 
period the net direction of TFR is downwards from 6.4 to 4.2 (Ghana Statistical 
Service (GSS) et al., 2015). 
National policy making context 
In Ghana, the 1992 Constitution Directive Principle of State Policy guides health 
policy decision making at national level. The Directive Principle of State binds the 
government to take public policy decisions that promote just and reasonable access 
by all citizens to public facilities and services for the realization of the right to good 
health care (Government of Ghana, 1992). Ministry of Health (MOH) a public 
institution coordinates national level policy decisions and provides overall policy 
direction for all actors within the health sector (Ministry of Health, 2007, Ministry of 
Health, 2014). According to the MOH, the health sector is more than health services, 
and includes all activities, institutions and resources whose primary purpose is to 
promote, protect, maintain and restore health (Ministry of Health, 2007). 
The Ghanaian health sector has had a hierarchical, predominantly publically 
financed, publically administered and delivered services model since independence 
in 1957. However, a strong private sector participation in service delivery has always 
accompanied it. Out-of-pocket payments at point of service have also ensured 
continuing ‘private’ financing for the sector. The sector underwent two major 
reforms in the 1990s. These were the creation of the Ghana Health Service (GHS) 
under the Ghana Health Service and Teaching Hospitals Act, and the adoption of a 
sector wide approach in 1997. Prior to passage of the Ghana Health Service and 
Teaching Hospitals Act in 1996, the MOH was the regulator of public and private 
sector, the body responsible for health policy direction, coordination, monitoring and 
evaluation, and the provider of public sector services. The Ghana Health Service and 
Teaching Hospitals Act 525 created an agency model in the health sector. The MOH 
became a civil service ministry responsible for overall sector policy making, 
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coordination, monitoring, and evaluation, with the GHS providing public health and 
clinical services (Agyepong et al., 2012, Mayhew, 2003). 
Under the sector-wide approach, dialogue between government and 
international donors shifted from the planning and management of projects, to the 
overall policy, institutional, and financial framework within which health care is 
provided at national level (Cassels and Janovsky, 1998). As part of the sector wide 
approach, a series of health sector policies dialogues were institutionalised. This 
includes the biannual review and planning health summits where the MOH and 
donors jointly agree on national priorities expressed in the programme of work 
(POW). The POW states the policies, strategies, targets, and resource envelope and 
allocation for the sector. 
The MOH with the authority to coordinate activities within the health sector 
wields power over the public policy decision process in pursuit of its vested interest 
and that of others. Policy usually emerges as the result of continuous decision 
negotiation and compromise through horizontal and vertical coordination between 
policy actors involved in the policy decision making process (Bevir, 2009, Hill and 
Hupe, 2002, Buse et al., 2005). For instance, the MOH engages in horizontal 
discussions and planning with its - service delivery, financing, research and training 
and regulatory agencies, and vertical discussions and negotiations with non-
government actors such as donors (bilateral and multilateral) and the private health 
providers. The MOH is therefore involved in multilevel discussions and negotiations 
with government and non-government actors in the development and 
implementation of maternal health policies. 
Ministry of Health  
The MOH administratively has eight directorates: Policy Planning Monitoring and 
Evaluation (PPME), Human Resource for Health (HRH), Research Statistics and 
Information Management (RSIM), Procurement and Supply (P&S), Traditional and 
Alternative Medicine (TAM), Finance, Administration and Internal Audit, and four 
main implementing agencies: regulatory, financing, service delivery, and training. 
The regulatory agencies are the Food and Drugs Authority (FDA), the Medical and 
Dental Council (MDC), Pharmacy Council (PC), Nurses and Midwives Council 
(NMC), Traditional Medicine Practice Council (TMPC) and the Health Facilities 
Regulatory Agency (HEFRA). The research and training agencies are the Ghana 
College of Physicians and Surgeons (GCPS), the Ghana College of Pharmacist (GCP) 
and the Ghana College of Nurses and Midwives (GCNM). There is a single financing 
agency - the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) - which oversees the 
implementation of the financing aspects of the national health insurance scheme. The 
service delivery agencies are the Ghana Health Service (GHS), Teaching hospitals 
(TH) and National Ambulance Service (NAS). 
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 Service delivery is offered through a hierarchy of hospitals, clinics, health 
centres and community based health planning service compounds (CHPS) and run 
on a three–tier system of care - from primary through secondary to tertiary services. 
The three-tier system of care is organized at five levels: community, sub district, 
district, regional and national. Community and sub-district levels provide primary 
care, with district and regional hospitals providing secondary healthcare. The 
teaching hospitals are at the apex providing tertiary services and responsible for the 
most specialised clinical and maternity care and also provide the highest level of 
academic and practical training and research in medicine and related health fields 
(Ministry of Health, 2001, Ministry of Health, 2007). 
Service delivery is complemented by mission or faith-based (private not-for-
profit (PNP)) and the private self-financing (PSF) providers. The Christian Health 
Association of Ghana (CHAG) represents nearly all private not-for-profit health care 
service providers in the country. The private not-for-profit facilities target hard-to-
reach rural communities and as a result receive financial support from government 
in the form of some payment of personnel cost, training and supply of equipment. 
On the other hand, the private self - financing health providers are concentrated in 
the urban and peri-urban areas, with low rural penetration and do not receive any 
financial support from government (Ministry of Health, 2013b). Ghana Living 
Standards Survey (GLSS 6) 2014 data shows that private health providers nationally 
produce nearly half (47 percent) of all services used by consumers and this makes 
them key players in the health sector (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). Figure 2.1 
shows the relationship between the MOH, its agencies and the private service 
providers. 
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Figure 2.1: Ministry of Health directorates, agencies and private service providers 
2.2 Study design 
To investigate context specific maternal policy agenda setting and formulation 
decisions in-depth, a multiple case study design with qualitative methods of data 
collection was used. Case studies were considered ideal because of its relevance in 
investigating a phenomenon in-depth especially when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, where ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions 
are being asked about a set of events over which the researcher has little or no control 
over in a social and physical setting (Yin, 2009, Robson, 2011). A case study approach 
allows the use of multiple research methods including flexible and open-ended 
methods of data collection, interpretation and analysis. The case study approach 
therefore allowed me to look at maternal health policy decisions not merely as inputs 
and outputs but as a process to better understand within context the interactions 
between the policy actors involved and decisions. 
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Case selection consideration 
In this thesis a case is defined as a maternal health policy decision(s) taken at the 
national level. The four cases are: (1) policy decisions in relation to fee exemption for 
maternal health care (antenatal, delivery, and postnatal), (2) the health sector 
programme of work in relation to maternal health policy decisions, (3) free family 
planning as part of NHIS policy decisions, and (4) policy decisions in relation to the 
inclusion and subsequent exclusion of primary care maternal health care (antenatal, 
normal delivery, postnatal) from the per capita provider payment system. These 
cases were purposively selected during my interactions with several policy actors at 
the Policy, Planning Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate (PPMED) of the MOH 
and active participation in health sector meetings and constantly asking ‘but why’ 
questions leading me sometimes to the beginning of the policy decisions. The ability 
to go back to the initial policy decisions or publically made statements was the core 
guide to the case selection – to be able to study the evolution of policy decisions 
within different timeframes, actors involved and their problem definitions, and the 
influence of a fast changing economic, political and international context on the 
policy decisions. 
A number of additional considerations informed the choice of case studies. 
One consideration was to be able to investigate a maternal health policy that had 
historical and recent decisions taken in relation to setting the agenda, formulation 
and implementation. Studying fee exemption decisions for maternal health care was 
appropriate because the policy agenda was first set in 1963, and had evolved over 
four and half decades and was never taken off the national health policy agenda. 
This case allowed investigations into the evolution of decision making processes and 
policy actors’ role over different historical periods and in different political contexts. 
The second case study was selected to investigate how maternal health policies 
appeared and evolved on the health sector programme of work between 2002 and 
2012. Studying how policy decisions evolved from 2002 to 2012 was appropriate for 
the research because as argued by Sabatier (2007, p4) a decade is a long enough 
period to observe policy change. This case allowed investigations into how policy 
actors used their sources of power to define maternal health problems and influence 
a policy’s fate within the programme of work framework. 
Yet another consideration was to be able to study ongoing maternal health 
policy decisions and draw inferences from my observations of policy actors 
interactions during these policy discussions to better understand how and why the 
policy decisions had evolved over time. Studying discussions related to the 2012 ‘free 
family planning as part of NHIS’ policy agenda and how it was to be implemented 
allowed investigations into how policy actors since 1970 when the family planning 
programme was established had framed family planning issues. And how the next 
focus of free family planning slowly evolved into ‘free family planning as part of 
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NHIS’ public policy agenda but failed to subsequently move into implementation. 
Finally, studying discussions related to the per capita provider payment policy 
agenda which was first stated in the NHIS regulations (2004) but not implemented 
until 2012 on a pilot basis allowed a better understanding of how primary care 
maternal health services were initial included and later dropped from the per capita 
provider payment system. 
2.2.1 Field work process, data collection methods and analysis 
Field work for this study was conducted between May 2012 and August 2014. The 
initial phase involved requesting permission in May 2012, to use the PPMED of the 
MOH as an entry point for the research. The PPMED director granted the permission 
and I was assigned to the Policy Analysis Unit to permit official participations in the 
health sector dialogues as a PhD researcher. The rest of the field work included data 
collection, analysis and interpretation. 
Data collection methods 
Multiple data collection methods including document review, interviews and 
observations were used to collect historical and current information and contribute to 
the validity and reliability of the research findings. 
Documents review 
Document review was the initial strategy for data collection to map policy decisions, 
actors’ role, actions and interactions. Document review was also used to corroborate 
and augment evidence from other data sources. Archival and current documents 
related to the maternal health both published and grey literatures were thoroughly 
assessed based on Scott (1990) four criteria on the use of documentary sources in 
social research. First, authenticity, and this assesses that the evidence is genuine and 
of unquestionable origin. Second, credibility, and this assesses whether the evidence 
is free from error and distortion. Third, representativeness, and this assesses whether 
the evidence is typical of its kind, and, if not, whether the extent of its untypicality is 
known. Finally, meaning, and this assesses whether the evidence is clear and 
comprehensible. Documents reviewed (see appendix 1) included government 
legislatives - Laws and Acts of Parliament, health sector reports, meeting records, 
letters and memos and media reports. The contents extracted from the reviewed 
documents were grouped and cross analysed based on the research questions, and as 
suggested by Robson (2011) to obtain rigorous and valid inferences  
Participant and non-participant observations 
Observations of ongoing health sector policy discussions including those related to 
the institutionalised policy dialogue processes, maternal health, family planning and 
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per capita provider payment system – were used to understand and draw inferences 
from ongoing decisions making discussions to interpret retrospective data from 
documents and interviews. During field work, I observed and took notes of policy 
actors’ interactions and discussions as noted by Patton (2002) to better understand 
and capture the context in which people interact. I also actively participated by 
summarizing meeting deliberations and joining the MOH and stakeholders on 
monitoring visits to the Ashanti region. I was asked by the PPMED to join the MOH 
monitoring team to the Ashanti region (6th-9th November 2012) to assess CHPS 
performance and supply and availability of Artemisinin-based combination therapy. 
As a result, I participated in a series of meetings. These included separate meetings 
with: (1) the regional health directorate team made up of the regional director, 
deputy directors of pharmaceutical services, public health and institutional care and 
acting coordinator for community based health planning service compounds (CHPS); 
(2) the Amansie west district health management team made up of the district health 
director, health information officer and the public health nurse; (3) service providers 
of private self-financing health facilities (Kama clinic, Kufuor clinic, County hospital); 
(4) service providers of public health facilities (Manhyia hospital, Ankam CHPS, 
Mampong government hospital, Yonso CHPS); (5) service providers of St Martins 
catholic hospital - a mission based health facility. I used the opportunity to interview 
them. Again I was asked by the PPMED to take notes and summarise the first two 
days of the April 29th – 6th May 2013 health summit. This presented the opportunity 
to observe at first hand direct policy actors discussions and interactions. 
During field work, initial findings were presented to policy actors at health 
sector meetings for discussions, comments and critique. The discussions of findings 
with policy actors allowed for further clarifications of issues less understood by me 
and the policy actors and further validation of issues with conflicting findings such 
specific decisions timelines. Appendix 2 summarizes health sector meetings attended 
during field work. 
Interviews 
Respondents were interviewed to obtain varied perspectives and better understand 
maternal health issues. A flexible questioning format rather than structured queries 
was used for each case study. Interviews as suggested by Yin (2009) and Kumar 
(2010) are important source of case study information because it allows a fluid stream 
of questions and interactions between researcher and respondent. The interviews 
were conducted with thirty-one government and twenty-one non-government 
respondents in total (see appendix 3). Detail of specific respondents interviewed per 
case is presented in the chapters 3 to 6. 
The interviews lasting on average 1 hour were conducted face to face, over 
telephone, by emails and on Skype. Depending on the type of respondents and 
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context I requested to tape record the interview, where permission was not granted I 
took notes maintaining as far as possible the respondent’s precise words and 
verifying later with them. 
Data analysis 
Data from the interviews, observations and document reviews were cleaned up, 
tabulated and systematically grouped based on individual cases. Through content 
analysis, patterns of decision making processes, policy actors’ role and power 
sources, problem definition and the effect of context on decisions were identified and 
mapped. Detailed accounts of conceptual analysis for each case are presented in the 
chapters 3 to 6. The individual cases were further cross analysed as suggested by Yin 
(2009) to identify core consistencies, contrasts and meaning. The cross–case analysis 
not only considered the initial analytic concepts but also identified new patterns of 
decision making processes domains and core characteristics of policy actors across 
the four cases. 
2.3 Insider and outsider dilemma 
During fieldwork I was confronted with the researcher’s tag of being an insider and 
an outsider at the same time. I was considered insider, because I relied on my 
existing social and professional network for details of potential interviewees and to 
get access to all kind of information. My affiliation with the MOH as a staff of the 
drug policy unit (on leave) helped me to quickly blend in when assigned to the 
PPMED policy analysis unit. I was able to collect and compile an enormous amount 
of data so much that people came to me for current and past copies of health sector 
documents. The challenges for me as an insider were: data overload and the 
perception that I should already have answers to some of the questions I asked of my 
interviewees. However, since I worked in a different directorate -pharmacy-, I was 
not previewed to national level maternal health policy discussions and interactions. 
Using the PPMED as an entry point for my field work and wearing a 
‘researcher’ cap earned me the outsider label. Sometimes during policy dialogue 
discussions I was referred to as a spy. During health sector meetings some policy 
actors were uncomfortable having a researcher sitting and constantly taking notes, 
there was some level of mistrust and a perception that I was there to judge and 
critique their work. On the contrary, some policy actors saw my participations as an 
opportunity to obtain detailed meetings records. In the end, being an 
insider/outsider was an incredible place to be because I was able to benefit from the 
opportunities and disadvantages of being an insider/outsider presented. As an 
outsider I moved from self (as a MOH staff) to objectively reflect on my findings and 
the health sector as a whole. As a result I was able to analytically observe discussions 
and interactions relevant to my research topic. As an insider I had the opportunities 
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to partake in high level meetings and access to some unpublished non-confidential 
policy decisions documents, allowing for gathering of some evidence that only 
document review of publically available documents will not give. 
2.4 Ethical consideration 
This study forms part of a larger study – ‘Accelerating progress towards attainment 
of Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5 in Ghana through basic health systems 
function strengthening’ – for which ethical approval was granted by the Ghana 
Health Service Ethical Review Committee and the Wageningen School of Social 
Science Research Assessment Committee of Wageningen University and Research 
Centre. Informed consent was obtained from all respondents, and respondent’s 
anonymity was maintained and protected using codes as labels during the study. 
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3 National level maternal health agenda setting and formulation: the 
pivotal role of policy actors and context  
3.1 Abstract 
Background 
Development of health policy is a complex process that does not necessarily follow a 
particular format and a predictable trajectory. Therefore, agenda setting and selecting 
of alternatives are critical processes of policy development and can give insights into 
how and why policies are made. Understanding why some policy issues remain and 
are maintained whiles others drop off the agenda is an important enquiry. This paper 
aims to advance understanding of health policy agenda setting and formulation in 
Ghana, a lower middle-income country, by exploring how and why the maternal 
(antenatal, delivery and postnatal) fee exemption policy agenda in the health sector 
has been maintained over the four and half decades since a ‘free antenatal care in 
government facilities’ policy was first introduced in October 1963. 
Methods 
A mix of historical and contemporary qualitative case studies of nine policy agenda 
setting and formulation processes was used. Data collection methods involved 
reviews of archival materials, contemporary records, media content, in-depth 
interviews, and participant observation. Data was analysed drawing on a 
combination of policy analysis theories and frameworks. 
Results 
Contextual factors, acting in an interrelating manner, shaped how policy actors acted 
in a timely manner and closely linked policy content to the intended agenda. 
Contextual factors that served as bases for the policymaking process were: political 
ideology, economic crisis, data about health outcomes, historical events, social 
unrest, change in government, election year, austerity measures, and international 
agendas. Nkrumah’s socialist ideology first set the agenda for free antenatal service 
in 1963. This policy trajectory taken in 1963 was not reversed by subsequent policy 
actors because contextual factors and policy actors created a network of influence to 
maintain this issue on the agenda. Politicians over the years participated in the 
process to direct and approve the agenda. Donors increasingly gained agenda access 
within the Ghanaian health sector as they used financial support as leverage. 
Conclusion 
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Influencers of policy agenda setting must recognise that the process is complex and 
intertwined with a mix of political, evidence-based, finance-based, path-dependent, 
and donor-driven processes. Therefore, influencers need to pay attention to context 
and policy actors in any strategy. 
Keywords 
Context, Fee exemption, Maternal health services, Policy actors, Policy agenda 
setting, Policy formulation. 
3.2 Introduction 
The development path of health policy whether as intent or practice can be difficult 
to predict because it is a complex and intertwined process and does not necessarily 
follow a particular format. Understanding why some policy issues remain and are 
maintained while others drop off the agenda (agenda setting and selection of 
alternatives) is an important field of enquiry since it can give insights into this 
complex process. This is because getting and maintaining policy issues on the agenda 
is an essential part of decisions made during policy development. 
Green-Pedersen and Wilkerson (2006) argue that the explanations proposed 
for why some issues make it onto the agenda and others fail are wide ranging. Some 
are structural, emphasizing how institutions are organized to advantage some 
alternatives or issues over others. Some are cognitive, emphasizing how individuals 
or even institutions process information in ways that limit what will be addressed at 
any given time. Others emphasize the role of external events or public opinions, and 
how they can combine with political incentives to quickly shift attention to a new 
direction (Green-Pedersen and Wilkerson, 2006). 
Some issues once on the agenda are maintained over time and periodically re-
examined to maintain their recurrence (Nelson, 1986). Political attention of vote-
seeking politicians for example maintained health policy issues on the national 
agenda over time in Denmark and the United States (Green-Pedersen and Wilkerson, 
2006). There is however very little research related to how and why some policies 
have a long life and are maintained over time despite periodic threats to their 
existence, while others cease to exist. 
The aim of this paper is to advance understanding of health policy agenda 
setting and formulation in low- and middle-income country (LMIC) settings by 
exploring how and why maternal (antenatal, delivery and postnatal) fee exemption 
policy agendas in the health sector in Ghana have been maintained over the four and 
half decades since a ‘free antenatal care in government facilities’ policy was first 
introduced in October 1963. Specifically we ask: How have maternal user fee 
exemption policies evolved in Ghana since independence? Which actors have been 
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involved in the policy agenda setting and formulation and why? What contextual 
factors influenced the process over time, how and why? 
Advancing the understanding of policy agenda setting and formulation 
process, especially how and why a policy agenda item is maintained over time, is an 
essential area of analysis to inform public social policy development and 
implementation. Nevertheless, there is limited research and publications on policy 
analysis in LMICs (Gilson and Raphaely, 2008) and in particular on processes of 
agenda setting and formulation (Shiffman and Okonofua, 2007). Our work firstly 
contributes to the general understanding of policy agenda setting and formulation 
processes in a LMIC setting. Secondly, it provides insights on how and why maternal 
fee exemption policies in Ghana were maintained over four and half decades despite 
the existence of at least eight distinct threats or opportunities for major policy 
reforms. 
Ghana Health Sector  
The Ghanaian health sector has had a hierarchical predominantly publically 
financed, publically administered and delivered services model since independence 
in 1957. However, alongside has always also been a strong private sector 
participation in service delivery has always accompanied it. Out of pocket payments 
at point of service have also ensured continuing private financing. The sector 
underwent two major reforms in the 1990s. These were the creation of the Ghana 
Health Service (GHS) under the Ghana Health Service and Teaching Hospitals Act, 
and the adoption of a sector-wide approach in 1997. Prior to passage of the Ghana 
Health Service and Teaching Hospitals Act in 1996, the Ministry of Health (MOH) 
was the regulator of public and private sector, the body responsible for health policy 
direction, coordination, monitoring and evaluation and the provider of public sector 
services. The Ghana Health Service and Teaching Hospitals Act 525 created an 
agency model in the health sector. The MOH became a civil service ministry 
responsible for overall sector policy making, coordination, monitoring, and 
evaluation, with the GHS providing public health and clinical services (Agyepong et 
al., 2012, Mayhew, 2003). Under the sector-wide approach, dialogue between 
government and international donors shifted up a level: from the planning and 
management of projects, to the overall policy, institutional, and financial framework 
within which health care is provided at national level (Cassels and Janovsky, 1998). 
The Government of Ghana represented by the MOH and international donors jointly 
agreed to national priorities expressed in the programme of work which states the 
policies, strategies, targets, and resource envelope and allocation for the sector 
(Birungi et al., 2006, Mayhew and Adjei, 2004). 
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In the immediate post-colonial period (March 1957) and several years 
afterwards, the majority of policy agenda and formulation decisions were 
undertaken mainly by politicians and a small group of bureaucrats (Kpessa, 2011). 
The sector-wide approach created a new avenue for policymaking platforms between 
the MOH, international donors and other actors broadening the scope and range of 
policy actors. As a result, expertise could be drawn from other actors in or outside 
the health sector to form groupings to guide the process. Yet, the ultimate policy 
choice still rested with politicians and a few bureaucrats (Agyepong and Adjei, 2008). 
A handful of policy elites taking the ultimate decision is not peculiar to Ghana. In 
their work on developing countries, Grindle and Thomas (1991) noted that small 
policy elites – government officials and civil servants – strongly influenced the 
agenda and the nature of adopted policies. 
3.3 Methods 
A longitudinal mix of historical and contemporary case studies of policy agenda 
setting and formulation for a specific issue – fee exemptions for maternal health 
services – was conducted for the period 1957 to 2008. The case study approach was 
ideal since it allowed collection and analysis of comprehensive, systematic and in-
depth information within a real life context (Patton, 2002, Yin, 2009). Nine specific fee 
exemption policy agendas for maternal health have been set since independence in 
1957 and each of these was treated as a separate unit of analysis or case. 
To systematically attempt to reconstruct the dynamics surrounding the nine 
historical maternal fee exemption policy agenda setting and formulation events, we 
relied on mixed methods, and analysed data in the light of an appropriate conceptual 
framework. Data was collected between June 2012 and May 2014 using key 
informant in-depth interviews, a desk review of documents and archival materials 
including media content from independence (1957) through to 2008, and participant 
observation during a 20 month period of practical attachment at the Policy Planning 
Monitoring and Evaluation (PPME) directorate of the MOH by one of the authors 
(AK)1. The PPME is responsible for the coordination of policy formulation and 
strategic planning for the health sector. Participant observation there was therefore 
ideal for observing and understanding aspects of the processes involved in 
contemporary policy agenda setting and formulation. 
The focus of the in-depth interviews was to obtain real-life experiences of 
policy agenda setting and formulation processes from respondents. In total, 27 
national level respondents were interviewed based on a semi-structured interview 
guide. Fifteen of these respondents were identified from health sector documents 
reviewed, while the rest (12) were suggested by other respondents. The in-depth 
interviews were conducted via face-to-face meetings, e-mails and phone. 
                                                 
1 PhD candidate 
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Respondents included actors within government settings such as past and current 
officials of the MOH (10), the GHS headquarters (3), the National Health Insurance 
Authority (4) and a former Minister of Health (1). Respondents also included actors 
outside government settings such as officials of the Christian Health Association of 
Ghana (1), the Coalition of Non-Governmental Organizations in Health (1), 
international donors (4) and health professional bodies (3). Interviews were tape-
recorded and later transcribed verbatim by a neutral person to maintain the original 
messages of respondents. Where permission was not granted to tape record an 
interview, notes were taken and verified later with the respondent. All transcriptions 
were read and analysed repeatedly and organized into retrievable sections based on 
the analytical framework. 
Document and archival review and analysis were used to map the historical 
sequence of events, identify policy actors, and further triangulate findings with 
respondent’s information. The study greatly relied on varied documents to trace 
historical happenings. Documents were assessed based on four criteria developed by 
Scott (1990). Firstly, authenticity which assesses that the evidence is genuine and of 
unquestionable origin. Secondly, credibility which assesses whether the evidence is 
free from error and distortion. Thirdly, representativeness which assesses whether 
the evidence is typical of its kind, and, if not, whether the extent of its untypicality is 
known. Finally, meaning which assesses whether the evidence is clear and 
comprehensible (Scott, 1990). National archives, the National Parliament Library, the 
George Padmore Research Library, and the Ghana Publishing Corporation were the 
sources of data for health legislative documents such as National Decrees, Acts of 
Parliaments and National Regulations, old health related reports and, records of one 
national newspaper - the Daily Graphic were also used. We obtained access through 
the policy analysis unit of the MOH to archives of non-confidential official 
documents including letters, meeting minutes, memoranda, health review reports, 
health sector programme of work, national strategic plans and agreements related to 
decisions to provide maternal user fee exemptions. Additionally, the web-based 
search engine Google Scholar was used to obtain published literature related to 
maternal fee exemptions. Relevant sections of all reviewed documents were 
highlighted and coded based on the categories identified in the analytical 
framework. 
Analytical concepts 
To guide the analysis of the data we drew on several policy analysis theories, 
frameworks and concepts in the literature. Grindle and Thomas (1991) conceptualize 
context as including the structure of class and interest group mobilization in the 
society, historical experiences and conditions, international economic and political 
relationships, domestic economic conditions, the administrative capacity of the state, 
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and the impact of prior or conterminously pursued policies. They also include in 
context, the individual characteristics of policy actors such as their ideological 
predispositions, professional expertise and training, memories of similar policy 
situations, position and power resources, political and institutional commitments, 
loyalties and personal attributes and goals. They observe that policy actors are never 
fully autonomous. Instead, they work within several interlocking contexts that 
confront them with issues and problems they need to address, set limits on what 
solutions are considered, determine what options are feasible politically, 
economically and administratively, and respond to efforts to alter existing policies 
and institutional practices. 
Kingdon’s framework of agenda setting argues that active participants (policy 
actors) and the processes by which agenda items and alternatives come into 
prominence are key factors that affect policy agenda setting and choice. Policy actors 
in his USA study included the President, the Congress, bureaucrats in the executive 
branch, and various forces outside of government including the media, interest 
groups, political parties and the general public. Policy agenda setting and choice 
processes are embedded within their context and as such influence how policy actors 
operate within these processes (Kingdon, 2003). 
Power is a key factor in health policy processes (Erasmus and Gilson, 2008). 
Contextual factors may serve as a source of power to influence policy actors’ action, 
inaction and choice. Policy actors therefore can become influencers within a specific 
context to affect policy agenda setting and formulation processes. As noted by 
Mintzberg (Mintzberg, 1983), to be an influencer, one requires some source of power 
defined by control of a resource, a technical skill and body of knowledge or 
stemming from a legal prerogatives or authority coupled with active involvement in 
ongoing processes in a politically skilful way. 
Drawing on these concepts of context, policy actors and power, we attempted 
to systematically reconstruct nine historical agenda setting and policy formulation 
events. Working iteratively on data gathered patterns, themes and categories that 
emerged were tabulated and further analysed. The analysis process involved 
mapping to our analytical framework contextual situations, policy actors and their 
role, linkage among policies, specific policy content, power sources and how these 
influenced the agenda setting processes and why. We acknowledge the problems 
involved in mapping the exact sequence of events. To minimise this, varied sources 
of data were used to reconstruct insofar as possible, the chronology and dynamics of 
maternal fee exemption policies agenda setting and formulation processes. 
3.4 Results 
This section contains a historical reconstruction of the dynamics related to the nine 
maternal fee exemption policy agenda setting and formulation events insofar as 
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possible. We acknowledge the difficulty in providing a full explanation of events as 
they unfolded - reconstructing who said what, when, to whom and how it was 
received. Where such data is available it is duly noted, otherwise the gap is noted, 
and possible inferences are made from interpretation of data. 
3.4.1 Policy actors and agenda setting 
Maternal fee exemption policies studied included free healthcare services related to 
one or more of antenatal, delivery and postnatal services starting from the initial 
introduction of free antenatal service in 1963. Policies related to maternal fee 
exemption were maintained and modified – including expansions and contractions, 
but were never completely dropped over the period studied. Nine specific maternal 
fee exemption policies were identified along the pathway, as the policies evolved 
from user fee exemption to national health insurance premium exemption. Table 3.1 
summarises the maternal fee exemption policies historical timelines, policy 
instruments and policy contents between 1963 and 2008.  
Over the period studied, we classified policy actors involved in maternal fee 
exemption policies based on their primary role into four groups. The first group, 
‘policy agenda directors’, includes high level politicians such as heads of state who 
gave directives to either set the maternal fee exemption agenda or modify a 
previously existing policy. The second group ‘policy agenda approvers’ includes 
high and middle level politicians such as heads of state and ministers of health who 
gave approval for existing maternal fee exemption policies to be maintained and/or 
modified. The third group, ‘policy agenda advisers’, includes government and non-
government individuals and organizations who advised agenda directors and 
approvers. Policy agenda advisers includes the Ministry of Health and its agencies 
such as the GHS and National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA), as well as those 
outside the health sector such as the Attorney General Office and National 
Development Planning Commission. Non-government policy agenda advisers 
include international bilateral and multilateral donors. Policy agenda advisers 
provided technical expertise in varying capacities to push/keep particular ideas on 
or off the agenda. Some have, over the period studied, provided financial resources 
to support their ideas and in some cases, set the agenda. The fourth group, ‘policy 
agenda advocates’, includes those who have supported and campaigned directly or 
indirectly to maintain maternal fee exemption policies. Examples include the general 
public, the Ghana Medical Association and the Pharmaceutical Society of Ghana. 
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3.4.2 Contextual factors and agenda setting 
Context and policy actors consistently influenced the manner in which policy agenda 
setting and formulation related to maternal fee exemptions occurred over the period 
of study (see Table 3.2). Contextual factors that shaped maternal fee exemption 
polices from 1963 to 2008 included political ideology, economic crises, historical 
events, change in government, election years, austerity measures, international 
agendas and country-based health outcomes in the form of health demographic 
indicators. These contextual factors also served as sources of power that policy actors 
used to influence the agenda setting and formulation processes, and justify their 
actions and inactions. They are described below for each of the nine discrete policy 
change periods we identified. 
1963 Free antenatal care in the public sector directive 
Prior to independence in March 1957, patients paid charges for hospital services. The 
existing health law Hospital Fees Ordinance, Regulation Number 56 of 1942, 
stipulated schedules of fees for hospital services (Konotey-Ahulu et al., 1970). In the 
context of political emancipation and the euphoria that marked independence, it was 
evident that charging of fees for services was at odds with the political ideology of 
free health and education – the Nkrumahism social philosophy – (Rimmer, 1992) 
promoted by the first head of state, Dr Kwame Nkrumah (Graphic Reporter, 1957). 
Thus the first financing policy related to maternal health services, the 21st October 
1963 directive by the Minister of Health that with immediate effect, all antenatal 
services should be provided at government hospitals free of charge (Konotey-Ahulu 
et al., 1970) had as its main contextual agenda driver, ideology. 
 
‘From independence, it was the socialist leaning of the Convention People’s Party that 
set the agenda’ [Former MOH staff, 22/8/2012]. 
 
Public reminders of this popular directive to provide free health services for 
all were carried in national newspaper with headlines such as; ‘hospital fees, no 
charge’; ‘free health service’ and ‘free medical service soon’ (Graphic Reporter, 1957, 
Graphic Reporter, 1958, Graphic Reporter, 1962). However, the MOH used a 
piecemeal approach in making free health for all a reality, although it was a political 
directive. In addition to the free antenatal service, the MOH also made adjustments 
to reduce existing hospital fees and provided free care for other services. For 
example, by 9th October 1961, private (professional) fees previously borne by 
patients were abolished and doctors, dentists and specialists were paid an annual 
allowance in lieu by government. By November 1961, confinement fees for 
midwifery services was reduced to about half of the charge stated in the General 
Orders of 1942. Further adjustments were made at a principal medical officers’  
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conference in May 1962, to treat children of 16 years and under free of charge in 
government clinics and health centres. In the post-independence context, the MOH 
may have used this piecemeal approach as it adjusted to the ‘new' post-
independence administrative procedures. 
1969 Hospital Fees Decree 360 
Full free health care as envisioned by Kwame Nkrumah’s ideology was not realised 
because he was ousted in 1966 by a military coup. After the coup and during the 
1967/1968 budget hearing, the military Head of State decided to reintroduce full 
hospital fees (Konotey-Ahulu et al., 1970). This decision was partly because the 
military leaders of the National Liberation Council (NLC) blacklisted anything 
associated with Kwame Nkrumah and his socialist ideology: 
 
 ‘In order to justify the change, they [NLC government] had to discard all that the 
previous government did; so many programs were neglected’ [Former MOH staff, 
15/7/2013] 
 
In addition to blacklisting all existing policies for political reasons, an 
important contextual factor motivating removal of fee exemptions was the worsening 
economic situation. The government of Ghana was faced with declining economic 
indicators and increasing health expenditure. By the mid-1960s, the economy was 
stagnant. Gross national income per capita was US$ 200 in 1963 and only slightly 
increased to US$ 220 in 1969 (Sowa, 1996, Index Mundi), resulting in a health sector 
budget deficit in the face of increasing expenditure due to hospital fee exemptions, 
minimal fees for other health services and an increasing population. Despite these 
motivations to reintroduce hospital fees, free antenatal service was captured as a user 
fee exemption policy within the Hospital Fees Decree. Additionally, delivery service 
for multiparous patients and patients referred to a hospital or clinic by a registered 
midwife or medical practitioner was made free. How and why did maternal fee 
exemptions remain on the agenda? 
In designing the hospital fees policy content, the MOH bureaucrats collated 
proposed reasonable fees from all government hospitals. These proposed fees were 
agreed on in a consultative meeting with regional heads of government health 
services and submitted to the NLC military government for approval (Graphic 
Reporter, 1967). Pending approval by the NLC, the MOH sent a circular dated 6th 
February 1968 to all government health facilities in an attempt to regularise the 
varying charges that the government’s decision to reintroduce hospital fees had 
caused. The implementation of these new charges brought an uproar from the 
general public (Konotey-Ahulu et al., 1970). Patients had to pay both dispensary fees 
and the cost of medicines and some facilities were charging more than stipulated 
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(Therson-Cofie, 1969, Konotey-Ahulu et al., 1970). The social uproar caused the MOH 
to issue a press release on 6th July 1968 to suspend the operation of the proposed 
charges (Konotey-Ahulu et al., 1970). The suspension only delayed rather than 
altered the government’s intention to reintroduce hospital fees. Subsequently, the 
approved fees were introduced with the Hospital Fees Decree of 18th June 1969, to be 
implemented from the 1st October 1969 (Government of Ghana, 1969, Konotey-
Ahulu et al., 1970, Therson-Cofie, 1969). 
During this period however, MOH bureaucrats as policy agenda advisers, 
advocated for maternal fee exemption in the Hospital Fees Decree, and this was 
approved by the NLC government. According to the MOH, this was done to pacify 
the general public and minimise the financial burden of care. Another critical 
contextual factor that influenced the MOH decision was evidence from the health 
management information system about the high number of maternal deaths. A 
former MOH staff stated: ‘In 1969, we [MOH] realised that maternal mortality was high 
and that we had to do something about it...’ [Interview, 15/7/2013]. Furthermore, the 
NLC military government policy agenda approver did not fully ignore the social 
unrest against the reintroduction of government hospital fees; and the need to 
consolidate political power and gain acceptance among the general public in 
approving the maternal fee exemptions. 
The NLC military government handed over to a democratically elected 
government led by Prime Minister Dr KA Busia on 1st October 1969, the same day 
the implementation of the Hospital Fees Decree was to start. Although, the Decree 
was softened to pacify the agitated public, its implementation was still vehemently 
opposed causing another social unrest. As a result, the Busia led administration 
suspended implementation of the Decree and set up a five-member committee 
known as the Konotey-Ahulu committee comprising a medicine and therapeutics 
lecturer, an industrialist, a health worker unionist, an Arts Council national organiser 
and a general medical practitioner. The committee was tasked to investigate hospital 
fees and recommend appropriate charges for health care services in government 
facilities (Konotey-Ahulu et al., 1970). 
1971 Hospital Fees Act 387 
With the suspended Hospital Fees Decree, Ghana was back to charging minimal 
hospital fees much lower than the actual cost of service delivery; although, it was 
experiencing increasing health care expenditure and a declining economy (Fosu, 
2001). Thus, in 1970 the MOH advised Busia’s government: ‘free health service is not the 
way to go, with increasing health bill and reduced revenue’ [Former MOH staff, 
15/7/2013]. 
As in the previous reform an important contextual driver was empirical 
evidence on the performance of the economy. Following the MOH’s advice, Busia’s 
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government decided to reintroduce hospital fees (Graphic Reporter, 1970). The new 
Hospital Fees Act 387 was passed into law by the National Assembly. The Act 387 
reflected the repealed Hospital Fees Decree. Existing fee exemptions for maternal 
health care under the Hospital Fees Decree were maintained by the national 
assembly and government (Government of Ghana, 1971). However, before the Busia 
government could develop a Legislative Instrument (LI) to interpret the Act 387 with 
specific fees, it was ousted on 13th January 1972 in a military coup. 
 
‘The LI was to be based on the committee’s report; however, Busia was overthrown 
before his government could implement any of the 65 recommendations of the Konotey 
Ahulu committee report’ [Former MOH staff, 15/07/2013]. 
 
The Military Government that replaced the Busia government was known as 
the National Redemption Council (NRC). The NRC was in a dilemma as to whether 
to charge hospital fees or abolish them. As a result the NRC commissioner for health 
invited views from the public on the recommendations of the Konotey-Ahulu 
Committee (Graphic Reporter, 1973a). The Konotey-Ahulu Committee in 1970 had 
recommended that there could be no health service without fees. For maternal 
services, it recommended that antenatal care should no longer be free, and that fees 
be paid towards the cost of medicines dispensed in government health facilities for 
maternal services. Also, multiparous patients with a history of five or more 
pregnancies should bear some cost for their health care services; not everybody 
agreed with this view. For example, a Daily Graphic newspaper correspondent was 
of the opinion that charging fees would scare away people and an ignorant expectant 
mother would totally refuse to attend hospital knowing that she would be charged 
(A Correspondent, 1974). 
There were over 4 months of public debate on whether to charge hospital fees 
or not (Owusu-Ansah, 1973, Graphic Reporter, 1973b, Nyakey, 1974, A 
Correspondent, 1974). A review of Daily Graphic newspapers from 1973 to 1974 
revealed that the majority of correspondents recommended the government to 
charge hospital fees and exempt the poor and unemployed. Despite these 
recommendations, the NRC government did not implement the Hospital Fees Act 
387 and the Konotey-Ahulu Committee’s recommendations. Charging hospital user 
fee was still unpopular with the general public, although their disapproving voices 
were not expressed greatly by the Daily Graphic correspondents. The NRC military 
government in order to consolidate political power and gain acceptance did not 
implement the Hospital Fees Act 387 and the Konotey-Ahulu Committee 
recommendations. 
1983 Hospital Fees Regulation (LI 1277) 
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Between 1975 and 1981, Ghana experienced a turbulent series of political changes in 
government structure. The NRC regime changed its name to the Supreme Military 
Council (SMC) and General Acheampong who was the head of the SMC was 
replaced by General Fred Akuffo in a palace coup in July 1978. On 4th June 1979, 
Flight Lieutenant Rawlings led the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council to 
overthrow the SMC. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council allowed planned 
multiparty democratic election to proceed and Dr Hilla Limann’s People’s National 
Party came to power on the 24th September 1979. Democratic rule was short lived 
when Limann was overthrown by Rawlings’s second coup on 31st December 1981, 
and the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) was established. 
The frequent change in government during this turbulent period was 
accompanied by the country moving from economic decline to disaster as gross 
domestic product per capita fell from US$ 281 in 1970 to US$ 180 in 1983. State 
institutions and public services were gravely damaged and under-resourced 
(Carbone, 2011). The decline in the health budget led to a reduced capacity to 
procure medicines and consumables. By the early 1980s, deteriorating health care 
services deterred the general public from using government facilities and some 
patients only used these facilities when their health conditions were critical. Medical 
and Pharmaceutical professional bodies advocated for the introduction of hospital 
fees to revive falling standards of health care and threatened to strike (Graphic 
Reporter, 1981, Debrah Fynn, 27th Febuary 1981, Waddington and Enyimayew, 
1990). Health workers unilaterally introduced de facto hospital fees as a result of the 
economic crisis and declining availability of health service inputs (Waddington and 
Enyimayew, 1990). All these contextual factors combined to put hospital fees back on 
the agenda by the early 1980s. However, once again, fee exemption for maternal 
health service was maintained on the agenda. How did maternal user fee exemption 
policy survive the urgent need to reintroduce hospital charges for all services in the 
face of economic crisis? 
To regularise the fees already charged by government health facilities, the 
MOH conducted a study to propose hospital fees to the PNDC military government. 
The PNDC government was initially not fully supportive of hospital fees. They 
reduced the amounts proposed, and later approved them. The reason for the initial 
reduction was political: 
 
‘The PNDC representative for finance said it will be ill politics to introduce user fees 
when the country had the economic crunch at the time. The proposed fees were 
reduced by about 90 percent’ [Former MOH staff, 22/8/2012]. 
 
The reason for the later approval was the further decline in health budget as a result 
of economic crisis. 
52 
 
To legitimise the approved fees, the MOH drafted the Hospital Fees 
Regulation with the assistance of the legal department of the Attorney General’s 
office. The initial draft made no exemption for maternal health service. This was 
contested by the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF): 
 
‘The first time we introduced the regulations, UNICEF was against our fees because 
for them the policy is that maternal care should be free. We argued that free maternal 
services would defeat family planning purposes ‘[Former MOH staff, 22/8/2012]. 
 
The MOH, therefore later incorporated fee exemptions for antenatal care, 
postnatal care and treatment at child health welfare into the new Hospital Fees 
Regulation, in part, because UNICEF advised against maternal hospital fee charges 
and demonstrated further interest in free maternal care by providing financial 
support to procure folic acid for antenatal care. Also, international maternal and 
child health discourse influenced the decision, in the sense that, in the early 1980s, 
maternal and child health attention had shifted with more focus on child health and 
family planning (Rosenfield and Maine, 1985). Some family planning activities were 
incorporated into postnatal care service (Campbell, 2001, Odoi-Agyarko Henrietta, 
2003), making free postnatal care a viable policy. The resulting Hospital Fees 
Regulation (LI 1277), came into force on 21st April 1983 approved by the PNDC 
military government (Government of Ghana, 1983). 
Up until this point development partners (donors) had not played visible and 
significant roles in shaping policy agendas related to user fee exemptions in Ghana. 
The appearance on the scene of UNICEF in a strong role as an agenda influencer was 
a reflection of the increasing amounts of development partner project aid flowing 
into Ghana as into many other LMICs because of the economic crisis and 
international development policies of the seventies and eighties. 
1985 Hospital Fees Regulation (LI 1313) 
Evidence of Ghana’s continuing economic decline drove in part the next agenda. 
Economic decline still posed a major challenge to Ghana and the PNDC government 
turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. By April 1983, 
government had introduced a Structural Adjustment Programme under the auspices 
of the IMF and the World Bank. This economic recovery policy implemented over 3 
years from 1983 to 1986, was intended to halt the downward economic spiral and 
stabilize the economy on a reasonable track (Loxley, 1990, Fosu, 2001). 
Hospital fees were substantially increased in July 1985, partly on the 
recommendation of the IMF and World Bank under the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (Waddington and Enyimayew, 1990) and partly because the existing fees 
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could not recover costs and health facilities had already increased their fees to halt 
further decline of health care services (Graphic Reporter, 1985, Government of 
Ghana, 1985). Although, hospital fees were increased with the aim of full cost 
recovery, antenatal and postnatal user fee exemptions were maintained and 
mentioned in the Hospital Fees Regulation (LI 1313). A key informant explained that 
with time, user fee exemption policies became a safety net for the poor and so the 
MOH maintained these. 
 
‘Based on experiences within the health service, fee exemptions had become a safe net 
for the poor so we (MOH] maintained it’ [MOH staff, 27/9/2012]. 
1997 Presidential directive to expand free antenatal and postnatal care to include 
deliveries 
In 1992, the PNDC allowed multiparty democratic election to be held. The PNDC re-
organized itself into a political party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and 
won the December 1992 election as well as the December 1996 multiparty election 4 
years later with Flight Lieutenant Rawlings as its flag bearer. In January 1997 at the 
beginning of his second term, the President gave a directive to include delivery 
service in the existing maternal (antenatal and postnatal) user fee exemption policy 
(Graphic Reporter, 1997). 
The President acted to mitigate the social consequences of the structural 
adjustment programme as evident by decreasing utilization of maternal health 
services and worsening health outcomes. Ghana Demographic Health Survey 1993 
empirical evidence revealed that national utilisation of free antenatal service was 
high at 86 percent. The picture was however different for supervised delivery, as 
national level supervised delivery in health facilities was only 44 percent. About half 
of the women who received free antenatal care did not return to deliver in those 
health facilities (Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) and Macro International Inc. (MI). 
1994) partly because of their inability to pay at the point of use. Additionally, the 
MOH 5-year programme of work, attributed a high national maternal mortality rate 
estimate of 214 per 100,0005 live births to the harsh economic recovery policy of the 
structural adjustment programme (Ministry of Health, 1996). These were major 
drivers of the agenda to provide free maternal (antenatal, delivery and postnatal) 
services. Nevertheless, the maternal user fee exemption guideline developed by the 
MOH to implement the directive in November of the same year provided fee 
exemption for only four antenatal visits; further visits had to be paid for as well as 
deliveries and postnatal care. Why did decision makers water down the intent and 
                                                 
5 Maternal mortality rate estimated at 214 per 100,000 live births was based on Ghana 
Demographic and Health Survey (1993) data 
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miss this opportunity to more radically reform existing maternal user fee 
exemptions? 
Interviews with a key informant explained that policy agenda advisers and 
formulators in the MOH limited the scope of the policy based on their experience, 
analysis and judgement of what was contextually feasible and practical to implement 
at that time. 
 
‘Based on our [MOH] experience of reimbursing bills for exemptions, the annual 
budget allocated was not sufficient to foot the bill; as such we could not have added 
delivery services’ [MOH staff, 27/9/2012]. 
 
There was insufficient government financial support to fully implement the 
directive (Ministry of Health, 2003a). This is because by the mid to late 1990s, 
Ghana's structural adjustment programme efforts had faded with slowed economic 
growth (Sowa, 1996) contributing to a reduction in the allocation of government 
budget to the health sector and hence the subsequent inability to fully implement the 
directive. 
2003 Maternal delivery exemptions in four selected regions 
The NDC lost the December 2000 election to the New Patriotic Party led by Mr John 
Kufuor, the new face of the Danquah-Busia tradition which was the party in 
opposition at independence in 1957 and had briefly ruled the country from 1970 to 
1972 before it was ousted in a military coup (Agyepong and Adjei, 2008). The Kufuor 
government came to power in a context of stagnant economic and even regressive 
growth (Sowa, 1996, Bank of Ghana, 2005). For example gross national income per 
capita for 2002 was US$ 270; the same as in 1971 (Index Mundi). To address economic 
stagnation, the government in 2001 opted for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative on the advice of the World Bank and IMF. This 
initiative was launched by the World Bank and IMF in 1996 (Bank of Ghana, 2005). 
One of the HIPC austerity measure conditionalities was for Ghana to develop a 
comprehensive poverty reduction strategy directed towards attainment of anti-
poverty objectives consistent with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As a 
result, relatively poorer regions (Northern, Upper West, Upper East and Central) 
were set to benefit most from the initiative (Ghana Statistical Service et al., 1999, 
Ministry of Health, 2001). As per the poverty reduction strategy, health related 
targets to reduce maternal mortality and under-five mortality proposed by the policy 
agenda advisers the National Development and Planning Commission with the 
assistance of the World Bank and IMF favoured these regions. In this regard, the 
existing maternal fee exemption policy was extended to include delivery and 
postnatal services and geographically limited to the four deprived regions (National 
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Development Planning Commission, 2003). In 2004, 27 billion cedis (US$ 3.1 million) 
from the HIPC grant were budgeted for this purpose (Ministry of Health, 2004b). 
2005 Expansion of maternal delivery exemptions to the whole country 
The December 2004 presidential election presented an opportunity for policy actors 
to modify existing policies putting maternal fee exemption back on the agenda. At 
the December 2004 health summit meetings, the MOH and stakeholders argued that 
a national maternal mortality rate of 503 per 100,0006 live births was high and there 
were pockets of extreme poverty across the country and not only in the regions 
labelled as deprived. 
 
‘The exemption policy and additional resources allocation contributed to the 
improvement in coverage of health services in the deprived regions. However, concerns 
emerged about the relatively poor performance of non-deprived regions in 2004 and 
the apparent worsening of health in urban areas’ [MOH staff, 10/7/2012]. 
 
A national user fee exemption for antenatal, delivery and postnatal services 
was therefore proposed by the MOH and stakeholders to help reduce maternal 
mortality (Ministry of Health, 2004a, Ministry of Health et al., 2011). Politically, this 
idea was approved by the government and in 2005, 30 billion cedis (US$ 3.4 million) 
from the HIPC grant was budgeted and allocated to implement the policy 
nationwide (Ministry of Health, 2005a). Empirical evidence of high maternal 
mortality was thus a major agenda driver. 
2008 Integration of maternal fee exemptions into the National Health Insurance 
Scheme 
The New Patriotic Party government won a second term in the December 2004 
election. By this time, implementation of their popular promise to replace the health 
sector ‘cash and carry’ system with a national health insurance scheme and assure 
access to basic clinical service for all Ghanaian regardless of ability to pay had started 
(Agyepong and Adjei, 2008). 
After 2005, maternal fee exemption policy implementation suffered a major 
setback. Empirical evidence from evaluation of the maternal user fee exemption 
policy in 2006 revealed that the policy contributed to a major increase in supervised 
deliveries, but was significantly under-funded (Witter et al., 2007). Issues of 
inadequate funds, sustainability and inability to predict when reimbursement would 
be paid by government were well-known and discussed within the health sector 
(Garshong et al., 2002, Ministry of Health, 2004c, Nyonator and Kutzin, 1999, Witter 
                                                 
6 Maternal mortality rate estimated at 503 per 100,000 live births was based on Ghana 
Demographic and Health Survey (2003) and institutional maternal mortality data 
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and Adjei, 2007). Not only was there a problem of inadequate funds, but also health 
facilities exemptions bills over time exceeded the budget allocated to implement the 
policy. By 2007, health facilities had to stop providing free maternal health services 
as unpaid reimbursement bills piled. As a key informant stated: 
 
’Maternal fee exemption became unsustainable because every month the bill was going 
up and going up, and it got to a point, the facilities were bringing the bill and we 
[MOH] did not have money to pay, so the exemption policy fizzled out’ [MOH staff, 
31/8/2012]. 
 
Empirical evidence presented at the health sector performance review in 2008 
revealed that the suspended maternal user fee exemption policy contributed to 
worsening maternal health indicators. Specifically with a decrease in the proportion 
of supervised deliveries from 44.5 percent in 2006 to 35.1 percent in 2007 and an 
increase in the institutional maternal mortality ratio from 187/100,000 live births in 
2006 to 224/100,000 live births in 2007 (Ministry of Health, 2008c). To this end, the 
Minister of Health at the April 2008 Health summit declared maternal health a 
national emergency (Ministry of Health, 2008a). 
Immediate decisions and actions followed the declaration. A ministerial task 
force was formed to formulate a timed framework aimed at reducing maternal 
mortality and the MOH was tasked to estimate the impact and financial implications 
of subsidising the enrolment of pregnant women onto the National Health Insurance 
Schemes (NHIS) (Ministry of Health, 2008a). Additionally, the United Kingdom 
Department for International Development (DFID) submitted a brief to the 
Presidency through the MOH suggesting that all pregnant women be given 
functional NHIS membership cards to assure access to maternal health care and 
improve the performance towards attainment of MDGs 4 and 5. This, they argued, 
would be an effective, affordable and extremely popular policy with the Ghanaian 
electorate. The Minister’s declaration created a charged atmosphere putting maternal 
health on the front burner with intense attention from all stakeholders. 
The MOH drafted a memo to the Presidency on the status of maternal health 
and possible interventions. The import of the MOH memo was to inform and 
prepare the President for his participation in the ‘Business Call to Action’ meeting 
hosted by the United Kingdom government and the United Nations Development 
Programme in London, May 2008. 
 
‘We [PPME-MOH] already knew what the British government was supporting; so we 
only aligned the President’s statements to that of the British Government and the 
British Government said yes’ [MOH staff, 31/8/2012]. 
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President Kufuor and Prime Minister Brown met on the side-lines of the 
Business Call to Action meeting. Their discussions centred on funding for Ghana’s 
‘school feeding’ programme and health care delivery. 
 
‘The DFID brief submitted to the Ghanaian MOH was also followed up through the 
British system and given to the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown. During their 
meeting, the Prime Minister told President Kufuor that he had heard of the challenges 
of institutional maternal mortalities. My understanding is that Gordon Brown said it 
was a good idea to provide free maternal services’ [Donor, 27/5/2014]. 
 
In London, President Kufuor announced to exempt all pregnant women from 
paying for maternal health service. However, based on historical experiences and 
evidence of inadequate financial resources to implement previous maternal fee 
exemption policies (Witter et al., 2007), availability of funds was the foremost 
concern of the MOH. According to a former MOH senior official, no specific budget 
was allocated by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning for this policy 
before it was announced outside Ghana. In an interview with a senior politician for 
clarification, he said: ‘sometimes you need to make the policy and later look for funds to 
implement it’ [Former Minister of Health, 21/12/2012]. 
With no central government allocated budget to implement the maternal fee 
exemption directive, the MOH relied on donor health sector budget support for 
financial commitment. 
 
 ‘DFID’s contribution was the obvious choice since maternal health care was tagged as 
DFID-supported. Although DFID emphasized that their contribution was not for free 
maternal delivery but to support the whole health sector programme of work, the 
MOH went ahead and earmarked the funds to implement the directive’ [Former 
MOH staff, 5/11/2012]. 
 
With secured funding from DFID through the health sector budget support 
and the preceding suggestion by the DFID to give pregnant women NHIA cards to 
assure access to maternal health care, the NHIA lobbied to implement free maternal 
health care arguing that it was competent in fund management and best positioned 
to implement the policy. Additionally, it already provided antenatal, delivery and 
postnatal services under its benefit package and as such, unregistered pregnant 
women could be issued with cards to enable them access health care without any 
waiting period. The MOH accepted the arguments. 
 
‘The need to incorporate it into the NHIS was realized later, because, when you make 
the national estimate for the number of expected pregnancies in a year and you look at 
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the premium level, it would be cheaper to pay the premium for pregnant women than 
to pay for the services’ [Former MOH staff, 5/11/2012]. 
 
By 27th June 2008, a guideline accompanying the directive to provide free 
maternal health care for all pregnant women was designed by the MOH, officials of 
the GHS, Ghana Registered Midwives Association and the NHIA. The policy 
implemented through the NHIA started 1st July 2008. 
3.5 Discussion and conclusions  
Over the four and a half decades since some form of exemption from payment for 
maternal health services was introduced in 1963, fee exemptions for health service 
use by pregnant women has managed to remain on the policy agenda. However it 
has remained on the agenda in a fluid process of ebbs and flows rather than in a 
static fixed form. Context and policy actors were the major influencers of the ebbs 
and flows.  
Contextual factors that influenced the ebbs and flows were: political such as 
Nkrumah’s ideology, change in government, and election year; economic crises and 
austerity measures; health and demographic indicators; historical events; social 
unrest; and international agendas such as the MDGs. These contextual factors served 
as a source of power for policy actors to influence maternal fee exemption as a policy 
agenda item. We therefore reason with Erasmus and Gilson (2008) that power is the 
heart of health policy process as these case studies illustrate how policy actors used 
contextual factors as power leverage to justify their actions, inactions and choices. 
Policy agenda setters (directors, approvers, advisers and advocates) acted 
within interrelated contextual factors, which sometimes worked as constraints and 
sometimes opened opportunities. We observed that interrelating context, whether a 
constraint or an opportunity, is used by specific policy agenda setters to influence the 
timely manner in which policy content is made and how closely it is linked to the 
intended agenda. Our observations are in keeping with similar observations by 
Grindle and Thomas (1991) that contextual factors working in interrelating manner 
can serve as a constraint and an opportunity within which policy actors manoeuvre 
to accomplish their goals. 
Contextual factors working in an interrelating manner as a constraint, present 
policy agenda setters with conflicting options shaping the policy content to be made 
in a less timely manner and less closely linked to the intended agenda. For instance, 
within the context of high maternal mortality, economic decline, limited government 
budget allocation, and political authority and will, MOH bureaucrats had to assess 
options to make practical and feasible choice. Evidence of a health sector budget 
deficit at times overtook government’s intent. This was the case in 1997; there were 
worsening indicators for supervised delivery as about half of the women who 
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hitherto attended government health facilities for free antenatal services did not 
return to deliver in those facilities. To solve this issue, in January 1997 the President 
within his constitutional power, gave a political directive to provide free healthcare 
for pregnant women. The directive presented an opportunity to reform existing free 
antenatal and postnatal policy. However, the government did not allocate adequate 
resources due to economic decline. To this end, the policy content developed by the 
MOH bureaucrats in November the same year only partially reflected the intended 
agenda. 
Contextual factors working in an interrelating manner as an opportunity, 
present policy agenda setters with complementary options in shaping the policy 
content to be made in a more timely manner and more closely linked to the intended 
agenda. For instance, within the context of economic decline, inequitable poverty 
indicators, high maternal mortality, donor financial support, election years, and 
international agenda, policy agenda setters defined the maternal health problem in 
relation to a clearly defined solution. This was the case for maternal fee exemption 
policies in the 2000s. In the early 2000s, the HIPC grant support proposed by 
international policy agenda advisers the World Bank and IMF to mitigate the effect of 
economic stagnation provided an opportunity to improve poverty and maternal 
health outcomes in deprived regions. Policy formulators and international and 
national policy agenda advisers ensured that the policy content was closely linked to 
the intended agenda and as a requirement to obtain the HIPC grant, the policy was 
made in a timely manner. Again in May 2008, President Kufuor announced a ‘free 
maternal health care’ policy based on proposed solution from international and 
national policy agenda advisers. In the light of secured funding from health sector 
budget support, the policy content was made and disseminated before the end of 
June 2008, for implementation on July 1st. 
In addition to context serving as a source of power to shape policy actors 
actions, inactions and choices policy actors also wield power by virtue of their 
political and administrative position, knowledge, experience and financial 
commitment. Policy agenda setters (directors, approvers, advisers and advocates) 
acted in varied influencer roles between 1963 and 2008. Politicians (policy agenda 
directors and approvers) and policy agenda advisers played an active role in 
maintaining maternal fee exemption policies over a long period. Maternal fee 
exemption policies therefore survived both military and civilian governments and 
have become sort of a national legacy. Politician’s interest in maintaining the agenda 
may have varied; however, whether it was out of genuine concern to improve 
maternal health or to gain political capital and favour, their political support to 
decisions of maternal fee exemption was critical. 
Both national and international policy agenda advisers played an active role in 
maintaining the policy. Though international policy agenda advisers did not have 
60 
 
official government positions to make and implement public policies, over time they 
became active agenda setters within the Ghanaian health sector. After the 1990s, 
international policy agenda advisers – international multilateral and bilateral 
organisations and officials have increasingly gained agenda access, and sometimes 
even set the agenda. Donors gained agenda access because they used financial 
support as leverage of what gets on the agenda and in the policy content. 
Policy agenda setters in varied ways and capacities strived to maintain 
maternal health issues on the agenda. At critical moments of agenda re-set, re-
examination, and modification of existing maternal fee exemption policies, policy 
agenda advisers – acting as policy champions took decisions within boundaries of 
previous policy content, implementation challenges, such as inadequate funds as 
well as current demands and expectations. Our finding agrees with the position of 
Shiffman and Smith (2007), that strong champions are required to shape political 
priority for a particular policy initiative. 
Policy agenda advisers as policy champions mobilised strategies and tactics in 
the form of commitment and consensus to maintain the maternal fee exemption 
policy on the agenda over the years. For example the World Bank and IMF 
committed to reduce poverty and improve MDG-related targets pushed for fee 
exemptions for maternal health services. They collaborated with the Government of 
Ghana and other state agencies such as the National Development and Planning 
Commission for a consensus on the practical details of the Ghana Poverty Reduction 
Strategy. Also, the MOH over the years built relationships with other policy actors 
such as donors at institutional level through interactions, consensus building and 
collaboration towards policy development. These strategies are described as strategy 
capacity (Pelletier et al., 2011) and include the human and institutional capacity to 
build commitment and consensus toward a long-term strategy, respond to recurring 
challenges and opportunities, build relationships among policy actors and undertake 
strategic communications with varied audiences. Strategic capacity is therefore 
critical for maintaining policy issues on the agenda over time. 
The fee exemption policy for maternal health was maintained over the years in 
a path-dependent manner. The free antenatal service trajectory taken in 1963 was not 
reversed, despite varied policy agenda setters and contextual factors. Policy actors 
relied on context and on each other for financial support, expertise, experience and 
political resources creating a network of influence to maintain a maternal fee 
exemption agenda over time. Some scholars argued that a process is path dependent 
if initial moves in one direction elicit further moves in that same direction (Kay, 2005, 
Pierson, 2000). Once maternal fee exemption was there, it was difficult to abolish 
because of wide popular support and later outcry over maternal mortality and 
international agenda such as the MDGs. 
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Policy agenda setters also relied on empirical evidence to inform their 
decisions, however, systematic reviews presumed as a ‘gold standard’ of evidence-
based policy making (Young et al., 2002) were not used. Rather, country based 
empirical evidence from economic assessments, surveys, research reports and health 
sector performance reviews were used. Policy agenda setters paid attention to this 
kind of evidence as one of several important contextual factors rather than the only 
or even the main one and made use of this evidence to maintain maternal fee 
exemption policy on the agenda. 
Finally, as noted by Shiffman and Smith (2007), the power of actors, the power 
of ideas, political context and characteristics of the issue are key for setting the global 
health agenda, these observations are also relevant at national level and evident in 
these case studies. In addition, a broader contextual environment such as financial 
allocation arrangements, international agenda and development partner’s 
relationships, data about health outcomes, national administrative capacity to 
develop and implement policies, historical experience and path dependency are also 
critical as shown in this paper. 
Ghanaian health sector policy agenda setting and formulation is complex and 
intertwined with a mix of political, evidence-based, finance-based, path dependent, 
and donor driven processes. The papers by Agyepong and Adjei (2008) and Seddoh 
and Akor (2012) note this complexity. Actors and stakeholders who want to influence 
agendas need to pay attention to context and policy actors in any strategy. Efforts to 
influence policy agenda setting must recognize that empirical evidence is only part of 
a complexity of factors of which context, path dependency and politics are also very 
important. Moreover the influence of evidence is dependent on awareness of its 
availability as well as it use for advocacy in policy agenda setting and formulation in 
the right window of opportunity. 
As policymaking processes are relevant across other LMICs, and national 
policy actors are likely to confront similar scenarios, we hope this paper contributes 
to learning beyond Ghana in which this work was conducted to other LMIC in sub-
Saharan Africa and beyond.  
 
62 
 
  
63 
 
Chapter 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter has been published as: Koduah A, Agyepong IA, van Dijk H. 2016. ‘The 
one with the purse makes policy’: Power, problem definition, framing and maternal 
health policies and programmes evolution in national level institutionalised policy 
making processes in Ghana. Social Science & Medicine, 167: 79-87. 
 
64 
 
4 ‘The one with the purse makes policy’: Power, problem definition 
and maternal health policies and programmes evolution in national 
level institutionalised policy making processes in Ghana 
4.1 Abstract 
This paper seeks to advance our understanding of health policy agenda setting and 
formulation processes in a lower middle income country, Ghana, by exploring how 
and why maternal health policies and programmes appeared and evolved on the 
health sector programme of work agenda between 2002 and 2012. We theorized that 
the appearance of a policy or programme on the agenda and its fate within the 
programme of work is predominately influenced by how national level decision 
makers use their sources of power to define maternal health problems and frame 
their policy narratives. National level decision makers used their power sources as 
negotiation tools to frame maternal health issues and design maternal health policies 
and programmes within the framework of the national health sector programme of 
work. The power sources identified included legal and structural authority; access to 
authority by way of political influence; control over and access to resources (mainly 
financial); access to evidence in the form of health sector performance reviews and 
demographic health surveys; and knowledge of national plans such as Ghana 
Poverty Reduction Strategy. Understanding of power sources and their use as 
negotiation tools in policy development should not be ignored in the pursuit of 
transformative change and sustained improvement in health systems in low- and 
middle income countries (LMIC). 
Key words 
Ghana; Institutionalised policy processes; Maternal health; Policy agenda setting; 
Policy formulation; Problem definition. 
4.2 Highlights 
Power relations steer the Ghanaian institutionalised health dialogue. 
Use of power to persuade others influences how maternal health agenda issues 
evolved. 
Control of budget allocation is an important source of power to influence decisions. 
Understanding of actors’ power and how they use them in policy development is 
vital. 
4.3 Introduction 
Gaining insights into why some policy issues get on the agenda and move into 
programme formulation while others disappear is important. This is because part of 
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the process of transformative change and improvement in health systems and 
outcomes is getting, formulating and maintaining priority policy issues on the 
agenda. 
Problem definition shapes what issues get on the agenda, and what specific 
course of action is taken and maintained or not. How policy actors interpret current 
and past events shape their problem definition (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994) and help 
to frame and label issues for decisions. Labelling an issue dictates the kind of 
attention the issue attracts and sets the stage for decision making (Peters, 2005). 
Therefore, what is usually more urgent and practical in influencing policy agenda 
setting and formulation is control over the interpretation of events (Mosse, 2005) and 
subsequent issue labelling. Different policy actors present different explanations for 
the nature of a particular problem (Portz, 1996) and use different negotiation tools 
such as the control over a resource or access to information to make a case and 
persuade others. Despite the importance of understanding agenda setting and the 
use of power to frame agenda issues, there is still limited literature on the 
examination of power in health policy in LMICs (Gilson and Raphaely, 2008). There 
are however papers on political agenda setting for safe motherhood in Nigeria 
(Shiffman and Okonofua, 2007), and actors practice of power in a South African 
community health programme (Lehmann and Gilson, 2013). 
Reasons proposed for why some issues are considered and specific course of 
actions formulated and why others fail are wide ranging. Some are structural, 
emphasizing how institutions are organized to advantage some alternatives or issues 
over others. Some are cognitive, emphasizing how individuals or even institutions 
process information in ways that limit the issues to be addressed at any given time. 
Others emphasize the role of external events or public opinion, and how they can 
combine with political incentives to quickly shift attention in a new direction (Green-
Pedersen and Wilkerson, 2006). 
This paper seeks to advance our understanding of health policy agenda 
setting and formulation processes in a lower middle income country, Ghana, by 
exploring how and why maternal health policy and programme agenda items 
appeared and evolved in the framework of the Ghanaian health sector Programme of 
Work (POW) agenda between 2002 and 2012. Our specific research questions were: 
Which maternal health policies were prioritised? How did they evolve on the agenda 
and why? We examined decision maker’s problem definition and decision making 
processes, theorizing that a policy or programme’s appearance and fate on the POW 
agenda is predominantly influenced by how decision makers use their source of 
power to define problems and frame their policy narratives and accompanying 
course of actions. This study contributes to still relatively limited literature on policy 
processes in Low and Middle Income Countries in general and West Africa in 
particular. It especially provides insights on the power dynamics of how and why 
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maternal health policies evolved on the Ghanaian health sector programme of work 
over a decade of time.  
Ghana health sector 
The Ghana health sector has had a hierarchical predominantly publically financed 
and publically administered and delivered services model since independence in 
1957. It is however accompanied by strong and increasing formal private sector 
participation in service delivery. It underwent two major reforms in the 1990s with 
the passage of the Ghana Health Service and Teaching Hospitals Act 525 in 1996; and 
the adoption of a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) in 1997. 
Prior to passage of the Act 525; the Ministry of Health (MOH), was the 
regulator of the public and private sector, the body responsible for policy direction, 
coordination, monitoring and evaluation and the provider of public sector services. 
With the passage of Act 525, the Ghana Health Service (GHS) was created as the 
public sector service delivery agency, and MOH became a civil service ministry 
responsible for sector policy-making, coordination, monitoring, and evaluation 
(Agyepong et al., 2012). 
Under the SWAp, development of national medium term (five year) strategic 
plans known as five year POW was established in the health sector. The annual POW 
was developed to progressively ensure the attainment of the five year POW. As part 
of the SWAp arrangements, international donors gained legal and structural access to 
national policy making and the authority to join MOH and local actors to negotiate 
five year and annual POW agendas and priorities during institutionalised policy 
dialogue processes. These negotiated priorities include specific policies, programmes, 
targets and financial allocations for implementation (Addai and Gaere, 2001). The 
institutionalised dialogue process engaged donors within an overall national policy, 
institutional and financial framework (Cassels, 1997), and promoted the use of POW 
review findings in decision making. Although, the institutionalised process promotes 
use of evidence, it is open to external influence and lobbying by interest groups. The 
institutionalised arrangements include the biannual (review and planning) health 
summit, health sector working group and several other meetings. Figure 4.1, the 
schematic outline of national level institutionalised dialogue processes, summarises 
and illustrates the different levels of the dialogue process, actors involved and 
routinized sequence of actions. The MOH moderates these meetings and ideas 
considered are carried through the processes, however, at the business meeting ideas 
are negotiated and decisions made. The negotiated decisions are detailed in an Aide 
Memoire. The Aide Memoire generated from the review and planning summits feed 
into the design of the POW. 
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Figure 4.1: Schematic outline of national level institutionalised dialogue processes 
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Also under SWAp, the mechanisms through which donor financial resources 
were channelled within the health sector were modified. Donors participating in the 
SWAp moved from specific funding of projects to contributing their funds into a 
common basket to support the agreed POW. They released funds on the basis of the 
annual POW to a central account jointly controlled by the MOH and the Controller 
and Accountant General’s Department. The resulting pooled fund was known as 
“Basket Funding”. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) and 
the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) started disbursement to 
this account in 1997, with the World Bank, the European Union (EU) and the Royal 
Netherlands Embassy (RNE) joining in 1998-9. Several donors such as United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) did not join the pooled fund. They 
nevertheless still had access to the institutionalized national dialogue processes. 
Donor funds not channelled through Basket Funding were known as “Earmarked 
funds”. These included MOH managed funds for specific programmes and projects 
channelled through the MOH as well as direct funding of projects and programmes 
by donors that were not necessarily in line with the POW (Addai and Gaere, 2001). 
As a result of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness the ‘Basket 
Funding’ was gradually replaced by a Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS) fund 
since the same donors who contributed into the Basket Funding were those who 
opted to contribute to a MDBS. Under MDBS, donors shifted their financial support a 
level upwards to a pooled fund at the macro level of the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning. This was in keeping with the principles of harmonizing donor 
support with national plans, strategies and budgets agreed upon between donors 
and developing countries governments (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
Development, 2009). 
Programme of work’s financial resources source and their allocation  
The POW draws financial resources from five main sources. First, direct statutory 
transfers by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) from the 
Government of Ghana (GOG) consolidated tax funds to the MOH referred to in short 
as GOG. Second, the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) established in 2004 as 
part of the implementation arrangements of the National Health Insurance Scheme 
(NHIS). The NHIF is made up of a national health insurance levy of 2.5 percent value 
added tax on selected goods and services, 2.5 percent of all Social Security and 
National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) contributions of formal sector workers; and out-of-
pocket registration fees from all subscribers and premiums from non SSNIT 
contributors. Money from the NHIF is transferred periodically by the MOFEP to the 
National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) to pay providers for services to 
subscribers and the administrative expenses of running the NHIS. Third, out-of-
pocket payments made by clients at service delivery points. Reimbursements to 
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service providers from the NHIF and out-of-pocket payments are all retained within 
the facility and are collectively referred to as Internally Generated Funds (IGF). The 
fourth source consists of donor budget support and earmarked funding. The fifth 
source is loans and credits secured by the Ghanaian government for the health sector. 
The funds from the above sources are allocated to four categories in the 
annual POW namely personal emoluments (salaries and allowances), administration, 
service delivery and investment. Personal emoluments are financed only by GOG. 
However some health facilities also use IGF to pay temporary staff. The 
administration category is financed by GOG, IGF and NHIF for administrative 
expenses incurred in service delivery such as maintenance of vehicles and 
equipment. The service delivery category financed by GOG, donors, IGF and NHIF 
provides for operational cost of service delivery. Finally, the investment category 
financed by GOG, donors, IGF, NHIF and loans and credits pays to procure vehicles 
and equipment; and construct new facilities and rehabilitate existing ones. 
4.4 Methods 
Study design and data collection 
A longitudinal study of maternal health policies and programmes appearing in the 
annual health sector POW was conducted for the period 2002 to 2012. The case study 
approach was appropriate allowing comprehensive and systematic data collection 
and analysis at different points in a real-life context to trace change over time (Patton, 
2002, Yin, 2009). We defined a case as a maternal health policy or programme agenda 
item appearing in the annual health sector POW over the study period. Twenty-
seven maternal health policy and programme items appeared in the annual POW 
between 2002 and 2012. We traced the fate of these from their first appearance in any 
of the annual POW documents in the period under study through subsequent years; 
to understand how they evolved on the POW agenda from year to year. 2002 to 2012 
was appropriate for the research because as Sabatier (2007, p.4) argues a decade is a 
long enough period to observe policy change. 
Data were collected between June 2012 and June 2014. Specific methods were 
in-depth interviews with key informants, a desk review of documents and 
participant observation during a 20 month period of field work at the MOH Policy 
Planning Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate (PPMED) by one of the authors 
(AK)7. The PPMED coordinates policy formulation and strategic planning for the 
health sector. Participant observation in this directorate was chosen, to study and 
better understand ongoing policy making processes and interactions among policy 
actors. AK participated in, observed and noted at first-hand ongoing power 
dynamics and negotiation within the institutionalised dialogue process as a student 
                                                 
7 PhD candidate 
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staff member assigned to the Policy Analysis Unit of the PPMED. The meetings 
attended, with an average discussion period of 4 hours, are listed in Table 4.1. AK 
was asked by the PPMED to take notes and summarise the first two days 
deliberations of the April 29th - 6th May 2013 review summit. Observing and 
documenting actors interactions and discussions from start to end of these meetings, 
allowed us to draw inference to support our retrospective data. 
Table 4.1 Health sector meetings attended 
Meeting  Date 
Business meeting 17 August 2012 
20 November 2012 
2 May 2013 
DFID budget support meeting 15 November 2012 
Health sector working group  5 July 2012 
6 September 2012 
7 February 2013 
20 March 2014  
Inter-agency performance review  4-5 April 2013 
16-17 August 2012 
12-13 September 2013 
MDG Acceleration Framework (MAF) for central 
and western regions  
8-12 October 2012 
MAF for teaching hospitals and training institutions  3-5 January 2013 
MAF monitoring and evaluation  12 October 2012 
MOH budget committee 5 September 2012 
MOH budget hearing at Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning 
20 September 2012 
MOH internal review  7 August 2012 
21 March 2013 
Health summit 29 April–6 May 2013 
PPME general meeting  25 June 2012 
30 August 2012 
PPME unit heads meeting  10,23 July 2012 
13 August 2012 
4,10 September 2012 
15,22 October 2012 
12,19 November 2012 
Pre-budget review  12 September 2012 
Pre-business meeting  16 November 2012 
Pre-health summit  19 April 2013 
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Key informant in-depth interviews were used to obtain lived experience of 
maternal health policy dialogues processes from respondents. The interviews were 
conducted face to face using a semi structured guide investigating how policy actors 
defined maternal health problems and prioritised policies. Nineteen participants 
were purposively interviewed. Participants included officials of the: MOH (5), 
former MOH (1), GHS headquarters (3), and NHIA (4). Respondents outside 
government include donors (4), coalition of NGOs in health (1), and Christian Health 
Association of Ghana (1). Where permission was granted the interviews were tape 
recorded. Otherwise notes were taken and verified later with the participant. 
Documents review was conducted to trace and map POW maternal health 
policy and programme sequence and financial resource allocations; make an 
inventory of policy actors’ definition of maternal health problems and frames of the 
course of action over time and to triangulate findings with participant’s information. 
Health sector documents reviewed were annual POWs, medium-term development 
plans, aide memoires, maternal health related evaluation reports, maternal health 
related meeting minutes, health sector review and study reports. 
Analytic concepts 
We drew on the concept of power and its use by actors to influence decision making 
to inform our analysis. Specifically, Mintzberg’s conceptualization of power, Ribot 
and Peluso’s theory of access, and Rochefort and Cobb’s concept of problem 
definition as an instrument of power. Mintzberg (1983) defines power as the capacity 
to effect (or affect) decisions and actions. He labels a policy actor who seeks to 
control decisions and actions as ‘influencer’ and argues that influencer’s 
interpretative manoeuvres ability vary as each tries to use his or her own levers of 
power as means of influence. Mintzberg categorised five general sources of power. 
These are the control of a resource, a technical skill, or a body of knowledge; 
authority by virtue of one’s legal and structural position; and access to those who can 
rely on the other four sources of power. 
To further understand access to power sources we drew on Ribot and Peluso 
(2003) theory of access. The concept of access facilitates grounded analyses of who 
actually benefits from things and through what processes they are able to do so. They 
define access as the ability to benefit from things – including material objects, 
persons, institutions, and symbols. They categorised mechanisms of access as right-
based; and structural and relational. Right-based access is when the ability to benefit 
from something derives from rights attributed by law or convention. The structural 
and relational access mechanisms are the abilities to benefit from resources in the 
light of constraints established by specific political-economic and cultural context 
within which access to resources is sought. These include access to finances, 
knowledge and authority. 
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Rochefort and Cobb (1993, 1994) argue that problem definition is a supreme 
instrument of power since there is no one fixed definition and as such policy issues 
are subject to the interpretative manoeuvres and discursive strategies of policy actors 
who influence the process. The defining process is dynamic and occurs in a variety of 
ways with the function to explain, describe, recommend and above all, to persuade. 
Once crystallized, some definitions become long-term fixtures of the policy making 
landscape; while others undergo constant revision or are replaced altogether by 
competing formulations. They conceptualised problem definition to include some 
descriptions of the problem origin, dimensions beyond causality such as severity and 
descriptive qualities of proposed solutions (Rochefort and Cobb, 1993, Rochefort and 
Cobb, 1994). 
Data from interviews and documents reviews were systematically grouped 
based on the research questions. The initial steps of analysis involved mapping out 
POW maternal health agenda items, financial allocations, maternal health problem 
definitions, and decision makers’ power sources. Further analysis involved 
iteratively reconstructing links between how decisions makers used their power 
sources to define maternal health problems and negotiated POW priorities. Due to 
the difficulty in providing full explanation of events as they unfolded from 
retrospective data, we drew from the research observation notes and 8IAA’s 
experience as a participant in the health sector processes first as a district and then as 
a regional health director over the decade covered by this study. Further 
interpretations were therefore made based on our observation and experience of how 
decision makers lobbied and used their funds, ideas, and empirical evidence to 
promote specific policy narratives. The analyses were synthesised to reconstruct how 
POW maternal health policy items appeared and evolved and why. 
Study limitation 
Data interpretation was limited by the challenge of retrospectively tracing and 
linking specific policies and programmes to individuals or organizations and 
financial allocations. Moreover, the negotiated decisions stated in the aide memoires 
and POW are recorded as collective decisions, masking the details of actual 
interactions such as who pushed for a particular issue, who said what to whom and 
how it was received. POW financial allocations are sometimes lumped without 
stating individual donor’s identity and contribution to a specific policy or 
programme. To get round these challenges we triangulated data from multiple 
research sources in the effort to reconstruct these interactions and processes. This 
helped but did not fill in the missing details in all cases. 
                                                 
8 Supervisor  
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4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Institutionalised decision making and maternal health policies and 
programmes evolution 
Institutionalised policy decision makers (henceforth decision makers) during 
meetings used technical skills, legal and structural authority, bodies of knowledge 
e.g. review reports, access to those with power and control of resources to influence 
each other and negotiate maternal policies and programmes for implementation. 
These power sources closely parallel those suggested by Mintzberg (1983). Those 
able to influence the institutionalised process were not necessarily always active 
participants in the particular decision making process on hand; but still had power to 
influence the process when mobilized. For example, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) who controls other financial resources or the President of Ghana who wields 
political power and influence. The decision makers relied on their power sources 
primarily to frame maternal health problems from annual POW to POW during the 
institutionalized policy dialogue processes. The constant revisions of maternal health 
problem descriptions resulted in some policies and programmes ‘disappearing’ from 
the POW agenda over time. These items are summarised in Table 4.2 (Data source: 
Health sector annual POW 2002-2012).  
Table 4.2: POW maternal health policy and programme items leaving the 
institutionalised discussions over time and issues too recent to analyse 
Evolution pathway Policy and programme items 
‘Disappearing’ from the 
POW discussion with time 
1. Assess barriers and develop an investment plan for 
improving supervised deliveries.(2007) 
2. Assess the extent to which facilities are designed to 
respond to maternal and child health services. (2005) 
3. Conduct a survey on maternal mortality. (2005,2006) 
4. Conduct baseline needs assessment for basic and 
comprehensive emergency obstetric and newborn care 
(EmONC). ( 2010) 
5. Continue advocacy for District Assemblies and District 
Health Management Teams to dedicate a percentage of 
their resources for maternal and newborn care. (2006) 
6. Develop national reproductive health strategic plan. 
(2005, 2006) 
7. Develop neonatal care guidelines. (2006) 
8. Disseminate revised reproductive health service policy, 
standards and protocols. (2004) 
9. Equip 60 district hospitals to handle maternal health 
complications. (2010) 
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Evolution pathway Policy and programme items 
10. Evaluate impact of high impact rapid delivery strategies. 
(2011) 
11. Finalise and implement recommendations EmONC 
assessment finding. (2011) 
12. Health promotion activities in safe motherhood and 
family planning. (2004) 
13. Implement high impact rapid delivery strategies. 
(2007,2008) 
14. Implement recommendations of consultative meeting on 
MDG 5. (2009) 
15. Improve referral system for reproductive health (2004, 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2009 ) 
16. Institutionalise maternal death audits and make maternal 
mortality a notifiable event. (2004,2005,2006) 
17. Introduce new maternal records book with partograph. 
(2006) 
18. Raise awareness on socio-cultural barriers to access to 
maternal and new-born care. (2011) 
19. Review information, education and communication on 
maternal health. ( 2003) 
20. Revise and pre-test indicators for measuring maternal 
health. (2005) 
21. Support private sector participation in implementation 
of maternal and child health care programmes. ( 2010) 
22. Train health workers on safe motherhood and 
Behavioural Change Communications. (2010) 
5: The issue is too recent to 
analyse what happens to it 
over time. 
 
1. Develop and implement measures to ensure safe blood 
and blood product transfusion, including the 
establishment of blood transfusion centres in Accra and 
Kumasi. (2011) 
2. Implement the MDG Acceleration Framework Country 
Action Plan for improved maternal and newborn care 
(2011, 2012) 
 
Others became long-term fixtures whose policy narratives remained and 
sometimes evolved with shifts in issue interpretations during discussions. We 
classified the evolution pathways of these that remained on the agenda as (1) 
‘reinterpretation’; (2) ‘disappearing and reappearing unchanged at a later date’; and 
(3) ‘expansion’. The accompanying accounts below further explain the processes 
summarised in Table 4.3 using specific cases to illustrate. 
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4.5.2 ‘Reinterpretation’ pathway  
The 2002 POW policy item of ‘provision of essential obstetric care (basic and 
comprehensive) in health centre and clinic’ evolved in a sequence of interpretative 
shifts from POW to POW annually and eventually end up as ‘provide emergency 
obstetric care equipment to three remaining regions namely Upper West, Greater 
Accra and Volta’ in 2012 (Ministry of Health, 2002b, Ministry of Health, 2012b). 
Initially, decision makers (DFID, EU, MOH, Royal Danish Embassy (RDE), 
RNE, and World Bank) at the 9-13 June 2003 review summit considered the fact that 
not all professionals who provide obstetric care obtained in-service training which is 
a challenge to maternal health service delivery. The health sector medium-term 
strategy (1997-2001) and the 2002 POW review report informed these considerations. 
The medium-term strategy regarded essential obstetric care a priority intervention to 
improve maternal health outcomes (Ministry of Health, 2001). However, the review 
report noted that in respect to essential obstetric care, only some rather than all 
doctors and midwives received in-service training for safe motherhood clinical skills 
and recommended more attention for obstetric care at all levels to improve care 
(Ministry of Health, 2003b). Decision makers therefore made ‘strengthen institutional 
capacity to provide essential obstetric care in all health facilities through in-service 
training’ a 2004 POW agenda item. 
In 2005, however, because of a December 2004 planning summit business 
meeting decision; ‘training of health providers to provide essential obstetric care’ 
became the next framing of this POW agenda item. Decision makers (DFID, EU, 
MOH, Nordic Development Fund (NDF), RDE, RNE, United National Population 
Fund (UNFPA) and, World Bank) used the MOH’s control of human resource and 
the 2003 POW review report to support this decision. The MOH controls public 
sector human resource generation by operating several health training institutions 
and allocation by virtue of public sector recruitment and government payment of 
salaries. Although the MOH controls public sector human resource, a gap existed 
and the review report recommended increase in the numbers of midwives and 
obstetrician gynaecologists, and the training of community health officers to provide 
obstetric care (Ministry of Health, 2004d).  
Decision makers (DFID, EU, MOH, NDF, RDE, RNE, UNFPA, and, World 
Bank) in 2005 further reinterpreted the provision of essential obstetric care issue and 
added obstetric equipment to the discussions. This was mainly influenced by 2004 
POW review report and donor financial support. According to the review report 
many health facilities lacked the numbers and mix of staff and the equipment to 
provide essential obstetric care (Ministry of Health, 2005b). To which the donors 
allocated financial resources to fill in the obstetric equipment gap. An analysis of 
POW financial resource information summarised in Table 4.4 (Data source: Health 
sector annual POW 2002-2012) shows that donors allocated more financial resources 
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than Government to procure obstetric equipment. Putting the donor influence into 
perspective, the DFID specifically, approved an initial contribution of £6.76 million 
with a first release of £3.38million in March 2009 and the rest (£3.38million) in 
January 2010; and a further £2.2million in March 2010 to the MOH to procure 
additional obstetric equipment (Singleton et al., 2010). 
Table 4.4: Financial resource allocation and source for obstetric equipment 
Year Amount GHC Amount 
US$ 
Source Amount 
Proportion 
per source 
% 
2006 900,000 981,000 Earmarked 100 Donor 
2008 4,566,000 
4,000,000 
1,546,000 
2,500,000 
 
 
TOTAL=12,612,000  
4,161,452 
3,645,600 
1,409,024 
2,278,500 
 
 
11,494,577 
Earmarked 
Budget support 
IGF 
NHIF 
67.9 Donor 
 
2009 7,175,000  
1,500,000  
 
TOTAL=8,675,000 
4,762,765 
995,700  
 
5,758,465 
Earmarked  
Budget Support  
 
100 Donor 
2010 1,068, 000 
 
740,338 Budget Support 100 Donor 
2011 3,834,000  
500,000 
 
TOTAL=4,334,000 
2,533,124 
330,350  
 
2,863,474 
Earmarked 
Budget Support 
100 Donor 
2012 1,800,000 927,900 Budget Support 100 Donor 
 
Over the period studied, shifts in discussions were predominantly informed 
by donor financial support and POW review findings. For example the 2007 POW 
review noted that investment in essential obstetric care was less systemic and 
recommended intensification of midwifery training and purchase of additional 
obstetric equipment (Ministry of Health, 2008c). The decision makers at the 
November 2008 summit business meeting decided to procure additional obstetric 
equipment and expand midwifery and nursing training institutions. Although 
‘expand midwifery and nursing training institutions’ was made a 2009 POW item, 
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training of health professionals was an ongoing process. As noted by a policy 
implementer – ‘the process of increasing the health work force is already in motion. There 
are always interventions to improve the manpower. For example, we moved from about 98 
trained midwives per year in 2000 to about 700 in 2009, with a corresponding increase in 
training institutions’ [22/08/2012]. 
By 2012, obstetric equipment was distributed to all regions except three. 
Decision makers therefore further reframed the POW agenda to; ‘provide obstetric 
care equipment to three remaining regions – Upper West, Greater Accra and Volta’. 
4.5.3  ‘Disappearing and reappearing unchanged at a later date’ pathway 
This pathway is illustrated with the policy narrative to strengthening family 
planning services; which was a 2002 POW item, but did not feature in the discussions 
and records in 2003, and then reappeared in 2004 and remained on the POW every 
year after that up to the end of our study period (2012). Our findings suggest that the 
urgent need to introduce National Health Insurance in 2003 by the Ghanaian 
Government (fulfilling a political campaign promise) and the focus to participate in 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative contributed to remove family 
planning from the 2003 POW agenda. However, decision makers consistently 
regarded family planning a major intervention to reduce maternal and neonatal 
mortality and morbidity. 
 
‘Family planning has direct effect on reducing maternal and neonatal mortality’ 
[GHS staff, 14/12/2012]; ‘We continuing invest in family planning to reduce 
abortions, unsafe deliveries and all associated complications to improve maternal 
health’ [Donor, 11/ 09/2012]. 
 
Decision makers used their knowledge of family planning benefits for 
maternal health, POW reviews, Ghana Demographic Health Survey (GDHS) 
indicators, and their control over financial resource to discuss and negotiate 
decisions to meet unmet demand for family planning. At the 9-13 June 2003 review 
summit decision makers discussed the increased contraceptive use as reported by the 
GDHS; from 13 percent in 1988 to 20 percent in 1993 and 22 percent in 1998 (ICF 
Macro, 2010); and the 2002 POW review findings. The review however reported a 
decrease in family planning use acceptors indicators from 24.9 percent in 2001 to 
21.6percent in 2002 and financial and procurement gaps for contraceptives (Ministry 
of Health, 2003b). These findings informed the decision to strengthen family 
planning programme through allocating funds to procure contraceptives; at the 2-4 
December 2003 planning summit. 
Over the years, family planning indicators had not improved much; according 
to 2008 GDHS, contraceptive prevalence rate for any method was 24 percent; and 36 
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percent of married women had an unmet need for family planning (ICF Macro, 
2010). Decision makers nevertheless had consistently allocated financial resources for 
contraceptives making this POW agenda item a long-term fixture. An analysis of the 
POW financial resource allocation summarised in Table 4.5 (Data source: Health 
sector annual POW 2002-2012) shows that donors predominately procured 
contraceptives. Ghana heavily depends on donors to implement the family planning 
programme since its inception in the 1970s. From 1996 onward notably, USAID and 
the UNFPA provided strong financial support with further and significant assistance 
from DFID and the World Bank (Government of Ghana, 2006). Donors filled in 
funding gaps created by the MOH’s insufficient financial commitment. As a donor 
commented: ‘the MOH is not adequately supporting family planning, creating gaps that 
donors fill by supplying some family planning commodities’[27/11/2012]. 
Table 4.5: Financial resource allocation and source for contraceptives. 
Year  Amount GHC  Amount 
US$ 
Source Amount 
Proportion per 
source % 
2004 2,792,793  
1,351,351  
 
Total=4,144,144 
3,100,000 
1,500,000 
  
4,600,000 
Earmarked 
Basket Funding  
100 Donor 
2005 1,355,626 1,500,000 Basket Funding 
(DFID,USAID,UNFPA) 
100 Donor 
2006 900,000 
 
 
1,800,000 
 
Total=2,700,000  
981,000  
  
 
1,962,000 
 
2,943,000 
Government of Ghana & 
Basket Funding 
(DFID,DANIDA,DUTCH) 
Earmarked 
 
 
 
67 Donor  
2007 1,500,000 
1,500,000 
 
 
Total=3,000,000 
1,387,950 
1,387,950 
 
 
2,775,900 
Budget Support 
NHIF  
50 Donor 
50 NHIF 
2008 600,000 
1,400,000 
300,000 
 
 
Total=2,300,000 
546,840  
1,275,960  
273,420  
 
  
2,096,220 
Earmarked 
Budget Support  
GOG 
 
87 Donor 
13 GOG 
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Year  Amount GHC  Amount 
US$ 
Source Amount 
Proportion per 
source % 
2009 3,200,000 
400,000  
 
 
Total=3,600,000 
2,124,160  
 265,520  
 
 
2,389,680 
Budget Support 
GOG 
89 Donor 
11 GOG 
2010 14,842,000  
3,200,000  
400,000 
 
 
Total=18,442,000 
10,288,474  
2,218,240  
277,280  
 
 
12,783,994 
Earmarked 
Budget Support 
GOG 
 
98 Donor 
2 GOG 
2011 18,808,000  
3,099,000  
 
 
Total=21,907,000 
12,426,446 
2,047,509 
 
 
14,473,955 
Earmarked 
Budget Support 
 
 
100 Donor 
2012 22,052,040 
3,250,000  
 
Total=25,302,040 
11,367,827  
1,675,375  
 
13,043,202 
Earmarked  
Budget Support 
 
100 Donor 
4.5.4 ‘Expansion’ pathway 
This pathway is illustrated by policy narratives to provide fee exemption for 
maternal health services which expanded from user fee exemption for skilled 
delivery in four regions (2003) to user fee exemption for skilled delivery and 
antenatal care in all regions (2005), and finally national health insurance premium 
exemptions for antenatal, delivery and postnatal care for all pregnant women (2009). 
Decision makers used their access to financial resources, POW review findings, 
national strategic plan and political authority to negotiate and expand maternal fee 
exemption policy. 
In 2000, for Ghana to access the HIPC programme of IMF and World Bank a 
Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS), was initiated. The GPRS noted that a 
positive correlation between income and health indicators such as utilization of 
health care services and mortality rates exist. Therefore the GPRS health targets 
aimed at improving core poverty indicators such as under-five mortality rate and 
maternal mortality rate focused on four regions (Central, Northern, Upper East and 
Upper West) classified as the most deprived because they had the highest under-five 
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mortality rates in the country. Three of them (Northern, Upper East and Upper West) 
had the highest percentage of the population living below the poverty line. The 
GPRS health priorities included interventions such as fee exemption for obstetric 
emergencies and life-threatening pregnancy-related conditions (Government of 
Ghana, 2000, Ministry of Health, 2003a). 
In the light of GPRS and its accompanying HIPC grant, and labelling of 
maternal health a ‘poverty issue’; decision makers commissioned a study to review 
existing fee exemption policies to align with the GPRS (Ministry of Health, 2002a). 
The study noted that an antenatal care user fee exemption policy existed but health 
facilities did not implement fully due to inadequate financial resources (Ministry of 
Health, 2003a). Decision makers at the 2-4 December 2003 planning summit aligned 
to the GPRS health targets and made user fee exemptions for skilled delivery in the 
four regions classified as “deprived” a POW item. 
At the 31 May-4 June 2004 review summit business meeting, decision makers 
noted and discussed the worsening maternal health outcomes in the six regions 
classified as “non-deprived” regions and the gains in the four classified as 
“deprived”.  
 
‘The exemption policy contributed to improve coverage of health services and 
outcomes in the deprived regions. However, concerns emerged about the relatively 
poor performance of non-deprived regions in 2004 and the apparent worsening of 
health in urban poor areas’ [MOH staff, 10/07/2012]. 
To address these concerns, the policy was extended to cover the whole country. 
The maternal user fee exemption policy suffered a major setback in the late 
2005 and by late 2006 health facilities stopped its implementation due to limited 
financial resources (Ministry of Health, 2008b). In 2005, US$ 3,319,500 was allocated 
to implement the policy as noted in Table 4.6. This account was only 10 percent more 
than what was allocated in 2004 for the four deprived regions with only 25.97 percent 
of Ghana’s population (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). The 2007 POW review 
findings discussed at the April 2008 summit noted a decrease in the share of skilled 
deliveries from 44.5 percent in 2006 to 35.1 percent in 2007 and an increase in the 
institutional maternal mortality ratio from 187/100,000 live births in 2006 to 
224/100,000 live births in 2007 (Ministry of Health, 2008c). Based on these data the 
Minister of health declared maternal health a national emergency (Ministry of 
Health, 2008a). In 2009, decision makers relied on a presidential directive to make 
maternal fee exemption a POW item. However, decision maker’s prior discussions 
and decisions discussed above influenced the presidential directive. 
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Table 4.6: Financial resource allocation and source for maternal fee exemption policy  
Year Amount GHC  Amount US$  Source Amount 
Proportion per 
source % 
2004 2,700,000 
 
2,997,000 HIPC Grant 100 Donor 
2005 3,000,000 
 
3,319,500 HIPC Grant 100 Donor 
2006 5,000,000 
 
5,450,000 HIPC Grant 100 Donor 
2007 8,000,000 
90,000,000 
 
TOTAL=98,000,000 
7,402,400  
83,277,000  
  
90,679,400 
HIPC Grant 
NHIF 
8 Donor 
92 NHIF 
2009 10,000,000  6,638,000  
  
Budget support  100 Donor 
2010 10,000,000  6,932,000 
 
Budget support  100 Donor 
 
Against the backdrop of these in country discussions, the President at the May 
2008 Business Call to Action meeting in the United Kingdom announced a free 
maternal services for all. According to the MOH, the government of Ghana negotiated 
with the UK government and allocated the DFID budget support to implement the directive 
[Interview, 5/11/2012]. With secured funding and implementation under NHIS, 
decision makers made the free maternal health policy a POW item (Ministry of 
Health, 2008b, Ministry of Health, 2009c). 
4.6 Discussion and conclusions 
This paper illustrates actors’ use of power sources as negotiation tools in interactions 
to influence the evolution of maternal health policy items in institutionalized 
decision making processes at national level in Ghana, a LMIC. The MOH and donors 
used legal and structural authority; access to political authority; control over and 
access to resources (mainly financial); access to evidence in the form of POW reviews 
and demographic health surveys; and knowledge of national plans such as Ghana 
Poverty Reduction Strategy – to negotiate POW policy items. In addition to the use of 
power as suggested by Mintzberg (1983) to convince others and to use one’s 
resource, information and technical skills in negotiation. Decision makers used their 
discretion to decipher which evidence, authority and resources to access to support 
their interest and ideas. 
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MOH and donors defined, framed and labelled obstetric care, family planning 
and maternal fee exemption as long-term POW fixtures. They attached labels such as 
- ‘inadequate obstetric care’, ‘family planning unmet need’, ‘maternal health poverty 
issue’, and ‘poor maternal health a national emergency’ - for actions and to ensure 
the continuous flow of funding. 
The MOH and donors used these labels in several ways. One was to promote 
and sustain specific interventions proven to improve maternal health outcomes and 
service utilization such as the provision of obstetric care, maternal fee exemption, 
and family planning programme (World Health Organization et al., 2004, 
Government of Ghana, 2006). Another was to highlight the magnitude and the crisis 
aspect to attract and mobilise support from stakeholders within and outside the 
institutionalised process. The Minister of Health declaring maternal health a national 
emergency legitimised its severity attracting support from the President. Yet another 
was to align to international agenda. For example, IMF and World Bank used the 
poverty label aligning to a broader international perspective directed towards 
attainment of anti-poverty objectives consistent with the MDGs. 
This paper also illustrates the importance of financial resource in agenda 
setting. The MOH and donors through collective decisions constantly allocated 
financial resources for obstetric care, family planning and maternal fee exemption 
policies. How different actors use their power sources to influence others through 
explanations and persuasions is critical in collective decisions because discursive 
power lies in the dominant narrative that controls issue interpretation (Mosse, 2005, 
Shiffman and Smith, 2007) and prioritization. For example, the MOH may have also 
dominated discussions around public sector human resource generation and 
allocation because about 90 percent to 93 percent of government’s total health sector 
financial allocation pays public health sector salaries (Ministry of Health, 2009c, 
Ministry of Health, 2011b). This however leaves very little resources for other health 
priorities creating opportunities for donors with financial resources to allocate funds 
to policy issues of interest and sometime set the agenda. Donors’ use of their 
financial control to influence POW agenda reflects an assertion by Mintzberg (1983) 
that influencers choose and concentrate on issues most important to them. 
Donor control of financial resources (control of the purse) has made them 
particularly powerful. Through the SWAp reforms, donors gained right-based access 
(Ribot and Peluso, 2003) access to an institutionalised process. As a result, they were 
allowed to “share” in the decision making process in exchange for “sharing” the 
decisions regarding the use of the finances they contributed to the sector by 
contributing to the basket funding. However once the process was institutionalized, 
they have continued to have the same access even after the demise of the basket 
funding. However, how decision makers use their negotiation tools to dominate 
discussions and convince each other raises the question of power relation and the 
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possible effect on future interactions in the light of changing development and aid 
context. 
The power relation between donors and the MOH reflect what Ribot and 
Peluso (2003) described when they said that some people and institutions control 
resource access while others must maintain their access through those who have 
control. Donors control financial access (earmarked and budget support) and the 
MOH to benefit from these must maintain relation with donors by investing and 
continuing with the institutionalised arrangements. However, donor power may 
have shifted between the control of the purse and discursive power (Rochefort and 
Cobb, 1993) as they follow up on international agenda such as the MDGs in attempts 
to direct national agenda. 
Ghana’s status change from low income to lower middle income means that 
Ghana is above income limits for grants eligibility (Moss and Majerowicz, 2012) and 
will eventually move away from aid. With the demise of “basket funding” and 
reduced total donor support (Ministry of Health, 2013a) there may be little or no shift 
in donor and MOH future power relations. This is because the health sector 
processes are path dependent and the processes may move in the same direction as 
established power relations may not change. However, if the government of Ghana is 
able to provide complete funding for the health sector minimising or cutting off 
donor financial support, then the power relations will shift with the government 
gaining greater control to interpret issues and set agendas. 
This paper also illustrates the fact that national agenda setting and 
formulation processes are enabled within institutionalised dialogue arrangements. 
The institutionalised arrangements such as the summits create a venue for policy 
decision making similar to what  Baumgartner and Jones (1991) described as a venue 
of policy action where interaction of ideas concerning a particular policy issue exist 
within a set of institutional structures. Therefore, interactions within these structures 
facilitate problem definition and prioritization of policies (Lindblom, 1980 ); and in 
this case policies, targets and financial resources allocation are agreed on during 
business meetings. Active participation in business meeting discussion is primarily 
restricted to the MOH and donors with authority and control over and access to 
financial resources. With limited power of private sector actors such as the Christian 
Health Association of Ghana, the agenda and course of action is greatly skewed to 
the interest of MOH and donors. We agree with Princen (2011) who in his work on 
European Union policy agenda setting observes similar pattern, that policy actors 
control the agenda by controlling participation. 
The fact that institutionalised venues restricts participation raise a question – 
are the relevant people meeting to maintain access to other available resources? For 
instance, actors who can facilitate potential policy change in terms of budget 
allocations such the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning are 
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underrepresented or sometimes absent at the health summits and other 
institutionalised arrangements. Additionally, the MOH implementing agencies 
responsible and accountable for policy implementation such as chief executive 
officers of teaching hospitals, directors of GHS headquarters directorates, and a large 
majority of regional health directorate are also underrepresented and sometimes less 
engaged in these interactions. 
Finally, decision makers, researchers and analysts alike - must be mindful of 
the use of power sources as negotiation tools to carefully define, frame and label 
issues to attract and mobilise support and the role of institutional structures in 
agenda setting and formulation. The study and understanding of power sources and 
use as negotiation tools in policy development should not be ignored in the pursuit 
of transformative change and sustained improvement in health systems in LMICs. 
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An abridged version of this chapter will be submitted to BMC Health Research 
Policy and Systems 
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5 The role of agenda setting processes and actors: a case of how free 
family planning got onto government agenda and not into 
formulation and implementation, in Ghana 
5.1 Abstract 
Background: 
Understanding how issues attain prominence on public policy agendas in LMICs and 
then move forward (or not) into successful formulation and implementation can 
yield important insights as to how to promote adoption and implementation of 
priority global and national policies and programmes. This paper contributes to this 
understanding by investigating how and why ‘free family planning as part of the 
National Health Insurance (NHIS) benefit package’ attained a position on the 
government policy agenda in 2012; but has not subsequently moved into formulation 
and implementation in Ghana. 
Methods: 
A case study approach was employed to systemically reconstruct the policy 
evolution. Data was collected from June 2012 to May 2014 through interviews, 
document reviews and observations; and analysed drawing on power concepts; and 
multiple streams and political priority frameworks. 
Results: 
Relying on their power sources such as access to bodies of evidence; bureaucrats, 
donors, reviewers and reproductive health advocates framed inadequate budgetary 
allocation and disbursement for family planning and exclusion of family planning 
services from the national health insurance benefits package - as major challenge to 
maternal health care. Drawing on their legal and structural access to institutionalized 
public policy processes in Ghana, they proposed including free family planning 
service in the national health insurance benefits package and increasing government 
and donor financial support as policy options. Window of opportunity opened when 
a Minister receptive to these problem definitions and policy options publically 
voiced support for the policy and therefore pushed it high and visibly onto the public 
policy agenda and it was also included in the revised the NHIS law. However, the 
policy has subsequently failed to move rapidly into formulation and implementation. 
Factors that influenced this failure included lack of stronger, broad actor support and 
related inability of actors to agree on and develop policy implementation guidelines; 
and maintain sustained political interest in the issue. 
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Conclusion 
For interest to be sustained and the item to move beyond prominence on the agenda 
into formulation and implementation it is probably necessary to invest in ensuring a 
powerful, convinced and persistent broad based supporting coalition at multi-levels 
of the health system. 
Key words:  
Agenda setting process, Actors, Power, Framing (Problem Definition), Maternal 
Health Service, Family Planning 
5.2 Key messages 
Implications for policy makers 
1. As in HIC, bodies of evidence and access to political authority and influence are 
important for public policy agenda setting in a LMIC like Ghana. 
2. Without maintained political interest and implementable policy modalities even 
when an item is pushed high up the public policy agenda, it can still fail to 
immediately move on into formulation and implementation. 
3. Linking policy item to a high government priority intervention such as maternal 
health care can influence the policy item’s appearance on government agenda. 
4. The ability to use issue framing to refocus problem definitions and policy options 
can influence agenda setting decisions, but it takes more than this to maintain an 
item high on the agenda and move it into formulation and implementation. 
Implications for public 
The study of how free family planning as part of the NHIS was raised to prominence 
on government agenda but then failed to immediately progress into formulation and 
implementation provides insights into public policy processes in a LMIC setting. The 
interests of bureaucrats, donors and advocates who influenced the agenda were to 
eliminate out of pocket payments for family planning service and still sustain the 
financial needs of the family planning programme through the NHIS. However, the 
lack of powerful and broad based support within the Ghanaian health sector to agree 
on implementation guidelines; and sustain political interest in the “free family 
planning as part of NHIS” policy agenda lead to stalled implementation after three 
and half years on the government agenda. With this information, the Ghanaian 
public especially health professions, family planning services users and advocates 
can demand policy guidelines from bureaucrats and funding from government for 
implementation. 
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5.3 Introduction 
Why some policy items get onto government agenda and move into formulation and 
implementation, while others do not is an important field of enquiry to inform public 
policy development. This is because to improve health outcomes and drive change is 
not simply enough to get policy items onto government agenda; they must move into 
formulation and implementation. There are several published studies on how policy 
items gain prominence and move into policy formulation (Green-Pedersen and 
Wilkerson, 2006, Kingdon, 2003, Shiffman, 2003, Princen, 2011), and how policy items 
are periodically maintained on the government agenda and reformulated (Nelson, 
1986, Koduah et al., 2015). There is however, limited research and publication from 
Low and Middle Income Countries (LMICs) (Gilson and Raphaely, 2008) as to why 
having made it onto the agenda, items fail to move beyond this into formulation and 
implementation. 
The government agenda is the list of policy items that government officials are 
paying serious attention at any given time (Kingdon, 2003). Problem recognition and 
definition are critical influences on what policy items occupy the government agenda 
(Kingdon, 2003, Rochefort and Cobb, 1994). Technical and bureaucratic policy actors 
label and define issues for the attention of high level decision makers in political 
systems; who are often political appointees (Kingdon, 2003). Technical and 
bureaucratic policy actors use their various sources of power (Mintzberg, 1983) such 
as access to evidence to highlight the magnitude and severity of problems or access 
to those who hold political power (political authority) to push issues onto the 
government agenda. They can also build on framings of current and past issues to 
shape problem recognition and definition. By framing we refer to the way problems 
are defined, labelled, stated or presented. Building on existing issue framing as 
suggested by Arts and Buizer (2009), makes arguments for certain problems and 
policy options to be more prominent than others. Simply getting an item onto the 
agenda is however no guarantee that it will stay on the agenda or move further 
forward into policy and programme formulation and implementation. The 
probability that a policy agenda item moves beyond merely being on the government 
agenda to formulation and implementation is dramatically increased if policy actors 
are able to link their problem definitions and possible solutions to a political 
receptive context in a single package (Kingdon, 2003). 
In 1970, Ghana’s family planning programme was established to promote and 
provide family planning education and service (National Population Council, 1994). 
The family planning service included methods and practices to delay pregnancy, 
space births, limit family size and prevent unintended pregnancies (Ghana Health 
Service, 2007). Over the years, the programme has been highly subsided by 
government and donors such that clients pay an out of pocket token fee averaging 
only about 10 percent of the international price (Smith and Fairbank, 2008) at point of 
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service. In 2012, a policy to completely remove the token out of pocket fees and pay 
for their replacement through the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) rose to 
visible prominence on the public policy agenda of the Ministry of Health (MOH). 
Two public statements by high government officials and the revised NHIS law 
promoted this agenda. The first high ranking public official statement was when the 
Minister of Health announced in May 2012 during a hospital refurbishment project 
launch that government would provide free family planning in public health 
facilities (Ghana News Agency, 2012b, Dorcas Larbi, 2012). The second public 
statement was Ghana’s communique issued after the London Family Planning 
Summit in July 2012 that stated - ‘Ghana is committed to making family planning free in 
the public sector and supporting the private sector to provide services...’ (UK Department 
for International Development and Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 2012). This was 
followed by a section in the National Health Insurance (NHI) Act 852 gazetted 
November 2012, that stated under the NHIS Benefit section [1]:“The Minister shall 
prescribe the healthcare benefits package including any relevant family planning package to be 
provided under the National Health Insurance Scheme” (Government of Ghana, 2012) 
clearly providing a legal framework for this policy. However, three and half years 
after these announcements and the promulgation of Act 852, this policy item has not 
moved beyond the agenda into formulation and implementation. 
In this paper we seek to advance our understanding of policy processes in a 
LMIC setting asking questions of how and why certain problem definitions and 
policy options can become prominent and endorsed at a high level as public policy 
agenda items; and yet fail to subsequently move swiftly forward into formulation 
and implementation. Specifically, we investigate how ‘free family planning as part of 
NHIS’ appeared on and rose to prominence on government (public policy) agenda in 
Ghana, a lower middle income country, but failed to move rapidly from there into 
programme formulation and implementation. We drew from multiple streams and 
political priority frameworks and power concepts to analyse this case. 
 
Theoretical background  
Kingdon (2003) in his influential work on USA health and transport policies notes 
active participants (policy actors) and processes by which agenda items come into 
prominence as two factors that affect agenda setting. He argues that the processes 
made up of – problem, policy and politics - develop and operate in independent 
streams which can couple randomly to create a window of opportunity for policy 
actors to push their preferred solutions or attention to special problems. He proposes 
that governmental agenda can be set solely in either problem or political streams; 
and solely by policy actors. The problem stream refers to processes through which 
policy actors use the existence of systematic indicators, focusing events and 
feedbacks from an existing policy to bring to the attention of government officials 
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some problems. The policy stream refers to processes where ideas are generated, 
debated, redrafted and accepted for serious consideration. The politics stream refers 
activities of interest groups and events such as election results that bring new 
administrations to power. Policy actors in his study included the President, the 
Congress, bureaucrats in the executive branch, and various forces outside of 
government included interest groups, political parties and the public (Kingdon, 
2003). 
Shiffman and Smith (2007) proposed a framework for determinant of political 
priority for national and global initiatives. They defined political priority as the 
degree to which international and national political leaders actively give attention to 
an issue, and back up that attention with the provision of financial, technical, and 
human resources that are commensurate with the severity of the issue. Power is core 
in the political priority framework which is made up of four components. The first 
component is the strength (power) of the individual and organizations concerned 
with the issue. The second is ideas; the ways in which those involved with the issue 
understand and portray it. The third is the political context in which actors operate; 
and the fourth issue characteristics that are features of the problem. 
Power is a key factor in policy process (Erasmus and Gilson, 2008, Weissert 
and Weissert, 2012) and a highly contested concept (Parsons, 1995). Mintzberg (1983) 
simply refers to power as the capacity to effect (affect) outcomes – decisions and the 
actions. He labels a policy actor who seeks to control decisions and actions as 
‘influencer’. He notes that the influencer essentially requires some source of power, 
coupled with the use of the power in a skilful way to effect (affect) outcomes. 
Mintzberg categorised five general sources of power as the control of (1) a resource, 
(2) a technical skill, (3) and a body of knowledge; (4) authority by virtue of one’s legal 
and structural position, and (5) power sources that derives simply from access to 
those who can rely on the other four. He argues that the influencers’ ability to control 
decisions and actions vary as each tries to use his or her means of influence 
effectively – to convince those to whom one has access, to use one’s resources, 
information and technical skills to their fullest. 
5.4 Methods 
Study design and data collection 
We employed a case study approach to systematically reconstruct how free family 
planning appeared on and moved through the government agenda over time. Case 
study approach allows for the collection of comprehensive, systematic and in-depth 
information within a real-life context to trace policy discussions and change over 
time (Patton, 2002, Yin, 2009). The case study approach allowed us to look at the 
policy item as not merely input and output, but to better understand the agenda 
setting context and how actors used their powers to influence the processes. 
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Data was collected from June 2012 to May 2014 through interviews, document 
reviews and observation. One of the authors (AK9 ) undertook a 20 month period of 
field work at the Policy Planning Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate (PPMED) of 
the MOH. The PPMED coordinates national policy and strategic planning for the 
health sector. AK also undertook a two week attachment at the Ghana Health Service 
(GHS) Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) department. The RCH department 
coordinates public sector family planning programme implementation. Participant 
observations at the RCH department and PPMED were chosen to study and better 
understand ongoing health sector family planning and maternal health policy 
discussions and actors’ interactions. Field notes from observing national level 
maternal health and family planning related discussions and actors interactions 
allowed us to draw inference on how policy actors use their power in discussions to 
support our retrospective data. 
The interviews lasting on average 1 hour were conducted face to face using a 
semi structured guide to explore how policy actors defined family planning 
problems and proposed solutions; and why the policy item did not move beyond the 
government agenda. Sixteen respondents involved in free family planning policy 
discussions were interviewed; six of these were identified from health sector 
documents, while the rest (10) were suggested by other respondents. The 
respondents included officials of the: MOH (4), GHS headquarters (2), the National 
Health Insurance Authority (3); and a politician (1). Respondents outside 
government included donors (5) and Coalition of Non-Governmental Organizations 
in Health representative (1). Where permission was granted the interviews were tape 
recorded. Otherwise notes were taken and verified later with the participant. 
Documents review was conducted to trace and map how family planning 
issues evolved within the health sector at national level; identify policy actors 
involved and their power sources; make an inventory of policy actors’ definition of 
family planning problems and policy options; and further triangulate findings with 
field notes and information from interviewees. The health sector documents 
reviewed were: medium-term development plans (2002-2006, 2007-2011, 2010-2013), 
annual programme of work (2002-2014), health sector working group 2012 meeting 
records (12 January, 9 February, 3 May, 7 June, 5 July), reproductive and maternal 
health reports, briefs, position papers and studies; and family planning related media 
information from the Ghana News Agency (2008-2014). 
Data from interviews, observations and documents reviews were systemically 
grouped based on the research questions. We systematically mapped out policy 
actors power sources and use; the way policy actors understood and portrayed 
family planning issues over time; and the political environment in which policy 
actors operated. Further analysis involved iteratively reconstructing the agenda 
                                                 
9 PhD candidate 
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setting processes – how policy actors used their power sources to push the ‘free 
family planning as part of NHIS’ policy onto government agenda and were not able 
to swiftly move the policy into implementation. Interpretations of how policy actors 
used their power to influence ongoing health sector decisions from the research 
observations allowed us to link up retrospective events and explanations. These 
analyses were synthesised to reconstruct family planning framing evolution and how 
and why ‘free family planning as part of NHIS’ policy item got onto the government 
agenda and failed to swiftly move into policy formulation and implementation. We 
acknowledge the difficulty in reconstructing retrospective events as they unfolded 
and mapping out who said what, when, to whom and how it was received. Data 
from multiple sources and methods were triangulated to minimise these challenges. 
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 ‘Free family planning as part of NHIS’ policy appearance on the 
government agenda 
Policy actors power sources 
The policy actors identified for the ‘free family planning as part of NHIS’ policy were 
MOH and GHS bureaucrats, National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA), National 
Population Council, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), health sector 
performance reviewers and donors. These policy actors invested their time and used 
legal and structural authority, technical skills, access to political authority, control 
over and access to financial resources and bodies of evidence parallel to those power 
sources suggested by Mintzberg (1983) to influence each other and the free family 
planning agenda setting processes. These policy actors power sources are further 
elaborated below. 
The MOH leads and coordinates national level institutionalised policy 
dialogue processes that set agendas and formulate policies for implementation. The 
GHS reproductive and child health department coordinates public sector family 
planning and reproductive health policy implementation. These bureaucrats 
therefore wield legal and structural authority, experience, technical skills to engage 
in family planning discussions because of their position within the health sector. 
They also have access to bodies of evidence e.g. health sector reviews; financial 
resources from government and donors; and political actors such as the Minister of 
Health and Parliamentarians. 
The NHIA is a body mandated to implement, operate and manage the NHIS 
that ensures access to basic healthcare services to all residents; and therefore wield 
legal authority to implement the NHIS policy. The National Population Council also 
wield legal authority to coordinate population-related programmes including family 
planning, set targets for programme performance and commission research to inform 
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policy making. As a result, the NHIA and the Population Council were actively 
involved in discussions related to the ‘free family planning part of NHIS’ policy. 
The main NGOs involved were Planned Parenthood Association of Ghana 
(PPAG) and the Alliance for Reproductive Health Rights (ARHR). Lobbying and 
campaigning abilities; and access to bodies of evidence, bureaucrats and political 
actors such as the Minister of Health - were their source of power, during discussions 
related to family planning. The health sector reviewers made up of local and 
international experts assess the health sector performance based on a clearly defined 
terms of reference set by the MOH and donors. The review findings form part of 
evidence that is debated upon during policy dialogues to inform decisions. The 
reviewers’ power sources include their expertise to generate evidence and access to 
bureaucrats and donors. 
Health sector donors [Royal Danish Embassy (RDE); Royal Netherlands 
Embassy (RNE), UK-Department for International Development (DFID); European 
Commission (EC); World Bank; United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA); World 
Health Organisation (WHO); United Nations International Emergency Funds 
(UNICEF); Embassy of Japan; U.S Agency for International Development (USAID) ] 
were actively involved in agenda setting discussions and decisions related to family 
planning to which they have structural authority to participate. Some of these 
discussions were embedded in an institutionalised policy dialogue process which 
emanated from a sector wide approach to health care adopted in 1997 (Cassels, 1997, 
Addai and Gaere, 2001). Under the sector wide approach the donors gained rights-
base access to national policy making and structural authority to join the MOH and 
local actors to prioritise health sector policies. The institutionalised policy dialogue 
therefore promotes a platform for collective action and decisions (Koduah et al., 
2016). 
Additional donor source of power is their control over financial resources for 
contraceptives; and our observations show that they use this as leverage and 
legitimacy to engage in the prioritization of health sector policies to push their 
preferred ideas through. Ghana has been heavily dependent on donor funding to 
implement family planning programme since inception in 1970. From 1996 onward, 
USAID and UNFPA provided strong financial support; with further assistance from 
DFID and the World Bank (Government of Ghana, 2006). Putting donors financial 
support into perspective, Graph 5.1 shows Ghana’s family planning funding sources 
for contraceptives between 2003 and 2007 (Smith and Fairbank, 2008). 
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Graph 5.1: Historical sources of funding for family planning contraceptives, 
Ghana 2003-2007 
 
Review of health sector annual programme of work revealed that donors over the 
years have given family planning programme much financial attention and had 
presented and supported policy options to safe guard it. To quote a policy 
implementer’s view point on donor support. ‘Family planning is very, very popular with 
donors and they have over the years provided funding for contraceptives’ [Interview, 
22/08/2012]. 
Also, donors supported the generation of evidence to influence the ‘Free 
family planning as part of NHIS’ policy debates. For example the USAID financially 
supported studies such as: ‘An estimate of potential costs and benefits of adding family 
planning services to the National Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana, and impact on the 
private sector’ (Smith and Fairbank, 2008); ‘Cost of family planning services in Ghana’ 
(Felix Ankomah Asante, 2013); and ‘How Ghana can save lives and money: the benefits of 
financing family planning through National Health Insurance’ (Chaitkin, 2015). The 
donors’ power sources combined made them particularly powerful in the ‘free family 
planning as part of NHIS’ agenda setting process. As noted by a bureaucrat with a 
view on donors’ intention: ‘donors are eager to get family planning to be free and are 
engaged in several discussions to push it’ [Interview, 22/08/2012]. 
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Family planning framing evolution in Ghana (1970-2006) 
The way that the justification for mobilization of resources and other support to 
subsidize or provide family planning services completely free as a public health good 
has been framed in Ghana by political and technical actors and donors has evolved 
over the years in attempts to gain and maintain influence in changing political 
context. 
In 1969, Ghana became the third country in sub-Saharan Africa, after Kenya 
and Mauritius, to declare a population policy affirming the government’s 
commitment to curbing population growth. The Population Planning for National 
Progress and Prosperity policy focussed heavily on demographic and other 
population related targets and the interconnections between population growth and 
socio-economic development (National Population Council, 1994, Government of 
Ghana, 2006). Following the adoption of the Population Planning for National 
Progress and Prosperity policy, a family planning programme was established in 
1970 to promote and provide family planning education and service. The Population 
Planning for National Progress and Prosperity policy provided the conceptual 
framework within which the family planning programme was framed and 
conducted with the focus to curb population growth and achieve national 
demographic targets and socio-economic development goals (Government of Ghana, 
2006). 
The 1969 population policy was revised in 1994 to correct implementation 
inadequacies and incorporate emerging issues such as HIV and AIDS. Within the 
revised policy, the family planning programme was reframed and focused to ensure 
access to affordable family planning means and services for all couples and 
individuals to enable them regulate their fertility (National Population Council, 
1994). 
To rekindle government’s interest, the family planning programme was 
repositioned in 2006 by MOH and GHS bureaucrats and health sector donors. A 
roadmap for repositioning family planning in Ghana was developed to again 
highlight family planning’s importance to health and socio-economic development as 
promulgated by the 1969 population policy. The repositioning roadmap initiated a 
policy shift and frame towards a national strategic plan of combined focus of 
individual and couple rights to contraceptive use and family planning as a tool to 
achieve health and socio-economic development objectives (Government of Ghana, 
2006, Odoi-Agyarko Henrietta, 2003). 
Between 2007 and 2012 the next focus of the family planning programme in 
Ghana – that is no out of pocket fees slowly evolved and consolidated into the 
prominent appearance of “free family planning as part of the NHIS” on the public 
policy agenda. 
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Issue framing towards a ‘free family planning as part of NHIS’ agenda 
To push the ‘free family planning as part of NHIS’ agenda, the supporting MOH and 
GHS bureaucrats and donors considered inadequate budgetary allocation and 
disbursement for family planning and exclusion of family planning services from the 
NHIS benefits package - as major challenge to family planning contribution to 
maternal health care. In April 2008, MOH and donors [RDE, RNE, DFID, EC, World 
Bank, UNFPA, WHO, UNICEF, Embassy of Japan, USAID] discussed the 2007 health 
sector review findings and highlighted family planning budgetary disbursement and 
allocation gap (Ministry of Health, 2008a). According to the report, government and 
donors in 2007 each allocated US$1.5million to procure contraceptives; however, only 
US$1million was disbursed (actual disbursement by each was not stated). The report 
also noted contraceptives supplies to the sector did not meet expected demands due 
to the huge and significant funding gap (Ministry of Health, 2008c). To address the 
funding gap challenges, the MOH and donors at the meeting agreed as a short term 
solution the following: (1) the MOH prepares paper on the need for increased 
government funding and negotiate with the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning, (2) the donors explore and mobilize additional funds, and (3) commission a 
cost effectiveness analysis of financing family planning service under NHIS (Ministry 
of Health, 2008a). 
As a result, international consultants were invited by the MOH through 
USAID Ghana office to provide an analysis of costs and benefits to the NHIS in 
adding family planning products and services to the benefits package. The 
consultants conducted from June 29, 2008 to July 11, 2008 a cost benefit analysis of 
adding coverage of long term and permanent family planning methods, as well as 
injectable contraceptives, to the benefits package. The analysis revealed that family 
planning would cause a decrease in fertility and would avert births that otherwise 
would cost the NHIS considerable expenditures. The report projected a net saving of 
almost US$ 11 million by 2011 with an increase to over US$ 18 million in 2017 if 
family planning is covered by NHIS in 2009. The consultants therefore recommended 
inclusion of family planning service onto the NHIS benefit package (Smith and 
Fairbank, 2008). 
In a related development, family planning programme was reframed as part 
of an appropriate response to persisting high maternal mortality indicators in July 
2008. Institutional maternal mortality ratio had increased from 187/100,000 live 
births in 2006 to 224/100,000 live births in 2007 and the proportion of skilled care at 
delivery also decreased from 44.5 percent in 2006 to 35.1 percent in 2007 (Ministry of 
Health, 2008c). The MOH therefore convened a two day (8 & 9 July) consultative 
meeting of national and international stakeholders to deliberate on Ghana’s maternal 
mortality burden and propose interventions. At the meeting, bureaucrats, 
reproductive health advocates, international technical advisors, and donors 
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identified and reframed family planning as a strategic tool to contribute reduce 
maternal mortality (Ministry of Health, 2008d). 
The cost effectiveness analysis findings and the reframing of family planning 
as a strategic tool for maternal health informed the bureaucrats and donors’ 
consideration of exclusion of family planning from the NHIS a challenge to overall 
maternal health care, during a policy dialogue meeting in April 2009. In addition, 
other evidence used to support the position of free family planning as part of the 
NHIS included inability of some women to pay for family planning and its potential 
effect on maternal health care (Ministry of Health, 2009b). Another evidence was the 
fact that other reproductive health services were already covered by the NHIS. 
Pregnant women registered free onto the NHIS to access free antenatal, delivery and 
postnatal services from accredited NHIS public and private facilities. This maternal 
health care policy in the light of family planning contributions to maternal health, 
created a situation that made the absence of family planning in the benefits package a 
viable problem. 
To safe guard family planning and provide an alternative financing option the 
bureaucrats and donors supported their problem definitions with narratives of the 
benefits of family planning for maternal health and the need to continuously invest 
in family planning. 
 
‘Family planning has direct effect on reducing maternal and neonatal mortality’ 
[GHS staff, 14/12/2012]; ‘Family planning programme must be financially supported to 
make contraceptives available and ensure its benefits to maternal health care’ [Donor, 
27/11/2012]. 
 
The MOH bureaucrats and health sector donors promoted as effective 
interventions for overall maternal health care the following: including free family 
planning service in the national health insurance benefits package and increasing 
government and donor financial support. With the intention to eliminate out of 
pocket payments for family planning service and still sustain the financial needs of 
the family planning programme through the National Health Insurance scheme. 
Ideas to promote ‘free family planning as part of NHIS’ agenda 
The idea to incorporate free family planning into NHIS floated around and resonated 
with many within the health sector. For example, according to the November 2009 
Aide Memoire Progress Report, the PPAG and UNFPA incorporated the findings of 
the cost effectiveness analysis into a position paper and submitted to the Minister of 
Health in October, 2009 for the government’s consideration (Ministry of Health, 
2009a). The reviewers of the 2009 health sector performance also recommended the 
inclusion of family planning into the NHIS benefits package, based on the cost 
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effectiveness analysis (Ministry of Health, 2010). Health sector donors, reproductive 
health advocates and bureaucrats also lobbied. 
 
The donors are advocating for family planning to be put on the NHIA list, as there is a 
report that recommends that the NHIA will make saving if family planning services 
are included in the benefit package. Other partners are involved in the advocacy - the 
PPAG and Alliance for reproductive Health’ [Donor, 27/11/2012]. ‘ The NHIA has 
an excellent reimbursement mechanism in place, that is why free family planning 
should be on its package so facilities could be reimbursed’ [GHS staff, 26/11/2012]. 
 
By 2011, the idea of adding family planning to the NHIS benefit package was 
nested within the health sector so much that the GHS Director General in December, 
2011 at an international conference in Dakar Senegal, promoted it. He said in an 
interview that Ghana was committed to family planning programme with 
negotiations underway to include family planning services onto the NHIS benefit 
package (Linda Asante Agyei, 2011). 
However, there was initial opposition to the idea. One argument used by the 
NHIA management and other opposing actors was that a ‘free family planning as 
part of the NHIS’ policy would financially overburden the NHIS. This was because 
the National Health Insurance Fund established as part of the implementation 
arrangement of the NHIS had not increased proportionately to expenditure of 
running the schemes over the years. Moreover, there had been financial gaps with an 
excess of expenditure over income; and reimbursement delays to providers (Ghana 
News Agency, 2013). 
 
‘The NHIS is saddled with unpaid claims therefore including family planning services 
will further over burden the scheme’ [GHS staff 26/11/2012 ]. 
 
To put the cost of implementing the policy in perspective, the NHIA estimated 
commodity and service cost per year based on National Population Council 
commodity and service cost figures. According to the estimates, it would cost the 
NHIA nearly US$13million in 2013 rising to US$17.02 by 2015 for short and long 
term contraceptive methods; and for provision of long term methods US$ 7.4 million 
in 2013 with an increase to US$ 10.1 million in 2015. Based on these estimations the 
NHIA management questioned the sustainability of such a policy under the NHIS 
and resisted the call to provide family planning (National Health Insurance 
Authority, 2015). The NHIA management requested for increased financial 
allocations to the NHIS if the benefit package must include family planning services. 
To quote an NHIS official with the increase financial resources viewpoint: ‘The huge 
budget for contraceptives from government and donors should be given to the NHIS if family 
planning is to be included in the benefit package’ [Interview, 26/11/2012]. 
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Upon persistent calls and lobbying by supporting actors, the NHIA 
management engaged the National Population Council in discussions on the full 
benefits of family planning and which aspects the NHIS could cover. By 2012, the 
NHIA had stated in its annual outlook for 2012 the intent to add long term family 
planning methods to the benefit package (National Health Insurance Authority, 2015, 
National Health Insurance Authority, 2012a). 
Political context surrounding the ‘free family planning as part of NHIS’ agenda 
The family planning programme in Ghana has survived as a national intervention 
through Ghana’s political transitions since it was first introduced in 1970. This 
includes a series of military and civilian regimes in the unstable period between 1970 
and 1992 and the current stable multiparty democratic system since 1992 with 
presidential and parliamentary elections held every four years in keeping with the 
1992 Constitution. Transition of power between political parties has taken place 
smoothly in 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012 with a handover from one political tradition to 
another in two instances. Ghana has over twenty seven registered political parties 
with the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP) being 
the dominant ones, between whom leadership of governance of the country has 
rotated since 1992 (Ghana Electoral Commission, 2015). The NDC claims a center left 
social democratic ideology (National Democratic Congress 2016) and the NPP a 
center right liberal democratic / liberal conservative ideology (New Patriotic Party, 
2016). In practice both have tended to support social policies for universal health and 
education access such as national health insurance, family planning, female 
education and free universal and compulsory education. Responding to the social 
and economic challenges of Ghana is perhaps more important than strict ideology in 
Ghana’s multiparty democratic politics. 
Window of opportunity  
Under the NDC administration and between 2009 and 2013, four different Ministers 
of Health were appointed by the President as listed in Table 5.1. A new ministerial 
appointment marks a change in the health sector administration. The Minister 
represents government and occupies a political authority position and oversees 
health sector decisions and strategic planning. The frequent turnover of Ministers 
some with less than a year tenure, was not ideal for continuity as noted by a policy 
actor – ‘having four Minister of Health in four years is a problem and not good for continuity 
in strategic planning’ [Donor, 11/09/2012]. But, provided the bureaucrats, donors and 
reproductive health advocates the opportunity to lobby and push their problem 
definitions and policy options to the Ministers as they took office. 
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Table 5.1: Ministers of Health and their office tenure between January 2009 and 
January 2013 
Minister of Health Start End 
Dr George Sipa-Adjah 
Yankey 
January 2009 October 2009 
Dr Benjamin Kunbuor November 2009 January 2011 
Mr Joseph Yieleh Chireh February 2011 February 2012 
Mr Alban Sumana 
Kingsford Bagbin 
February 2012 January 2013 
 
A political window of opportunity for the ‘free family planning as part of 
NHIS’ policy was opened when the Mr Bagbin became receptive to the problem 
definitions and policy options promoted through the collective actions of 
bureaucrats, donors and advocates. Mr Bagbin therefore at a hospital refurbishment 
launch in May 2012, announced that government will provide free family planning in 
public health facilities (Ghana News Agency, 2012b, Dorcas Larbi, 2012). The donor 
community at the April 2012 policy dialogue meeting welcomed the free family 
planning announcement (Ministry of Health, 2012a). 
To further push the ‘free family planning as part of NHIS’ policy agenda after 
the Minister’s public announcement, the MOH and GHS bureaucrats lobbied the 
Parliamentary Select Committee on health. The Committee made up of elected 
parliamentarians from both government and opposition in Parliament deliberate on 
overall health strategic plans and oversee reviews of health legislations and laws. 
They are therefore influential in getting ideas onto the government agenda. 
According to the November 2011 Aide Memoire Progress Report, the MOH and GHS 
bureaucrats at a Parliamentary Select Committee hearing in July 2011 advocated free 
family planning under NHIS. The bureaucrats therefore accessed and lobbied this 
political influence during the NHI Act 650 review process and presented the 
evidence of financial saving to be made if family planning service was incorporated 
into the NHIS benefit package to the Committee for consideration. 
Mr Bagbin further demonstrated his receptiveness when he agreed for the 
MOH and GHS to participate in the July 2012 London Family Planning Summit; after 
a DFID’s invitation and request for government to declare support for family 
planning programme at the summit. According to a 5th July 2012 policy dialogue 
record, the MOH prepared a presentation for the Summit. The Summit organised 
and hosted by the United Kingdom government and the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation aimed to put increased access to contraception for women in the 
developing world back on the global health and development agenda (Cohen, 2012).   
At the summit, the Ghanaian delegates issued a communique stating - ‘Ghana 
is committed to making family planning free in the public sector and supporting the private 
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sector to provide services...’(UK Department for International Development and Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation, 2012). As a follow up to Ghana’s commitment to family 
planning, a legal backing was provided for under the revised NHI Act 852. The Act 
852 gazetted November 2012, under the Benefits section [1] stated that – The Minister 
shall prescribe the healthcare benefits package including any relevant family planning package 
to be provided under the National Health Insurance Scheme (Government of Ghana, 2012). 
The inclusion of family planning in the Act 852 was informed by the Mr Bagbin’s 
receptiveness and the GHS/MOH bureaucrats’ use of the cost effectiveness evidence 
to lobby and convince the Parliamentary Select Committee on health. 
5.5.2  ‘Free family planning as part of NHIS’ policy failure to swiftly move into 
formulation and implementation  
The ‘free family planning as part of NHIS’ policy presence on the government 
agenda was not openly contested within the health sector, however, it failed to 
swiftly move into formulation and implementation. One factor contributing to the 
policy’s failure to swiftly move into formulation implementation is partial coupling. 
Partial coupling occurs when problems come up for decisions without solutions 
attached (Kingdon, 2003). When the political window of opportunity opened the 
supporting policy actors failed to fully link the problem definitions and clearly stated 
policy specifics to the political receptiveness. Months after the summit, 
implementation modalities were not agreed upon by the GHS, MOH and NHIA. As 
noted by a donor – before the summit the DFID asked the GHS/MOH to a make declaration 
and design modalities for implementation. Before the summit discussion was on how the 
implementation will be done. It is the same conversation for the past 6months. [Interview; 
27/11/2012]. 
The bureaucratic delay in the design of the implementation modalities may 
also be partly attributed to funding uncertainty and anticipated future 
implementation constraints. As noted by a policy formulator with a possible 
implementation constraint viewpoint: ‘family planning programme involves 
contraceptives, implementing a free family planning policy will present a challenge if a clear 
and agreed guidelines on how to implement is not developed. One needs to make sure that the 
contraceptives are not taken out of the facilities for private use’ [GHS staff, 26/11/2012].  
Funding uncertainty on the other hand is fuelled by: absence of government 
budget allocation and disbursement for the policy (National Health Insurance 
Authority, 2015), gradual reduction of health sector donor budget support (Ministry 
of Health, 2013a, Camp and Musinguzi, 2011) and the fact that the NHIA would have 
to spend money (that is not available) first to provide free contraceptives before it 
can recoup the ‘saving’ over time (National Health Insurance Authority, 2015, Smith 
and Fairbank, 2008). These uncertainties have resulted in a weak broad base health 
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sector actor support and related inability to agree on and develop policy 
implementation guidelines. 
Yet another factor contributing to the policy failure to swiftly move into 
formulation implementation is reduced political access and interest in the issue after 
it moved up the government agenda. The political window closed when a new 
Minister took office in February 2013 under the same NDC government. So although, 
free family planning remained on the government agenda its prominence reduced 
and faded with the change of a critical and powerful supporting actor like the 
Minister for health. This may have hampered ongoing free family planning 
implementation modalities discussions. As noted by a policy actor: ‘the family 
planning implementation modalities discussion may be ongoing. However, I believe the 
energy is low and there are many other issues on the table now. And this current Minister 
may have other priorities’ [MOH staff, 14/01/2014]. 
5.6 Discussion and conclusions 
In this study, we have asked: Who are the policy actors involved and how did they 
use their power sources to define problems and propose solutions? How did free 
family planning end up on the government agenda and failed to move beyond it? We 
theorized that the way policy actors used their powers to define problems and 
propose solutions building on a family planning reframing as a strategic tool to 
reduce maternal mortality and the cost effectiveness analysis predominately moved 
free family planning as part of the NHIS, that started being floated around a few 
years earlier; high onto the government agenda in 2012. However, the actors that 
moved it high up the policy agenda lacked equal power to move it into formulation 
and implementation; and at the same time, the actors with more power to move it to 
formulation and implementation were not completely mobilized and convinced of 
the financial feasibility and sustainability of the policy. 
The policy agenda influencers – supporting MOH/GHS bureaucrats, donors 
(especially, USAID, DFID, UNFPA, World Bank), reviewers, National Population 
Council and advocates (PPAG, ARHR) - relied on power sources that closely parallel 
those suggested by Mintzberg (1983) to influence the agenda setting process. They 
relied on their expertise, legal and structural authority within the health sector to 
prioritise issues, control and access to financial resources as leverage and legitimacy 
to engage in the agenda setting process; access to bodies of evidence and political 
influence to collectively push ‘free family planning as part of NHIS’ policy onto 
government agenda.  
But some supporting actors were more influential; particularly the donors 
with their subtle use of evidence, leverage of financial support and structural 
authority within the health sector and ability to concentrate their energies and 
skilfully convinced those to whom they had access. This made the donors 
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particularly powerful in the agenda setting process influencing others to accept the 
‘free family planning as part of NHIS’ policy issue. However, other influential policy 
actors such the Ministers of health that came after the ‘receptive Minister’ were not 
completely mobilised and convinced of the financial feasibility and sustainability of 
the policy and this affected the policy’s ability to move into formulation and 
implementation. 
The absence of sustained mobilised political support reflected in a low 
national political priority for the ‘free family planning as part of NHIS’ policy after it 
appeared on the government agenda in 2012. The low national political priority led 
to the policy’s failure to swiftly move into formulation and implementation. 
According to Shiffman and Smith (2007) national political priority is present when: 
(1) national political leaders publicly and privately express sustained concern for the 
issue; (2) the government, through an authoritative decision-making process, enacts 
policies that offer widely embraced strategies to address the problem; and (3) the 
government allocates and releases public budgets commensurate with the problem’s 
gravity. In our case study, despite national political leaders publicly expressing 
support and the Parliament including the policy item into the revised NHIS law, the 
last two political priority indicators i.e. enactment of strategies and release of public 
budgets were absent; and the initial political access and interest in the policy was not 
sustained by supporting policy actors.  
Sustained political interest and access is particularly important for the timely 
manner in which policies are enacted and implemented in Ghana (Koduah et al., 
2015) as in other LMICs (Shiffman, 2003). For example, to fulfil a political campaign 
promise made in 2002 to provide universal health coverage through national health 
insurance ; the Ghanaian government fast-tracked the policy formulation process and 
ensured that the NHI Act 650 and its accompanying Legislative Instrument (L.I 1809) 
were developed and gazetted in September 2003, and 2004 respectively for 
implementation (Agyepong and Adjei, 2008). Heavily indebted poor countries 
initiative resources were allocated to implement the policy. Again, the free maternal 
health care policy announced by the President of Ghana in May 2008 had its 
implementation guidelines developed and implemented July same year with donor 
funds allocated to jump start implementation (Koduah et al., 2015). 
Framing and attraction of the interest of powerful actors can push items high 
up on public policy agendas. However how they fare once there that is whether they 
move forward into formulation and implementation or stall depends on the power of 
the supporting actors including how broad based the support for the agenda item is 
as well as continuous political interest and resources for policy implementation. For 
interest to be sustained and the item to move beyond prominence on the agenda into 
formulation and implementation it is probably necessary to invest in ensuring a 
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powerful, convinced and persistent broad based supporting coalition at multi-levels 
of the health system. 
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6 Technical analysis, contestation and politics in policy agenda 
setting and implementation: the rise and fall of primary care 
maternal services from Ghana’s capitation policy 
6.1 Abstract 
Background 
Why issues get on the policy agenda, move into policy formulation and 
implementation while others drop off in the process is an important field of enquiry 
to inform public social policy development and implementation. This paper seeks to 
advance our understanding of health policy agenda setting, formulation and 
implementation processes in Ghana, a lower middle income country by exploring 
how and why less than three months into the implementation of a pilot prior to 
national scale up; primary care maternal services that were part of the basket of 
services in a primary care per capita national health insurance scheme provider 
payment system dropped off the agenda. 
Methods 
We used a case study design to systematically reconstruct the decisions and actions 
surrounding the rise and fall of primary care maternal health services from the 
capitation policy. Data was collected from July 2012 and August 2014 through in-
depth interviews, observations and document review. The data was analysed 
drawing on concepts of policy resistance, power and arenas of conflict. 
Results 
During the agenda setting and policy formulation stages; predominantly technical 
policy actors within the bureaucratic arena used their expertise and authority for 
consensus building to get antenatal, normal delivery and postnatal services included 
in the primary care per capita payment system. Once policy implementation started, 
policy makers were faced with unanticipated resistance. Service providers, especially 
the private self-financing used their professional knowledge and skills, access to 
political and social power and street level bureaucrat power to contest and resist 
various aspects of the policy and its implementation arrangements – including the 
inclusion of primary care maternal health services. Arenas of conflict moved from the 
bureaucratic to the public as opposing actors presented multiple interpretations of 
the policy intent and implementation and gained the attention of politicians and the 
public. The context of intense public arena conflicts and controversy in an election 
year added to the high level political anxiety generated by the contestation. The 
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President and Minister of Health responded and removed antenatal, normal delivery 
and postnatal care from the per capita package. 
Conclusion 
The tensions and complicated relationships between technical considerations and 
politics and bureaucratic versus public arenas of conflict are important influences 
that can cause items to rise and fall on policy agendas. 
Key words 
Agenda setting, Arenas of conflict, Implementation, Maternal health services, 
National Health Insurance, Per capita payment 
6.2 Introduction 
Why some issues get on the policy agenda, move into policy formulation and 
implementation while others drop off in the process is an important field of enquiry 
to inform public social policy development and implementation. Despite several 
published studies on how issues gain prominence (Princen, 2011, Shiffman et al., 
2004, Shiffman, 2003, Kingdon, 2003); or are periodically re-examined and 
maintained on an agenda over time (Nelson, 1986, Green-Pedersen and Wilkerson, 
2006, Koduah et al., 2015) there remains a relative dearth of work on these issues 
from Low and Middle Income Countries (LMICs) (Gilson and Raphaely, 2008). 
To advance our understanding in this area of work; the current investigation 
in Ghana, a lower middle income country explored how in the implementation 
processes of a pilot prior to national scale up; antenatal, normal delivery and 
postnatal services that were initially included as part of the basket of services in a 
primary care per capita National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) provider payment 
system dropped off the agenda. 
Under a per capita provider payment system (capitation), accredited health 
service providers receive in advance, a predetermined lump sum payment to provide 
a defined package of services for each enrollee with the provider for a fixed period 
(National Health Insurance Authority, 2011c, Epstein and Cumella, 1988). The 
predetermined lump is computed to reflect the average cost of providing the defined 
package of services to the enrolled population. The amount is paid whether or not 
the enrollees make use of services within the payment period. Providers therefore 
have strong incentives to minimise their financial cost. Since the compensation 
package is decided prospectively, providers can maximize the difference between 
their earnings and costs by simply keeping costs down. There is no limit on the 
number of times the enrollee can seek services from the provider, and providers 
therefore have an incentive to limit the quantity of services provided to the patient 
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per visit as a preferred approach to reducing their operating cost (National Health 
Insurance Authority, 2010, Jegers et al., 2002, Chawla et al., 1997). 
In 2010 the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) commenced a 
process to design and implement a per capita provider payment system in Ghana on 
a pilot basis. The stated objectives for the introduction of the per capita payment 
system were to: (1) improve cost containment, efficiency and effectiveness of health services 
through more rational resource use. (2) share financial risk between schemes, providers and 
subscribers. (3) introduce managed competition for providers and choice for patients to 
increase the responsiveness of the health system. (4) correct some imbalances created by using 
the Ghana Diagnostic Related Groupings payment system for outpatient care such as 
outpatient supplier-induced demand. (5) simplify claims processing and (6) address 
difficulties in forecasting and budgeting. The approach of a pilot in one region before 
nationwide implementation was to “enable testing of the overall effectiveness of the 
designed system in achieving the identified objectives, identify key features of implementation 
that would be essential for success in scale-up after the pilot” (National Health Insurance 
Authority, 2010). 
Ashanti region where implementation of the capitation was piloted has 19 
percent of Ghana’s population – making it the region with the largest proportion of 
Ghana’s population. It reflects the diversity of Ghana from the complex metropolis of 
Kumasi the regional capital to deprived remote rural areas like parts of the Afram 
plains (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012). 
The use of per capita provider payment system in health insurance is not new. 
Health insurance schemes in middle income countries like Argentina, Brazil, 
Nicaragua and Thailand have adopted capitation payment as a means to remunerate 
public and private providers (Mills et al., 2000). However, for the lower middle 
income country in Sub-Saharan Africa that Ghana was in 2010 and currently remains, 
it was a major innovation. In Ghana, capitation was mentioned in the National 
Health Insurance law (Act 650) and legislative instrument at the inception of the 
scheme in 2003 as one of the payment mechanisms to be explored (Government of 
Ghana, 2003, Government of Ghana, 2004) and thus already on the strategic 
purchasing agenda. However, it remained dormant, largely because of a sense that 
the experience to implement it was lacking; until it re-emerged in 2010 with the 
NHIA decision to reform the provider payment system. 
Primary care maternity services were included in the capitation basket of 
services in the initial design, and implementation started in January 2012 in the 
Ashanti region. However, by March 16, 2012 after less than three months 
implementation of the policy amid heavy public arena social and political 
contestation of the policy; primary care maternal health services were removed from 
the basket of service. The specific research questions this study tries to answer are: 
Who were the policy actors involved? How did they include and subsequently 
exclude primary care maternity services in the capitation policy and why? This 
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analysis firstly provides insights on how and why primary care maternal health 
services got onto the capitation policy agenda, implemented and later removed. 
Secondly, it contributes to the general understanding of policy agenda setting, 
formulation and implementation in a LMIC setting. 
National health insurance provider payment mechanisms in Ghana  
In September 2003, Ghana passed a National Health Insurance Law (Act 650) to 
provide the legal backing for the implementation of a national health insurance 
scheme that would ensure all residents access to basic healthcare services 
(Government of Ghana, 2004). Implementation started in January 2004. A National 
Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) established as part of the implementation 
arrangements had as its funding sources a national health insurance levy of 2.5 
percent value added tax on selected goods and services, 2.5 percent of all Social 
Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) contributions; registration fees from 
all enrollees and premiums from non SSNIT contributors. 
NHIS provider payment mechanisms have evolved over time. In 2004, NHIA 
started with itemized billing with no standardized fee schedule for services and 
medicines. Each of the district schemes negotiated with their providers itemized fee 
rates for services, consumables, and medicines. In the face of growing concerns over 
inefficiencies such as random price variations for the same procedures and 
consumables, cumbersome billing and claim vetting procedures and cost escalation, 
NHIA in 2008, introduced a case based payment mechanism known as the Ghana – 
Diagnosis Related Groups (G-DRG) for clinical services and procedures; and 
standardized itemized fees for medicines based on a periodically revised medicine 
list. The G-DRG is an adaptation of the DRG approach, in that although it has the 
patient classification system, it does not have cost weights and severity levels. The G-
DRG and itemised fees for medicines are applied nationwide for all levels of care 
from the lowest (Community Health Planning and Services compounds) to the 
highest (Teaching hospitals), to pay all accredited providers – public, quasi-
government, and private – for inpatient and outpatient services. A study of Ghana’s 
NHIS provider payment and service supply behaviour and incentives by Agyepong 
et al (2014) found that financial incentives to service supply were mixed. For example 
the G-DRG design allows a provider to bill for three visits for outpatient care – the 
initial visit and two follow-up visits. It could be to the financial advantage of the 
provider to bill routinely for all three visits regardless of whether the client needed or 
even made them. On the contrary, the bundled payments of the G-DRG for services 
were a disincentive to carry out extensive diagnostic investigations whether they 
were needed or not. Additionally, there was less financial incentive to over prescribe 
than would be expected under the itemized fee for service billing system, because of 
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the actuality as well as the perception of too low tariffs that negated, in part, 
incentives to prescribe and dispense unneeded medicines (Agyepong et al., 2014). 
Payment to providers for services and medicines was and remains 
retrospective. Section 38 of the legislative instrument (LI 1809) recommended 
schemes to pay claims within four weeks after receipt from a health care facility. In 
practice, it takes much longer. Providers file claims, which go through a vetting 
process in the NHIA district scheme offices or for the higher-level facilities such as 
teaching and regional hospitals in the computerized central claims processing office 
of the NHIA before final payment. The claims processes of many provider and 
district scheme offices remain predominantly manual despite increasing 
computerization (Government of Ghana, 2004, Sodzi-Tettey et al., 2012). 
Maternal health is a national priority and reducing financial barriers is one of 
governments’ interventions to improve outcomes. Related to this, in 2008 Ghana 
started implementing its free maternal health care policy under the NHIS and 
reimburses service providers through the G-DRG payment mechanism for these 
services. Table 6.1 describes the benefits under the free maternal care policy 
(Twenaboa, 2011). 
Table 6.1: Benefits under the free maternal care policy 
x No premium for fresh registration or renewal of membership  
x No processing fee for registration or renewal 
x Antenatal period: free antenatal, general services and medicines  
x Delivery: free service and medicines, including caesarean  
x Postnatal period: free services and medicines  
x Full year cover no matter when pregnant woman registers  
x Free care for the baby on mother’s NHIS ticket for 90days 
x Alternatively the baby can be treated free on the father or other designated 
guardian  
x After 90 days the child can be registered as an individual under 18 (no 
premium but processing fee required) 
 
6.3 Methods 
Study design and data collection 
We used a case study design because it allows collection and analysis of 
comprehensive and systematic data at different points in a real-life context to trace 
policy discussions and change over time (Patton, 2002, Yin, 2009). Data was collected 
between July 2012 and August 2014 using in-depth interviews, document reviews, 
observations and feedback discussions with respondents. The in-depth interviews 
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were conducted to obtain real-life experiences from key actors involved in the 
decision making and pilot implementation of the per capita payment system 
especially in relation to maternity services. The interviews lasting on average 1 hour 
were conducted face to face using a semi-structured guide to investigate how policy 
actors included and later excluded primary care maternal services from the 
capitation policy. AK10 (one of the authors) interviewed twenty-eight respondents 
summarized in Table 6.2. For confidentiality, names and positions are not used. Ten 
of these were identified from the documents review and the rest (18) were suggested 
by other respondents. 
Table 6.2: List of respondents by agency /role in the health sector in relation to 
capitation 
Respondents  Number 
Ministry of Health  4 
National Health Insurance Authority  4 
Ghana Health Service headquarters  2 
Ashanti regional health directorate  2 
Provider Payment Mechanism Technical Sub Committee  2 
Society of Private Medical and Dental Practitioners  2 
Christian Health Association of Ghana head office  1 
Public health facility in the Ashanti region  4 
Christian Health Association of Ghana health facility in Ashanti 
region  
1 
Private self-financing (for profit) health facility in Ashanti Region.  3 
Government politician  1 
Opposition politician  1 
Coalition of non-governmental organizations in Health - Ashanti 
regional representative  
1 
Document analysis was used to map the sequence of decisions and actions, 
identify actors’ roles and further triangulate findings with respondent’s information. 
We conducted content analyses of provider payment mechanism technical 
subcommittee meeting records and reports (2010-2012); press releases and media 
discussions from the Ghana News Agency archive related to the policy. 
To understand decision making dynamics and interactions in the Ghanaian 
health sector, a 20 month period of practical attachment at the MOH Policy Planning 
Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate (PPMED) was undertaken by AK (one of the 
authors) as a participant observer. The PPMED coordinates policy formulation and 
strategic planning for the health sector. As a result, there were interactions with the 
                                                 
10 PhD candidate 
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key regional and district health actors during the MOH joint monitoring team visit to 
Ashanti region (6th - 9th November 2012). Further interactions with key actors during 
a December 21-22, 2012 national health insurance stakeholder meeting in Accra and a 
February 12, 2013 capitation evaluation meeting in the Ashanti region gave insights 
into the varied opinions on the capitation policy. 
The initial findings were validated and further substantiated by a presentation 
for discussion, comments and critique at an August 29, 2014 provider payment 
mechanism technical subcommittee meeting. 
Analysis concepts 
We drew from Mintzberg’s power concept to guide the analysis of what powers 
policy actors used to control decisions and actions related to the rise and fall of 
primary care maternal health service capitation policy. Mintzberg (1983) defines 
power as the capacity to effect (or affect) decisions and actions and labels an actor 
who seek to control decisions and actions as influencer. Mintzberg argues that 
influencer’s interpretative manoeuvres ability vary as each tries to use his or her own 
source of power as means of influence in a politically skilled way. He proposes the 
sources of power as the control of a resource, a technical skill, or a body of 
knowledge; authority by virtue of one’s legal and structural position; and access to 
those who can rely on the other four sources of power (Mintzberg, 1983). 
To analyse policy actors’ responses and actions related to the rise and fall of 
the policy; we drew on the concept of arenas of conflict of Grindle and Thomas 
(1991). Grindle and Thomas (1991) observed that decisions to change existing 
practice almost always generate conflict. They described two broad scenarios of 
reactions or response to policy change – conflict in the public arena and bureaucratic 
arena. Conflict to policy change in the public arena usually occurs during 
implementation and when the costs or burden of the reform has a direct impact on 
the public or on politically important groups in society. On the other hand, conflict in 
the bureaucratic arena is largely determined by bureaucratic agencies and public 
official’s response to the change. This usually occurs during policy formulation 
especially when the administrative content of the policy is high or it is technically 
complex and requires coordinated efforts of public officials and agencies through 
consensus building to design the reform (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). 
To understand and analyse how providers were able to resist the policy in 
addition to their use of power; we drew on Sterman’s (2006) concept of policy 
resistance. Sterman (2006) conceptualises policy resistance as the tendency for a 
policy to be defeated by a system’s response to the policy itself. He argues policy 
resistance arises because the system is complex made up of separate but 
interdependent parts that interact with each other in many ways. The system is 
therefore dynamic, evolving, interconnected and governed by feedback loops. He 
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further argues that within a system decisions and actions feedback on themselves, 
triggering others to act thus giving rise to a new situation. Policy actors operate 
within this complex system and their actions and decisions alter the system and, 
therefore may trigger unanticipated effects. Others seeking to achieve their goals and 
acting to restore the balance may also trigger intended and unintended 
consequences. Policy resistance arises because policy actors are not aware of the full 
range of feedback surrounding – and created – by their decisions (Sterman, 2006). 
Drawing upon these concepts, we systematically attempted to reconstruct the 
case of decisions and actions surrounding the rise and fall of primary care maternal 
health service capitation policy in the Ashanti region. The information was analysed 
first to map events and the power sources of key policy actors. A stakeholder 
analysis of actors as individuals, groups and institutions was done to further 
understand their position, interest and use of power to influence. Next the evolution 
of decisions and actions, the formation of groupings were identified. Finally, the 
analyses were synthesised to reconstruct insofar as possible the case. We 
acknowledge the difficulty in providing a full explanation of events as they unfolded 
within the dynamic health system – reconstructing who said what, where, when, to 
whom and how it was received. To minimise this multiple research methods and 
data sources were used. Where such data is available, it is noted; otherwise, the gap 
is noted and possible inferences are made from data analysis. 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Technical analysis: the rise of primary care health service capitation policy  
Capitation provider payment: an active policy option 
Health service cost containment was the main driver for the NHIA provider payment 
reforms. The financial challenge was twofold – increasing claims cost accompanied 
by a much lower rate of increase of the NHIF (National Health Insurance Authority, 
2011a, Ministry of Health, 2013a) as summarized in Graph 6.1: trend of NHIS income 
and expenditure 2007-2011 (National Health Insurance Authority, 2012b). The NHIA 
attributed the financial challenge, first to increased number of enrollees. For instance, 
the number of registered pregnant women more than doubled from 421,234 in 2008 
to 1,277,819 in 2010. Second, to overbilling practices such as service providers billing 
the NHIS for multiple visits that did not occur (Twenaboa, 2011, Acheampong, 2011). 
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Graph 6.1: Trend of NHIS income and expenditure 2007-2011 
Primary care maternal health service capitation policy agenda and formulation  
The NHIA with the assistance of the World Bank supported health insurance project 
established the Provider Payment Mechanism Technical Sub-Committee (henceforth 
Committee), in June 2010. The Committee with health financing and implementation 
expertise and authority to design the capitation policy comprised officials of the 
NHIA, MOH, Ghana Health Service (GHS), Christian Health Association of Ghana 
(CHAG), Korle Bu Teaching Hospital and a national representative of the Society of 
Private Medical and Dental Practitioners (SPMDP). The Committee assessed the 
financial situation of the NHIS and noted that the G-DRG payment system had not 
contained cost particularly outpatient services claims. Furthermore outpatient claims 
was accounting for 70 percent of NHIS claims with an increased average claims of 50 
percent between 2007 and 2009. To ensure that a routine package of services was 
paid for by a standard capitation rate across the country, the Committee agreed on a 
basic basket of service for walk-in outpatient department (OPD) to be paid for by 
capitation. The original basket of services classified as the primary health care (PHC) 
bundle is listed in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3: Capitation basket of services (Primary health care bundle) 
1. Primary health care outpatient department consultation 
2. Maternity consultation and services with a trained midwife or doctor for 
antenatal, normal delivery and postnatal  
3. Medicines for services included in the capitation package 
4. Selected laboratory services that can be performed at all levels, namely: 
x Routine Urine 
x Malaria Test 
x Blood Test 
x Pregnancy Test 
x Venereal Diseases Research Laboratory Test 
The Committee’s technical consideration of the financial and sustainability 
challenges of the NHIS alongside what should be essential primary health care in 
Ghana and therefore what should be included in the per capita basket of services 
presented a window of opportunity to reform not only health financing but also 
maternal health service delivery. The NHIS per capita provider payment reform was 
also needed to address some of the long standing challenges associated with delayed 
reimbursement to providers. There had been numerous instances where providers 
suspended services to NHIS enrollees because of delayed payments from the NHIA 
(Ghana News Agency, 2013, Jafaru, 2015) and this may be due to long vetting 
processes (Sodzi-Tettey et al., 2012) and the fact that NHIA expenditure is higher 
than its income (National Health Insurance Authority, 2012a).The adverse effect of 
services suspension on maternal health was that expectant mothers had to pay out-
of-pocket at the point of use to access a ‘free’ service. The upfront payment to 
providers that capitation mechanism offers was a potential to reduce if not prevent 
such happenings. Prompt payments of capitation rate to providers may not be 
guaranteed, however the delays may be minimal because the amount is 
predetermined and claims vetting is excluded. Capitation also holds service 
providers financially responsible for services they deliver and this provides strong 
incentives for them to integrate activities and reduce cost (Bazzoli et al., 2000). 
Therefore including antenatal, normal delivery and postnatal services which can be 
provided at primary care level in the capitation basket of service was to ensure 
continuity in care because capitation payments mechanism could minimise 
provider’s tendency to suspense services to primary health care. 
The Committee also agreed on the following that: (1) a provider must 
demonstrate the availability of the listed services within the facility to be accredited 
as a primary care provider to receive a capitation fee. (2) capitation would be limited 
to this primary health care bundle and all other services would continue to be paid 
for by the already existing G-DRG for services and itemized fee for medicines 
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(National Health Insurance Authority, 2010). Review of the committee’s reports and 
meeting records shows decisions including those on per capita rate and enrolment 
requirement before pilot start were based on consensus building within the 
Committee; after a back and forth process of discussions. Medicines dropped off the 
basket of services before it moved into implementation because of stakeholder and 
technical concerns that it was not clear how best to implement a capitation basket 
that included medicines in the context of Ghana’s health system. It was decided to 
continue to pay for all medicines under the itemized fee for service. 
Primary care maternal health service capitation policy stakeholder education and 
advocacy  
The NHIS is a major health service purchaser and its sustainability is a major 
national concern. Ways to ensure its sustainability had been discussed at many fora. 
As a result, at the health sector multi stakeholder November 2011 meeting, 
participants welcomed the introduction of the capitation policy for primary health 
care services as a measure to improve efficiency and contain cost (Ministry of Health, 
2011a). 
During the pre-implementation phase the Committee and officials of the 
NHIA held series of fora to inform stakeholders from local to national level on key 
policy principles. Several of these were covered by the media for example forum 
with the Asante-Akin South District Assembly at Juaso (Ghana News Agency, 
2011a). District health insurance schemes and the regional implementation 
committee; representatives of the MOH, GHS, CHAG and health professional bodies; 
and private self-financing providers were all participants at these fora (National 
Health Insurance Authority, 2011d). 
The NHIA brought on board politicians to inform and solicit bipartisan 
support. This included members of the Parliamentary Select Committee on health – 
elected parliamentarians with the mandate to advice the Parliament on health issues 
- and members of Parliament representing all constituencies in the Ashanti region. 
Additionally local government was engaged through the regional coordinating 
council and the district chief executives in the Ashanti region (Stephen Odoi-Larbi, 
2011, National Health Insurance Authority, 2011d). However, the political approval 
from politicians may have influenced resistance from some stakeholders. As a policy 
implementer noted – ‘involving politicians created the impression that capitation policy 
was a political issue, putting a political connotation on the policy’ [9/11/2012]. 
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6.4.2 Contestation:  the fall of primary care maternal health service capitation 
policy  
Service providers especially the private self-financing (private for profit) contested 
and resisted the policy intent and implementation in the run up to and during 
implementation. Service providers wield a lot of power based on multiple sources 
including their knowledge, skills, authority, social and professional identity and 
access to other influencers such as the Minister of Health and NHIS enrollees. The 
access to NHIS enrollees, the discretion required by the nature of their work, public 
respect and trust for as well as dependence on their skills and knowledge gave them 
major “street level bureaucrat” (Lipsky, 1980) power. The Minister of Health and 
NHIS enrollees were not actively involved in the policy design, but had the power to 
influence the policy process when mobilized. These power sources closely parallel 
those suggested by Mintzberg (1983). 
Service providers’ contestation and resistance created unanticipated effects. 
There was intense media attention and discussions across the country and not only in 
the Ashanti region where the pilot was taking place. A mobilized pressure group – 
Ashanti Development Union - sprung up to oppose the capitation policy. 
Stakeholders called for the policy to be suspended, and private self – financing 
providers finally suspended services to NHIS subscribers as part of their protest 
against the policy. Apart from the contestation by the service providers, the fact that 
2012 was an election year fueled the public arenas of contestation and high politics as 
commentators from both sides of the political divide joined the media discussions 
and increasing acrimony. All these finally cascaded into a crisis situation and gained 
the attention of the President and the Minister of Health. We discuss in more detail 
below these stakeholder’s arguments, unanticipated effects, and the committee’s and 
government’s responses and actions using specific contested issues to illustrate. 
Stakeholder’s arguments  
Policy resistance to including maternity services had started to build up even before 
implementation finally started in January 2012. The main contested issues included: 
the per capita rate, the enrolment rate, rationale for using the Ashanti region as a 
pilot site and ‘all or nothing’ choice scenarios that confronted the service providers. 
Per capita rate 
The per capita rate for the basket of services was computed from a combination of an 
analysis of historical NHIS annual expenditure on the services in the basket against 
annual enrolment; and an estimate of the NHIA ability to pay. The per capita rate 
was then adjusted further for service fixed cost difference between private and public 
health facilities (National Health Insurance Authority, 2010). The calculation of the 
per capita rate drew from the G-DRG payment system data. Even in the computation 
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of the G-DRG rates, there had and continued to be challenges related to data quality 
and completeness and the need therefore to model and estimate. However this was 
the best data available and the G-DRG system had been developed with it and 
accepted by providers (Agyepong et al., 2014). 
Providers – public and private – raised several concerns with the per capita 
rate and its calculation. First, they felt the per capita rate was too low. In response to 
this the Committee reassessed and increased the rate by 22 percent (National Health 
Insurance Authority, 2011d). However the SPMDP and providers under the Manhyia 
health insurance scheme disputed and maintained the revised rate was still 
inadequate. Discrepancies between provider and scheme data on claims and 
utilization created a data gap and made it difficult for either the NHIA or providers 
to be certain about the appropriate rate for the PHC bundle. 
Providers also argued that the gains made under the free maternal care policy 
would be derailed under the capitation policy since there would be incentive to 
reduce service inputs. 
 
 ‘Maternity service is a priority for the country and also for the MDGs, maternal 
mortality will increase if maternity service is put under capitation. Under capitation, 
there will be restricted services and this will affect the quality of care given - for 
example the number of antenatal may be reduced by the provider’ [GHS staff, 
9/11/2012]. 
 
Thirdly the per capita rate was a single flat rate with no risk adjustment.  The 
data quality problems did not make risk adjustment possible.  Providers argued that 
the type of enrollees played an essential role in the nature of the financial risk borne 
by providers. They anticipated their risk to be much higher with more enrolled 
pregnant women. 
 
‘The outcome of pregnancy is certain and that is delivery. If maternal service is 
capitated, we (providers) will bear most of the financial risk [Public Provider, 5/ 
11/ 2012].  
 
Fourthly and related to the preceding arguments, they anticipated the low rate 
would ruin their health care business. 
 ‘This capitation policy will collapse health care system and business in the Ashanti 
region because the per capita rate is too low and we cannot provides services with such 
small amount’ [SPMDP, 7/11/2012]. 
 
Finally, providers claimed to be unable to understand the method of rate 
computation. 
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‘We (providers) do not understand how the capitated rate was calculated’ [SPMDP, 8 
/11 /2012]. 
 
Table 6.4 shows the per capita rate for implementation as of July 2011 after the 
22 percent upward adjustment. 
Table 6.4: Per capita rate per health facility ownership for implementation as of July 
2011. 
Provider 
Ownership 
Capitation 
Rate (GH¢)  
Clinical 
Service  
(Per Member 
Per Month) 
Capitation 
Rate (GH¢) 
Medicines  
(Per Member 
Per Month) 
Total Rate 
(GH¢)  
Clinical 
Service & 
Medicines  
(Per Member 
Per Month) 
Total Rate 
(USD) 
Clinical 
Service & 
Medicines  
(Per Member 
Per Month)  
Private self-
financed 
1.11 0.64 1.75 1.16 
Government 0.59 0.64 1.23 0.81 
Mission-based 0.79 0.64 1.43 0.95 
Data source: Preferred Primary Provider Group Practice Guidelines, July 2011, 
National Health Insurance Authority. Conversion from Ghanaian cedis (GH¢) to US 
dollars; exchange rate at 4.00pm universal time on 31st July 2011 - 1GH¢ = 0.662USD. 
http://www.xe.com/currencytables/?from=GHS&date=2011-07-31 
Enrolment rate 
Per capita payment systems use the transfer of an average rate per enrollee. This way 
in any given period, the money of those who do not use the system helps to take care 
of those who use the system. Under these circumstances it is essential that 100 
percent of active enrollees voluntarily chose a preferred primary care provider (PPP) 
or are administratively assigned to a PPP to avoid short changing providers in the 
per capita transfers. The method chosen for enrolment to PPP in the Ghana per capita 
payment system design was voluntary enrolment. It was however acknowledged 
that it would be impossible to get 100 percent voluntary enrolment. The Committee 
therefore stipulated that an at least 80 percent voluntary enrolment rate needed to be 
attained and then the remaining enrollees would be administratively assigned for the 
implementation start. But, by December, 31 2011, only 46 percent of the active NHIS 
subscribers had voluntarily enrolled with a PPP. The SPMDP and providers under 
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the Manhyia health insurance scheme contested the start date given that 80 percent 
enrolment to PPP had not been attained. 
The Committee attributed low enrolment rate to logistics, staffing and 
financial constraints as well as poor management of the enrolment process. There 
were also communication challenges such as people considering enrolment 
information as political propaganda (National Health Insurance Authority, 2011d). 
Because of the slow progress in enrolment, the Committee had already shifted the 
start date from August 2011 to October 2011 and again to December 2011 in a quest 
to attain closer to 80 percent voluntary enrolment. By October 2011, the Committee 
felt it was no longer appropriate to keep changing the start date. 2012 was an election 
year and after the first quarter of the year it would be impossible to introduce any 
reform as major as capitation. A lot of time, money and effort had already been 
invested in designing the policy and accompanying programmes and trying to move 
them into implementation. Moreover, some stakeholders perceived the frequent shift 
in start date as a sign of weakness and a policy that was doomed to failure. 
 
‘The continuous changing of the start date did not help, it fuelled the perception that 
the NHIS is collapsing ‘[GHS staff, 9/11/2012]. ...‘postponing several times the 
start date contributed to less confidence in the policy implementation’ [Committee 
member, 29/08/2014]. 
 
The Committee felt that given all these issues, the voluntary target of 80 
percent should be lowered and other strategies devised to ensure 100 percent of the 
insured had been assigned to a PPP. 
Suspicions about the rationale for the selection of Ashanti region 
The mobilized pressure group – Ashanti development union - and providers 
questioned the rationale for selecting the region for the pilot. Some claimed the 
region was chosen because NHIA labelled it a ‘fraud region’. 
 
‘NHIA brought capitation to the region because they believe there is fraud and abuse 
here. So the focus is to fight fraud’ [Private self-financing provider, 8/11/2012]. 
 
Others claimed the region was punished for its voting patterns. The region is 
politically described as a New Patriotic Party (NPP) – the party in opposition at the 
time of introduction of the pilot – ‘stronghold’. The NPP has consistently won the 
majority parliamentary seats since the start of multiparty democracy in 1992. For 
instance in the 2008 election, the NPP won 34 parliament seats while the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) that won the national presidential election had only 
three (Ghana Electoral Commission, 2015). The timing of the pilot in an election year 
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in addition to placing it in an opposition stronghold also fuelled the suspicions about 
the intent of the reformers. 
 
‘Some people believe this is political, this is to punish the region for voting against the 
government in power. The timing was also wrong, implementing such a policy in an 
election year in an opposition dominated region, it’s difficult to understand their 
(NHIA) motive’ [GHS staff, 28/8/2012]. 
 
 ‘All or nothing’ choice scenarios 
The policy implementation presented providers with ‘all or nothing’ choice 
scenarios. Under the capitation policy developed by the Committee any service 
beyond a normal delivery for example assisted deliveries and caesareans were to be 
paid for by the G-DRG. Providers who run primary as well as referral care clinics 
could not opt out of being NHIS provider for primary care under a per capita system 
and continue to be provider for referral service care. 
 
 ‘If you do not participate in capitation, you cannot provide services for NHIS 
subscribers – unless the subscriber pays out-of-pocket. This is not fair.’ [Private self-
financing health facility, 8/11/2012]. 
 
Accredited facilities needed to have the capacity to provide the whole basket 
of services to qualify as a preferred primary care provider. Maternity homes are 
private facilities run by nurse midwifes.  They are licenced purely for the provision 
of primary maternal care services such as antenatal, delivery, postnatal and family 
planning.  From a legal point of view, Maternity homes could therefore not become 
preferred primary care providers, since they were not licenced to provide the other 
components of the primary care per capita package other than antenatal care, normal 
delivery and postnatal care. Maternity homes accounted for about 12 percent of 
NHIS accredited providers in the region (National Health Insurance Authority, 2016, 
National Health Insurance Authority, 2011b). Maternity homes were particularly 
concerned about this since though they were only licenced in theory to provide 
maternity services, many provided other primary care services. To date no one had 
applied the law strictly, but what would happen under a per capita payment system? 
 
Within the package there were other services apart from the maternity services, and as 
such the maternity homes will not be able to be part of the capitation payment system 
and they were going to lose out’ [NHIA official, 4/10/2012]. ‘The position taken by 
the NHIA that facilities should provide all the primary care bundle will collapse 
maternity homes’ [SPMDP, 7/11/2012]. 
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In response, the Committee recommended Maternity homes could be a PPP if 
they provided evidence of their capacity to provide the whole basket of services. 
Such evidence included forming a partnership or group practice with another clinic 
or a community pharmacy shop with written agreements confirming that all the 
partners understand and had agreed to group together as a ‘primary health care 
bundle provider’ (National Health Insurance Authority, 2011b). This concept of 
group practice was however new to Ghana. Private providers were unclear how to 
operationalize it, or even if they wanted to operationalize it. And there were all the 
other objections to capitation. 
Unanticipated effects 
Policy redefined by opposing voices 
The private self-financing providers made recommendations to promote their 
desired outcomes, with contestation starting at the bureaucratic level before 
implementation start in January 2012. In a petition dated October 5, 2011 to the 
NHIA chief executive officer, the SPMDP suggested the removal of maternal health 
service from the basket of services. The SPMDP also recommended new per capita 
rates between 15 – 20 times the rates calculated by the NHIA for the PHC bundle as 
listed in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5: Per capita rate recommended by the SPMDP in December 2011 
Facility  Total Rate (GH¢)  
Clinical Service & 
Medicines  
(Per Member Per Month) 
Total Rate (USD) 
Clinical Service & 
Medicines  
(Per Member Per 
Month) 
Hospital 20.57 12.57 
Clinic 18.14 11.08 
Maternity 9.76 5.96 
Data source: Recommendation to the NHIA on pilot implementation of capitation in 
Ashanti region, December 2011, Society of Private Medical and Dental Practitioners. 
Conversion from Ghanaian cedis (GH¢) to US dollars; exchange rate at 4.00pm 
universal time on 31st December 2011 - 1GH¢ = 0.61087USD. 
http://www.xe.com/currencytables/?from=GHS&date=2011-12-31 
The SPMDP based their calculation on the rate of encounter with clients and 
the existing G-DRG payments as estimated by the society. They noted any amount 
below their request would immensely affect quality of health care and subsequently 
collapse private self-financing clinics and maternity homes. According to the 
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SPMDP, increasing cost of general goods and services was making healthcare 
expensive so primary health care should not be considered as a package of low-cost 
interventions. 
In January 5, 2012 the NHIA therefore organised a meeting to negotiate the 
basket of service and per capita rate with leaders of the public and private providers, 
but this ended in chaos with continuing disagreement between the NHIA and the 
private self-financing providers on the basket of services and the per capita rate. The 
SPMDP threatened to opt out of capitation. The NHIA also threatened to abrogate all 
contracts with SPMDP members, stating that private providers that did not 
implement capitation would not be permitted to provide services under the NHIS 
(Ghana News Agency, 2012a). 
To increase their bargaining power the SPMDP and the Ghana Registered 
Midwives Association (GRMA) aligned, although they were affected differently by 
capitation. SPMDP facilities were licensed to provide all the basket of services while 
Maternity homes were not, despite still providing a broader range of services in 
practice. SPMDP’s focus was to negotiate a higher per capita rate and GRMA focus 
was to negotiate approval to provide all the basket of services to NHIS enrollees. To 
register their objection they moved the discussions to the public arena using the 
media; and issued a press release on the January 11, 2012 stating: ‘We shall not start 
with the pilot capitation under its present form. However, we shall continue to render our 
services to our Health Insurance Clients using the existing Ghana-Diagnosis Related 
Groupings (G-DRG) package based on our contract with the National Health Insurance 
Authority’. 
The unfolding resistance and press release did not deter the NHIA’s intent to 
continue implementation of the per capita payment system despite the strength of 
private self-financing providers as key health players in the health sector and the 
Ashanti region. According to the regional health directorate 2010 half year report, the 
private maternity homes and clinics operated two hundred and seventy-eight (278) 
out of the five hundred and twenty-seven (527) health facilities (53 percent) in the 
region (Ashanti Regional  Health Directorate, 2010). 
Increased media attention and calls for policy suspension 
The media with its power to instantly reach thousands of people served as a platform 
for many stakeholders to convey their messages. Intense media discussions built up 
as stakeholders discussed multiple interpretations of the policy. Discussants, some 
with inadequate technical understanding shifted to political interpretations that not 
only contributed to misinform, but also publicized ideas and influenced others 
(National Health Insurance Authority, 2011d). 
‘Some politicians and even some officials of the NHIA misunderstood the technical 
content of the capitation payment system’ [Committee member, 29/08/2014]. 
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For example, a municipal chief executive (a political appointee), stated that the 
capitation policy was not for ‘political witch hunting’ but to check corruption as most 
providers and some NHIS officials had connived to loot the scheme resources 
(Stephen Odoi-Larbi, 2012). Such statements influenced political discussions and 
shifted attention away from the intent and purpose of the policy and the technical 
issues underlying the disagreements. 
Multiple interpretations and the unresolved negotiations ultimately fuelled 
calls for the capitation policy postponement to allow agreement on contested issues. 
A range of stakeholders - politicians (mainly opposition), private self-financing 
providers, health professional bodies (Ghana Medical Association and the 
Pharmaceutical Society of Ghana), and the Ashanti development union joined the 
call to suspend the pilot (Ghana News Agency, 2011b, Ghana News Agency, 2012c, 
Ashanti Development Union, 2012, Ghana News Agency, 2012d). The opposition 
politicians and supporters took to the streets to register their disapproval (Morgan 
Owusu, 2012) and the Ashanti development union threatened a demonstration 
(Ashanti Development Union, 2012). 
Private providers suspended their services to NHIS enrollees 
The NHIA did not postpone the capitation policy and did not give in to the demands 
of private self-financing providers. Resistance reached its highest point on February 
1, 2012, when the private self-financing clinics and Maternity homes operators 
suspended their services to NHIS enrollees. They stated the policy was imposed by 
the NHIA to the detriment of quality care and health facilities in the region (Ghana 
News Agency, 2012e). The suspension incited further calls to postpone the policy and 
the opposition parliamentarians perceived it would lead to poor maternal and child 
health outcomes (Ghana News Agency, 2012f). 
6.4.3 Politics: the governments’ responses and actions 
The resulting crisis escalated to a high politics situation, attracting the attention of the 
President and the Minister of Health. The President in his February 16, 2012 State of 
the Nation Address to Parliament acknowledged the crisis and called for urgent 
dialogue and consensus building on NHIS provider payment mechanisms to ensure 
sustainability (Ghana News Agency, 2012g). To intervene and build consensus, the 
Minister of Health met both private and public providers on February 29, 2012. The 
Minister assured providers of government’s commitment to dialogue with all 
stakeholders to design a comprehensive and sustainable health financing policy for 
the benefit of all. He reiterated government would not impose any policy to the 
detriment of any group of people and pledged to convey their issues to the President 
for immediate action (Ghana News Agency, 2012d). 
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Parliamentary and presidential elections were due to be held in December 
2012. Government stood to gain political points by listening and responding 
favourably to the opposing voices and to lose if they did not. By March 16, 2012, the 
government had taken a decision to have primary care maternal health service 
removed from the basket of service. NHIA was to reimburse accredited health 
facilities through the G-DRG payment mechanism (Ministry of Health, 2012c). 
It is of interest to note that four years on, in 2016, capitation is being scaled up 
in a step wise fashion with three regions of Ghana set to begin implementation any 
time soon. The process has been quiet and relatively free of the rancour and 
contestation of the original pilot to date. The reasons are a story in their own right. 
However part of it is definitely the organizational learning that occurred from the 
experiences of the pilot. 
6.5 Discussion  
This case illustrates the tensions and complicated relationships between technical 
consideration, contestation and political responsiveness in policy processes that 
combine to determine the outcomes of policy agenda setting and formulation, with 
the result of implementation processes sometimes leading backwards to a revision of 
the policy agenda and formulation. 
The capitation payment mechanism was already legitimised by Law (Act 650) 
but dormant until multiple concern about financial challenges of running NHIS, high 
outpatient (primary health care) claims and the increased experience and technical 
skills with provider payment in the country made it just ‘right’ to implement primary 
care maternal health care services. We reason with Cook and Skogan (1990) that 
factors such as policy legitimisation, multiple source concern of an issue and a ‘ripe 
climate’ contribute to elevate the issue onto the agenda for implementation (Cook 
and Skogan, 1990). 
Actions and decisions of opposing stakeholders (policy influencers) led to the 
fall of primary care maternal health services from the capitation policy. Opposing 
stakeholders in this case, relied on their professional, political and social sources of 
power to convince those to whom they had access, project their problems and by that 
reframed the issues to their benefit. They created a system of meaning (Ribot and 
Peluso, 2003) as they reframed issues from their understanding as well as ideas from 
others to manipulate revision of the policy. As suggested by Stone (2012 p. 176) 
policy actors use interpretation as strategic manipulation tool to frame issues to lend 
legitimacy and attract support to a course of action (Stone, 2012). In our case and also 
noted by Agyei-Baffour et al. (2013), the media was venue for information and 
rebuttal; and a breeding ground for multiple policy frames as stakeholders convey 
their ideas and influenced others. Decision making process related to the policy 
moved beyond the bureaucracy of the NHIA into the public arena as media 
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discussants and private self-financing providers reframed the policy issues. In the 
bureaucratic arena, though there were technical disagreements on what to include in 
the policy design, decisions were based on consensus. Conversely, in the public 
arena discussion, decisions were based on the media discussants and private self-
financing providers’ ability to manipulate interpretations of the policy in a politically 
skilful way to their benefit (Mintzberg, 1983) than facts. They used frames such as – 
“derail maternal health”; “political punishment”; “fraud region”; and “collapse 
health care” to make their arguments and gain political attention. 
Within the public arena, not only did opposing stakeholders leverage their 
professional, political and social power to reframe issues, but also benefited from the 
context within which the policy was implemented to justify their actions. For 
instance, the Ashanti development group based on the political context – a 
‘stronghold’ of NPP - questioned the rationale for introducing the policy in the 
region. Also, the private providers gained a high bargaining power and were able to 
resist the policy because they operated about 53 percent of the health facilities in the 
region (Ashanti Regional  Health Directorate, 2010). The fact is that private 
providers’ resistance imposed limits on the NHIA and the Committee’s power on the 
policy implementation. 
Limits on power by resistance contribute to the outcomes of power relations 
(Barbalet, 1985) and the outcomes at different stages of the policy process. In this 
case, power relations existed between the NHIA and Committee on one side and the 
private providers. During the formulation process, the NHIA and Committee with 
the authority and capacity and upper hand within the bureaucratic arena designed 
the capitation policy for implementation. On the other hand during the 
implementation process there was a shift in power; private providers with 
professional knowledge and skill to implement policies benefited from all the policy 
contestation within the public arena gained the upper hand and in effect influenced 
the removal of maternal primary care from the capitation policy. 
Despite the recognition of the importance of stakeholder engagement and the 
use of a multi-stakeholder Committee that included providers; stakeholder 
identification, analysis and consultation was perhaps inadequate. Contestation is 
often an inevitable part of policy reform, and reform as major as provider payment 
with all the incentives inherent in different payment methods holds huge potential 
for contestation. More careful stakeholder analysis as part of the design and 
implementation process might have perhaps made some of the problems that 
precipitated a crisis e.g. selecting an opposition region for pilot of major reform; 
anticipated and perhaps avoided. 
So what started as a seemingly quiet negotiation between the NHIA and 
private providers resulted in a dispute; and like a ‘snowball’ lead to a series of 
unanticipated effects. And as noted by Sterman (2006) and others, these 
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unanticipated effects are spontaneous and difficult to predict, and feeds back on its 
self - creating new situations (Sterman, 2006, Paina and Peters, 2012). In this case, the 
new situation – multiple issue reframing - intensified the attention and interest of the 
President and Minister of Health in the policy. Because, politics is driven by how 
people interpret and reframe information; and as such political actors strive to 
control interpretations (Stone, 2012) and debunk any unfavourable ones. 
So, the policy with the opportunity to contain NHIA cost and improve 
continuous access to maternal health care was overturn by high politics and political 
responsiveness of the government. In a nutshell, a strong competing voice emerged 
within an enabling environment to dispute the policy through repeated multiple 
issue reframes. These factors are similar to those proposed by Cook and Skogan 
(1990) in their work on the fall of criminal victimization of the elderly from 
government’s agenda (Cook and Skogan, 1990). 
6.6 Conclusion 
Policy formulation and implementation therefore is not only about technical 
considerations but also how policy influencers’ particularly opposing actors frame 
and reframe issues to generate political attention and response. The tensions and 
complicated relationships between technical consideration, contestation and political 
responsiveness in the capitation policy processes raises some questions we pose for 
policy dialogue and further research. What is the relationship between government 
policy makers and private service providers in terms of government policy 
implementation? How is health care service cost determined? The dynamics of this 
relationship and how health care service delivery cost is calculated are vital for the 
overall health care system quest to attain universal health coverage and critical for 
government interventions to improve access to health care services especially in 
areas dominantly serviced by private providers. 
The tensions and complicated relationships between technical considerations 
and politics and bureaucratic versus public arenas of conflict are important 
influences that can cause items to rise and fall on policy agendas. 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An abridged version of this chapter will be submitted to Health Policy and Planning 
as: Koduah A, van Dijk H, Agyepong IA. Power and networks of influence in health 
sector governance: national level decision making for maternal health policies in 
Ghana 
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7 Synthesis and conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
The research has had as its objective to explore who formulates maternal health 
policies and the agenda setting and decision making processes through which policy 
actors operate in Ghana. Despite some decline, high maternal mortality remains a 
persistent problem in Ghana. This thesis proposed that a better understanding of 
conditions under which maternal health policy agenda and formulations are made 
can serve as lessons for decision makers to strategize and engage in making better 
informed policy decisions towards improving maternal health outcomes. The 
research questions specifically asked: 
(RQ1) Which policy actors have been involved in maternal health policy agenda setting and 
formulation and what roles did they play? 
(RQ2) What are the decision making processes related to maternal health policy agenda 
setting and formulation? 
(RQ3) How did contextual factors influenced maternal health policy agenda setting and 
formulation and why? 
(RQ4) How did policy actors define maternal health issues and why? 
Four cases: maternal (antenatal, skilled delivery, and postnatal) fee exemption 
policy decisions; health sector programme of work maternal policy decisions; free 
family planning as part of the NHIS policy agenda; and primary care maternal health 
service capitation policy decisions were investigated to answer these four main 
research questions. This final chapter reflects on the research questions, presents 
theoretical and methodological considerations, policy implication and 
recommendations for future research. 
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7.2 Answering the research questions 
Maternal and neonatal health is a national priority in Ghana a LMIC country. 
Maternal health policy agenda at national level is mainly set by political actors and 
the formulated policy is also mainly approved by political actors whilst bureaucrats, 
advocates and donors sometimes influence the direction of the policy agenda 
decisions made by the political actors and draft the accompanying policy guidelines 
for approval. A maternal health policy issue on the national agenda with or without 
accompanying policy guidelines does not guarantee implementation. However, as 
shown in these cases a sustained political and international support and interest in 
the maternal issue, availability of funds for implementation, and broad base support 
of health sector actors from national to the peripheral can move the policy agenda 
into implementation. 
At national level, a maternal health policy agenda whether formulated into an 
accompanying policy guideline and implemented or not has the tendency to evolve 
in relation to a fast changing national economic and political and international 
context. These case studies point to three trends: (1) the possibility of a maternal 
health policy agenda to sustain and remain unchanged even as its accompanying 
policy guideline is constantly revised and modified along the way (chapter 3); (2) the 
ability of a maternal health policy agenda to gain political prominence and gradually 
fade and reduce in prominence with no accompanying policy guideline (chapter 5); 
and (3) the ability of a maternal health policy to be completely removed from a 
government agenda along with its accompanying policy guideline (chapter 6). These 
tendencies at national level agenda setting for maternal health and its evolution are 
contingent upon the actions of a large variety of policy actors including Presidents, 
political appointees, bureaucrats, donors, general public and service providers who 
consistently rely on power sources from one’s resources, knowledge, skills or access 
to others; and context to define issues and influence decisions. The broad 
categorizations of the policy actors involved, the decision making processes domains 
in which they operate, the effect of context and problem definitions related to 
maternal health agenda setting and formulation are further highlighted to reflect on 
the main research questions. 
7.2.1 Policy actors involved in maternal health policy decisions (RQ1) 
Looking back on the four cases we can deduce two main overlapping categories of 
policy actors within the large variety of actors identified: (1) those who took the final 
decisions to set the agenda and approve policies and (2) those who influenced the 
agenda setting and formulation decisions and sometimes formulated policies. 
We can further subdivide the first category (those who took the final agenda 
decisions and approved policies) into policy agenda directors and approvers; and 
these are generally political actors with the political mandate and power to take final 
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decisions and/or approve decisions made by policy formulators. There were a 
number of maternal health policy directives and approvals made by political actors. 
For example, Dr Nkrumah first set the free maternal policy agenda in 1963 and other 
political actors had over four and half decades sustained and modified the decision 
but never disapproved it (Koduah et al., 2015). Also, a Minister of Health first put the 
‘free family planning as part of NHIS’ policy on the political (government) agenda in 
2012 after several years of lobbying by both national and international policy actors. 
Again, a Minister of Health reversed a decision to reimburse providers primary 
maternal health care services delivered through per capita payment system, after less 
than three months of implementation (Koduah et al., 2016a). However, political 
actors giving directives or taking final national policy decisions is not peculiar to 
these cases, others (Green-Pedersen & Wilkerson 2006, Grindle and Thomas, 1991, 
Kingdon, 2003, Parsons, 1995) have noted similar findings different developing and 
developed settings. 
We can further subdivide the second category (those who influenced agenda 
setting and formulation processes and sometimes formulate policies) into policy 
agenda advisers and advocates. The MOH and agencies bureaucrats, bilateral and 
multilateral donors played the primary role of policy agenda advisers and policy 
formulators. Whilst health professional bodies, service providers, general public and 
non-government organizations played the primary role of policy agenda advocates. 
These policy formulators, agenda advisers and advocates relied on power sources 
parallel to those suggested by Mintzberg (1983) such as access to knowledge, 
technical skills and structural and positional authority to influence each other and 
more importantly political actors. They used several strategies to lobby, bargain and 
convince those to whom they had access to push their interest and ideas. 
One strategy was the use of country based empirical evidence from routine 
health management information system data and commissioned studies to lobby and 
bring to the attention of political actors and other policy influencers the causes of 
maternal deaths and morbidities, and solutions. Another strategy was the use of 
funding as a leverage and legitimate right to push ideas onto the government 
agenda; the one with the purse can and did direct the maternal health policy agenda 
and accompanying policy implementation guidelines. For example the IMF and 
World Bank directed the agenda and accompanying policy implementation 
guidelines to fee exemptions for four deprived regions as conditionality for the 
Ghanaian government to access the HIPC grants. Donors (especially USAID, DFID, 
UNFPA and World Bank) have largely financed family planning programme and 
had used their support as leverage to push the free family planning as part of the 
NHIS agenda. Another strategy was the power of collective action. As shown in 
these cases and also suggested by Bevir (2009), the policy influencers were able to 
secure decisions in the direction of their preferred policies when they collaborated 
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with each other in a collective manner. Policy influencers worked collectively by 
association and design. For instance the private services providers relied on their 
professional knowledge and skills, access to political actors, made reference to their 
professional identities and used their social power and ‘street level bureaucrat’ 
power (cf Lipsky, 1980, Ribot and Peluso, 2003, Mintzberg, 1983) and joined forces to 
contest and boycott the capitation policy. Their collective action led to their desired 
outcome - a removal of the primary care maternal health service from the capitation 
policy. 
In conclusion, the two main categorisation: those who take the final decisions 
to set the agenda and approve public policy content (policy agenda directors and 
approvers) and influencers of agenda setting and formulation decisions (policy 
agenda advisers and advocates) present another way of policy actor categorisation 
and contributes to policy analysis knowledge. Some scholars (Kingdon, 2003, Buse et 
al., 2005, Mintzberg, 1983) categorize policy actors based on their position in the 
society or organization, but what we see here is another way to categorise and study 
policy actors based on their actions and use of power and authority without a 
necessary affiliation to an organization or position in society. Such categorization 
aids to further understand how policy actors use different power sources during 
political and technical interactions to effect public policy decisions in specific 
directions. For instance, a service provider or professional group representative as 
part of an expert committee can bring to bear his/her professional knowledge to 
formulate public polices and during a political interaction on the same or different 
policy issue can draw on their access to social and political power to direct specific 
decisions to their benefit.  
7.2.2 Decision making processes related to maternal health policy decisions 
(RQ2) 
Decision making processes at different periods in four domains - technical, public, 
institutionalised and political – can be identified as a result of cross-case analysis. 
Explaining decision making processes within these domains can provide some 
guidance to health practitioners and analyst who wish to understand national level 
decision making processes and entry points into the pluralistic (Ministry of Health, 
2007) and sometimes elitist (Agyepong and Adjei, 2008, Seddoh and Akor, 2012) 
Ghanaian health sector. People who want to influence national level decisions can 
actively participate in one or more of these decision domains. Each has its own 
peculiarities and subtle rules of who can (or cannot) participate and one must 
strategize to be able to influence decisions within the domains. 
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Decision making processes within a technical domain 
Looking back, decision making processes within a technical domain occur when 
policy advisers and formulators mainly with technical expertise and positional 
authority take decisions on specific policy issues usually based on a set of pre-
determined objectives. Decision making usually occurred through consensus 
building among the experts on the appropriate way to design policy content within a 
‘closed’ membership arrangement. Decision making processes may be temporary as 
the cases of the provider payment mechanism technical subcommittee (chapter 6) 
and the Konotey-Ahulu committee (chapter 3), or routine as the case of the MOH 
bureaucrat’s operational activities within the health sector (chapters 3) and the health 
sector review process (chapter 4&5). 
Administrative capacity to design policy content and technical expertise of 
experts, were some contextual factors associated with the technical domain. 
Administrative capacity of institutions mandated to design policy content is 
important because it determines which policies or organizational changes can be 
pursued effectively as suggested by Grindle and Thomas (1991) and shown in the 
case studies. For instance, the capitation policy was pursued in part because the 
administrative capacity of NHIA that existed in 2010 was able to facilitate the design 
process. Closely related to administrative capacity is the capacity of technical experts 
and their ability to use their power of knowledge to take decisions particularly 
irrespective of political directives. For example, the MOH bureaucrats based on their 
experience and technical expertise had narrowed a political directive to provide free 
maternal health care and formulated a policy implementation guideline of only four 
antenatal visits to reflect what was practically possible to implement at that time. 
The case studies also point to the fact that decisions made in the technical 
domain are usually about formulation and not about agenda setting. However, in 
some instances the repercussions of these technical decisions in terms of policy 
implementation guidelines and recommendations reset or maintained an existing 
agenda. For example, the technical decision to include primary maternal health care 
service in the per capita payment system and implement in a region with more than 
50 percent of its health care provided by private service providers lead to resistance 
and subsequent reset of the policy agenda. In another example, the National 
Redemption Council government maintained the decision not to implement the 1971 
Hospital Fees Act 387 although the Konotey-Ahulu committee recommended that 
there could be no health services without fees (Konotey-Ahulu et al., 1970). In both 
cases there was resistance against technical advice, which led to changes and even 
abolishment of the technical decisions. This also highlights the limited extent to 
which policy in a LMIC setting can be based on technical advice/evidence. Technical 
advice/evidence is only part of a complexity of factors of which public opinion and 
politics are important. 
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Decision making processes within a public domain 
Decision making processes within the public domain occur when people usually 
non-bureaucrats discuss and recommend and advocate for decisions on government 
policies in the public. Decision making processes in the public domain result from 
what Grindle and Thomas (1991) describe as reactions to policies perceived to have a 
direct impact on broader parts of the society and readily visible to the affected public. 
Looking back on the findings, people’s reactions to government policies were based 
on their own understanding of how the policy personally affected them and how 
others interpreted the policy. The main strategy used by people in the public domain 
is framing and interpretation of issues to one’s benefit. Framing and interpretations 
of issues ranged from people’s views and understanding of the policy content, 
implementation arrangements to personal, political and social implications. The 
media platform was one of the venues for public discussions where through debates 
and rebuttals people explained their varied understanding of issues to drive the 
opinions of an issue. As findings from chapter 6 point out, in the public domain, 
technical reasoning and facts are of less importance. 
The political context in which policies are designed and implemented, change 
in government, an election year, and the political leaning of a society affected by the 
policy implementation are some contextual factors associated with decision making 
processes in the public domain. Political context presents window of opportunities 
for people to express their views and leverage on the political responsiveness of 
governments to reset policy agendas. For example as discussed in chapter 3, the 
reintroduced hospital fee in February 1968 caused a public uproar and the new 
military government attempting to consolidate its political power and gain 
acceptance suspended the policy implementation to a later date. Also, as discussed in 
chapter 6, 2012 as an election year and the fact that Ashanti region is an opposition 
region contributed to the Minister and President’s responsiveness to the capitation 
policy saga. 
Decision making processes within an institutionalised policy dialogue domain 
The design of the programme of work which provides strategic direction for the 
health sector is associated with this domain. Decision making processes within the 
institutionalised policy dialogue domain allows for structured interactions as 
illustrated in figure 4.2. The MOH and agencies bureaucrats, donors, POW reviewers 
and other stakeholders engage in this domain. However as discussed in chapter 4, 
priorities, programmes and budget allocations decisions rest with the MOH and 
donors. This is because through the sector wide approach reforms, donors have 
gained rights-based access (Ribot & Peluso, 2003) to national level agenda setting and 
formulation and are allowed to partake in decision making in exchange for their 
financial support (Koduah et al., 2015). 
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Case studies discussed in chapters 4 and 5 point to alignment to existing 
national strategic plans such as Ghana poverty reduction strategy, and international 
agendas such as the MDGs, availability of financial means, and worsening maternal 
health indicator as some contextual factors influencing decisions within this domain. 
If we look back on decisions taken within the institutionalised process, the MOH and 
donors relied on broader national and international policies to inform the 
programme of work agenda. Although, indicator of maternal health mortality was 
not the only influencing factor as showed in these cases, the policy formulators and 
advisers nevertheless used this evidence to support their ideas. Moreover, the 
availability of financial means whether international support from the World Bank, 
IMF, donor earmarked and budget support, or government was a major determinant 
of what appeared on the programme of work agenda. 
Decision making processes within a political domain 
Decision making processes in the political domain is where politicians (Presidents, 
Parliamentarians, political appointees, and political party’s members) in- and outside 
government operate to take and approve national level decisions. Decisions taken 
within the political domain are associated more with maternal policy agenda setting 
and less with policy content for implementation. At national level decision making in 
the political domain is an ongoing process because firstly, politicians outside 
government are in the business of constantly scrutinizing and challenging 
government policies and secondly the government is mandated (and obliged) under 
the 1992 Constitution to constantly take public policy decisions to ensure citizen’s 
access to good health care (Government of Ghana, 1992). 
Political actors’ actions and inactions depend on what is at stake in terms of 
the public welfare, international recognition, and political gains. This finding is 
similar to what Grindle and Thomas (1991) noted in their work on political economy 
of reform in developing countries. In our case, politicians sometimes took decisions 
based on what policy advisers and advocates drew their attention to, but the 
politicians were also mindful of their political gains especially in an election year. So 
though decision making processes within the political domain is ongoing and 
routine, when the stakes are high, some maternal health policy decisions are put in 
the public domain to show government’s commitment to the populace. For example, 
when maternal health indicators worsened and the country was off track the MDG 5 
target, President Kufuor publically announced a free maternal health care policy as 
government’s commitment to tackle maternal mortality. On the hand, when the 
stakes are low, it becomes what Grindle and Thomas (1991) described as ‘politics-as-
usual’ where political actors approve decisions of policy agenda advisers as in the 
case of the institutionalised policy dialogue decisions. 
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In summary the decision making processes domains are fluid and 
interconnected to each other, for example processes in the public domain are 
generally profoundly political and affect the processes in the political domain. 
Similarly the technical processes sometimes impact the public for instance an expert 
recommendation and debate can trigger discussions within the public domain. 
However, the entry points to these decision making processes may vary. The entry 
point into the technical domain is dependent on one’s expertise as well as availability 
to engage in the decision making process. The public domain entry point is open and 
as such people who can invest time, advocate and interpret issues publically to their 
benefit can actively participate. The institutionalised dialogue domain have several 
entry points but with controlled participation. The multi-stakeholder health summit 
is open to all stakeholders within and outside the health sector. But participation in 
the business meeting is controlled and dependent on how much funds one brings to 
the table. However, the use of empirical evidence from reviews, operational studies 
and research finding during the institutionalised policy dialogue present a window 
of opportunity for stakeholders with technical expertise to invest time and generate 
evidence and advocate for its use in policy development. The political domain is 
limited to the Presidents, Parliamentarians, political appointees, and political party’s 
members and cronies. 
7.2.3 The effect of contextual factors effect on maternal health policy decisions 
(RQ3) 
Policy actors’ relationship with different contextual levels (international, national 
and local) and their ability to operate across these levels to affect a policy decision, 
and the effect of various contextual factors on the evolution of a policy agenda are 
the main points of influence of context on national level maternal health policy 
agenda and formulation decisions. 
A variety of policy actors operate in several ways at different contextual levels 
to influence national level decisions as shown in the case studies. An example is the 
role of donor staffs representing international organizations and countries who 
actively participate in global maternal health related meetings, transmit knowledge 
of global thinking, decisions and funding sources and also operate at national level in 
close connection with national policy makers. In this way they operate at national 
level by virtue of the context of their financial support and participation in the sector 
wide approach to health care promoting global thinking such as the MDGs as they 
engage with national bureaucrats and political actors. For example, the 2003 maternal 
health fee exemption for four deprived regions national policy was formulated 
because of the poverty reduction strategy directed towards attainment of anti- 
poverty objectives consistent with the MDGs and availability of the HIPC grant 
which were both international initiatives. 
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Another example is how policy actors across different contextual levels 
defined maternal health issues differently. At international level, donors focus 
primarily on the global maternal health picture and presumed benefits to a country 
of their presumptive solutions. Whilst at national level, political appointees and 
bureaucrats focus primarily on national context of politics, sustained financial means 
for implementation and a broader actor support for the policy within the Ghanaian 
health sector. Family planning for example has an international focus and support 
and the USAID, UNFPA and DFID actively promoted the ‘free family planning as 
part of NHIS’ policy based on cost and benefits assessment of including 
contraceptives in the NHIS package. Meanwhile, implementation had stalled because 
political actors and bureaucrats are not completely convinced of how to continuously 
fund and implement a policy (of free contraceptives) and avoid future funding 
constraints and the possibility of the ‘free contraceptives’ ending on the market in the 
financial and policy implementation context of Ghana’s health sector. 
Varied interrelating context whether a constraint or an opportunity influenced 
the timely manner in which a policy guideline can be formulated and implemented 
and closely linked to the intended agenda. Our findings are similar to findings by 
Grindle and Thomas (1991) in their study of public choices and policy change in 
developing countries that context in interrelating manner can serve as a constraint 
and an opportunity within which policy actors act to accomplish their goals. For 
example, within the context of high maternal mortality, political authority and a 
presidential directive, economic decline, limited financial means from the 
government for full implementation, the MOH bureaucrats implemented fee 
exemption policy for only four antenatal visits 11 months after the free maternal 
health directive. Conversely, contextual factors working in an interrelated manner as 
an opportunity presented bureaucrats, donors and political actors with 
complementary options and shaped the 2008 free maternal directive implementation 
to be made in a timely manner and more closely linked to the intended agenda. 
Within the context of high maternal mortality, political authority and will, donor 
health sector budget support, an election year, broader actor support to reduce 
maternal deaths, and international agenda – MDG 4&5 - the policy guidelines of fee 
exemption for antenatal, delivery and postnatal was developed and implemented 
within 2 months after the Presidential directive. 
7.2.4 Problem definitions related to maternal health policy decisions (RQ4) 
Problem definitions (framing) show how policy actors understood, debated and tried 
to persuaded others on maternal health issues and influence final decision makers 
and tried to get policy issues onto the agenda. As noted by Rochefort and Cobb 
(1993) and shown in the case studies there is not a single fixed maternal problem 
definition narrative, policy actors therefore related to context and their power 
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sources parallel to those suggested by Mintzberg (1983) such as access to knowledge 
and technical skills to define maternal health issues and policy narratives. 
The problem definition focused mainly on: (1) highlighting the severity of 
maternal health problems, (2) connecting with other national and international 
policies and agendas, (3) promoting specific interventions and programmes and (4) 
highlighting challenges of maternal policy implementation. First, policy agenda 
advisers especially relied on empirical evidence to highlight maternal health 
problems for attention. Inputs from empirical evidence provided information from 
which comparisons were made and the severity of the issue was underlined. As 
shown in the case studies and also noted by Grindle and Thomas (1991) policy actors 
used empirical evidence to advocate and garner support for specific policy decisions. 
For example, the MOH bureaucrats used the high maternal mortality narrative to 
advise the National Liberation Council government in 1969 for government to 
maintain the fee exemption policy for maternal health services. 
Ghana has signed on to international agreements and usually develops new 
policies or aligns to existing ones to achieve them (Campbell, 2001, Ministry of 
Health, 2007). International agendas do come with conditionalities and funding 
opportunities. Therefore, political actors and bureaucrats especially tend to connect 
to the problem definitions and policy narratives of these global agendas and adopt it 
for national policies. For example as discussed in  chapter 3, the user fee exemption 
policy in 2003 for the four most deprived regions was influenced by policy narratives 
from the poverty reduction strategy in line with the MDGs targets and the IMF and 
World Bank HIPC initiative.  
Third, policy actors also relied on existing problem definitions and policy 
narratives from interventions proven to improve maternal health outcomes. Notably 
are skilled delivery, maternal fee exemptions, provision of emergency obstetric 
services and contraceptives. Additional, these interventions are usually promoted by 
agencies such the International Federation of Gynaecology Obstetric and 
International Midwives Union making them even more important in maternal health 
care (Government of Ghana, 2006, World Health Organization et al., 2004), and 
credible to receive financial support from donors. Therefore, policy actors frame 
maternal health issues and policy narratives to ensure that these interventions 
became what Rochefort and Cobb (1993) describe as long-term fixtures on the health 
sector agenda. 
Finally, maternal health policies implementation challenges also contributed 
to the problem defining process. Most challenges that informed the defining process 
were uncovered from studies and programme evaluations (e.g. Maternal fee 
exemption policy evaluation, (Witter and Adjei, 2007)), and POW reviews (e.g. 
Aligning exemption policy and practise with poverty reduction goals (Ministry of 
Health, 2003a)). The terms of reference of these studies usually contain already a 
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problem definition about which policy actors such as MOH and donors agree to a 
certain extent. These studies, programme evaluations and reviews usually 
highlighted maternal policy implementation challenges due to inadequate financial, 
human and material resources. But, the case studies point to the importance of the 
availability of financial resource as the principal solution to maternal health 
problems whether material, human or financial. Therefore the one with money (a 
solution) is particularly powerful during the problem definition process and as 
suggested by Rochefort and Cobb (1993) a problem definition with a solution is likely 
to garner general support. In our case, the policy narrative promoted by the one with 
financial resource usually dominates the problem definition process as they persuade 
others to see the ‘solution’ in their policy narratives. This findings is similar to 
argument by Mosse (2005), that policy actors have power to control problem 
definition process and translate their dominate policy narratives into other people’s 
own solutions.  
Surrounding situations that trigger problem definitions of maternal health 
discussed here and in chapters (3-6) were used by policy actors more in some 
decision making processes domains than others. Table 7.1 summarises the 
surrounding situations used in problem definitions in the specific decision making 
processes domains.  
Table 7.1: Surrounding situations that trigger problem definitions of maternal health  
Technical domain 
x Empirical evidence from routine 
health management information 
system, demographic health 
surveys, cost effectiveness 
analysis, and economic and 
financial situational analysis 
x Situational analysis of economic 
and financial context 
x Policy implementation challenges 
such as inadequate financial, 
material and human  resources 
x Prior or similar pursued policies 
x Interventions proven to improve 
maternal health outcomes 
Public domain 
x Perceived effect of government 
policy 
x Societal political leaning 
x People’s anticipated  risk  of policy 
implementation 
x Administrative challenge such as 
unresolved negotiations between 
policy makers and implementers  
Political domain 
x Public perception and 
interpretation of government 
policies 
Institutionalised policy dialogue 
domain 
x Empirical evidence from routine 
health management information 
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x Worsen maternal health outcomes 
and indicators 
x International and national 
agreements and plans 
x Societal political leaning 
x Electoral period 
x Anticipated political risk 
x Public mood and opinion 
system, demographic health 
surveys, cost effectiveness 
analysis, and economic and 
financial situational analysis 
x Financial commitment and 
availability 
x International and national context, 
agendas and targets 
x Interventions proven to improve 
maternal health outcomes 
x Inability of some women to pay 
out of pocket for maternal health 
care and other reproductive health 
services such as family planning 
 
7.3 Theoretical and methodological considerations 
Theoretical consideration and contribution 
In literature on LMICs health policy analysis is often descriptive with little or no 
theoretical considerations, however, theoretical considerations and insights can 
advance the study of health policy and systems research supporting policy learning 
beyond where the research was conducted and enhancing research rigour and 
quality (Gilson et al., 2011, Gilson and Raphaely, 2008). The stage heuristic 
framework (Sabatier, 2007) and power approaches to decision making perspectives 
(Parsons, 1995) were used to organise the enquiry – an analysis of the maternal 
health policy process - given the complexity in studying policy and to highlight 
policy actors’ use of power to influence maternal health agenda setting and the 
formulation of decisions in relation to the various power sources of policy actors. The 
interconnectedness and varied effects of actions within the stages (agenda setting, 
formulation, implementation and evaluation) on each other show the complexity of 
the policy making process (Sabatier, 2007). However, zooming on agenda setting and 
formulation allowed unpacking of this complexity and gave insights into the policy 
making processes (Kingdon, 2003). 
Power is the heart of health policy making (Erasmus and Gilson, 2008, 
Weissert and Weissert, 2012) so drawing on power approaches to decision making, 
Mintzberg’s conceptualisation of power and Ribot and Peluso’s theory of access that 
is benefits from access to power emanating from people and institutions was 
appropriate to unpack the varied power sources of policy actors, how they deal with 
and control each other and the processes through which they are able to exercise 
their powers. The empirically grounded case studies point to the importance of 
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power (control over and access to knowledge, skills, resources and authority) and its 
use in a skilful way to convince those to whom one has access, to use one’s resources, 
evidence, authority and technical expertise to their fullest in negotiation, to sense 
what is possible and to organise the necessary alliances and networks – as suggested 
by Mintzberg (1983). However, the use of power as a means of influence to effect a 
desired decision and action as argued by Mintzberg can occur around a specific 
policy issue at multi-levels to impede some policy actors’ desired action. As shown in 
chapter 5 donors, advocates and bureaucrats with means of influence around the 
family planning decisions by virtue of their evidence of family planning benefits to 
maternal health care, control over donor budget support, lobbying expertise and 
positional and structural authority within the health sector could not yet influence 
the implementation of the free family planning as part of NHIS policy agenda. A 
possible stronger power source – a combination of sustained political interest, 
financial means to implement, and broader based actor support – untapped by 
bureaucrats, advocates and donors resulted in their inability to influence policy 
implementation – their desired action. 
The analytical framework (figure 1.1) and the assumed relationships between 
– policy actors, power, problem definition and context - allowed the study of how 
policy actors within specific contexts used their power sources to define maternal 
problems and framed accompanying course of action in the Ghanaian pluralist and 
sometimes elitist health sector. The study findings give new theoretical insights to 
public policy analysis in several ways. First, the results of the empirical analysis of 
how bureaucrats, donors, advocates, services providers, the general public and 
political actors within a LMIC setting are able to exercise power, control and 
maintain access to others under different periods and context to – influence and 
make maternal health policy agenda and formulation decisions. Second, the 
categorisation of policy actors based on their actions as policy directors and 
approvers (those who take final decisions) and policy advisers and advocates (those 
who influence decisions and formulate policies) and their interactions with the 
different decision making processes (technical, public, institutionalised and political) 
domains identified.  
Thirdly, we were able to link these categories of policy actors to specific 
decision making processes domains. The domains as entry points into the policy 
process present policy actors’ unique opportunities to interact and use their power 
sources and surrounding situations as negotiation tools to control each other and 
decisions. Decision making processes in the public and technical domains are similar 
to Grindle and Thomas (1991) public and bureaucratic arena of decision making, 
what the thesis contribute are examples of decision making processes within the 
institutionalised and political domains in a LMIC setting and the effect on maternal 
health policy agenda and formulation. Fourth, is the idea of network of influence. 
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Network of influence is the collective action of policy actors to effect a policy 
decision. The case studies point to the important role of network of influence in: (1) 
maintaining maternal fee exemption policy agenda over time (Koduah et al., 2015); 
(2) constantly revising and maintaining other policies as long term fixtures on the 
POW agenda (Koduah et al., 2016); (3) pushing free family planning as part of the 
NHIS onto the government’s agenda (chapter 5); and (4) resisting health financing 
and maternal health service delivery reforms (Koduah et al., 2016a). A network of 
influence is steered by power relationships between policy actors. Some actors such 
as donors had the upper hand in the power relationship because they controlled 
financial resources access while others for example the MOH simply maintained 
their access through those who had control. Understanding a network of influence 
and how policy actors controlled and maintained access to resources can help to 
explain how they are able to influence policy agenda and formulation decisions in a 
LMIC setting. 
Methodological reflection 
One main methodological concern was how to retrospectively piece information 
together in a systematic way to develop comprehensive case studies acknowledging 
the difficulty in mapping out the exact sequence of events. However, reviewing 
various documents (listed in appendix 1), participating in and studying ongoing 
health sector discussions (listed in appendix 2), following policy actors interactions 
and the policies evolution over time, and attempts to follow the money – allowed to 
reconstruct insofar as possible the interactions and processes surrounding the four 
cases. Additionally being an ‘insider/outsider’ and participating in high level 
meeting and analytically observing policy actors interactions, I gained understanding 
of the thinking behind some decisions recorded as collective decisions in national 
documents and this understanding complemented interpretations of findings from 
the documents reviews. However, following the money was difficult, because 
financial allocations were sometimes lumped without stating the individual donor’s 
identity and contribution to a specific policy, and the actual funds disbursed and 
spent on the policies investigated were not publically available. Inability to trace 
actual expenditure was not peculiar to this research, the National Health Account 
study that tracks the flow of funds through the health system, from their sources 
through those who control them to their end uses experienced similar difficulties, 
and reports that financial information obtained from primary and secondary data 
were aggregated making it difficult to disaggregate the financial information to 
determine certain sub-classification such as actual expenditure for specific policy 
implementation (Ministry of Health, 2013a). 
Studying who formulates maternal health policies and the agenda setting and 
decision making processes through which policy actors operate, was not a linear but 
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a complex iterative process with back and forth refining and modifying the set of 
research questions, developing understanding, following interesting lines and 
reviewing cases to study in the light of ongoing policy discussions. Conducting the 
research also involved studying the non-linear feedback effect of maternal health 
policy implementation and evaluation on the national level agenda for maternal 
health and policy formulation. Given the complexity in studying how policies are 
made, I recommend the following methodological activities for the study of public 
policies: participate in ongoing policy making processes within context of the study, 
follow policy actors interactions and discussions, follow the policy issue over time 
and follow the money – though difficult. 
Another methodological concern was related to the generalizability of the 
study findings. This is a major methodological concern of a case study design (Yin, 
2009, Robson, 2011). The problem of generalizability of these cases arises as with 
many case studies. One may question whether the evidence from studying four cases 
could provide an understanding of national level maternal health policy decisions in 
Ghana. However, when you look at the empirically-grounded four cases which 
investigated different policies at different periods, the findings all point to the same 
general conclusions. The policy agenda directors, approvers, advisers and advocates 
reliance on context and use of power sources to frame issues and effect maternal 
health policy agenda setting and formulation decisions at national level. 
Additionally, case studies like experiments, are generalizable to formulate theoretical 
propositions and not to populations or the universe (Yin, 2009). Theoretical 
propositions entail the development of general conclusions that although derived 
from limited number of cases, provide theoretical insights that can be put forward 
for consideration and testing in other similar situations (Gilson Lucy, 2012). 
Therefore the general conclusions and theoretical insights of this study in terms of 
power sources, problem definition, policy actors, and context can be tested by 
applying to other health policy decisions in Ghana and other LMIC setting with 
similar broader economic, social and political context. Also, the general conclusions 
and theoretical conclusions can be tested through comparative case studies of 
maternal health policy agenda setting and formulation across LMIC settings. The 
general conclusions can be extended to study other policy processes such as 
implementation and evaluation. 
7.4 Policy implication and future research 
The case studies highlight how policy making for maternal health happens in reality 
instead of what should. In reality the national level policy agenda and formulation 
decision making for maternal health is complex and intertwined with a mix of 
political, evidence based, varied interpretation of maternal problems, finance-based, 
path-dependent and donor driven processes, in a LMIC setting - Ghana. Therefore 
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decision makers and analysts who want to influence national agendas and policy 
content need to pay attention to the power sources, power relations between final 
decision makers and policy influencers, the varied decision making processes 
domains and the effect of context in any strategy. 
Public policy actors in Ghana have evolved over the years from predominately 
government and bureaucrats to include donors and service providers, as shown in 
the case studies. This shift brings a new power dynamics within the health sector, as 
donor and service providers seek to push their interest onto the government agenda 
and influence decisions to their favour. In addition to the shift in power dynamics, 
national political actors who take final decisions usually rely on international 
agendas and influence as well as international and national discourse to direct the 
national policy agenda. All these issues have implications for ongoing and future 
formulation of maternal health policies designed to reduce maternal deaths. 
A first implication is the role and influence of donors in maternal policy 
agenda and formulation decisions and its consequences for ongoing public policy 
decision making processes. The donors have sometimes influenced political actors to 
set national agenda in specific directions and greatly influenced the accompanying 
policy contents because of their funding to the health sector. This is not peculiar to 
Ghana, Uganda’s national policy development had also followed blueprints drawn 
by donors (Jeppsson, 2002). Donors may have pushed their ideas out of humanitarian 
interest or otherwise, but what matters is to understand the relevance of the donor 
driven policies to avoid a mismatch of donor priorities and practical realities. 
Findings show that donor blueprints such as the HIPC initiative and their subtle 
push of ideas during the policy dialogue processes advance their interest onto the 
government agenda. Because the national agenda tends to follow these donor 
blueprints and accompanying financial support, a structure of accountability is 
created where donors demand accountability on policy and programme 
implementation from government and MOH bureaucrats. This accountability 
structure existed over the years and was formalised under the SWAp arrangements 
(Birungi et al., 2006, Addai and Gaere, 2001). The accountability structure signifies 
the power relation between donors and the MOH bureaucrats and reflects what 
Ribot and Peluso (2003) described when they distinguish how people and 
institutions control resources access while others must maintain their access through 
those who have control. Donors control earmarked and budget support access and 
the MOH bureaucrats to benefit have maintained relation with donors. But the basis 
of this relationship under the SWAp had shifted because of the demise of the ‘basket 
funding’ and donors’ movement back towards vertical programme funding and 
parallel systems (Ministry of Health, 2013a), however, the government and MOH 
bureaucrats still periodically account to donors. 
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Donor’s activities within the health sector are institutionalised and they 
cannot be ignored, however, in the light of Ghana’s status as a LMIC, reduced donor 
funding and the demise of the basket funding (Moss and Majerowicz, 2012, Camp 
and Musinguzi, 2011, Ministry of Health, 2013a), there is the need for a paradigm 
shift and urgent reforms in the following ways. One, government and MOH 
bureaucrats must rethink their relationship and accountability structures with 
donors, and design new structures that reflect the current relationship. Two, 
government and MOH must access resources of other stakeholders to improve 
maternal health outcomes and to maintain sufficient budget. I recommend the 
government and MOH build extra technical and strategic capacity to engage other 
actors who can facilitate potential maternal policy change in terms of budget 
allocation and implementation to minimise policy implementation uncertainties. As 
argued by others (Aberese-Ako et al., 2014, Kwamie et al., 2014), the Ghanaian 
maternal policies implementation at district and hospital levels are compromised due 
to uncertainties about the flow of financial, material and human resources. Therefore 
to reduce implementation uncertainties, the MOH must develop a coherent and 
consistent policy making process and decisions such that maternal policies 
formulated are implementable with the requisite resources. To do this, the MOH 
must engage more with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and lobby 
for increased GOG allocation and disbursement. The MOH also needs to develop 
their human and institutional capacities to build commitment and consensus with 
health services providers on maternal health ideas relevant to actual needs and 
practical realities, and create and maintain access to service providers’ expertise and 
experience to build collective support for policy design and implementation towards 
reducing maternal deaths. 
A third implication is that the national level policy makers need to rethink the 
role and influence of private (self-financing and not-for-profit) service providers in 
public maternal health policy agenda and the formulation of decisions for 
implementation. The case studies gave an example of how private (self-financing) 
service providers’ resisted a policy reform and implementation because of their 
disagreement with the policy implementation arrangements and misunderstandings 
between them and the policy formulators. The private self-financing and not-for-
profit service providers are key stakeholders in service delivery in the urban and 
rural areas respectively (Ministry of Health, 2013b, Ghana Statistical Service, 2014) 
and are potential ally in the government’s quest to increase access to health care 
services across the country (Ministry of Health, 2007). However, the involvement of 
private sector actors in national policy design appears limited, for example within 
the institutionalised dialogue process where decisions are greatly skewed to the 
interest of MOH and donors, the private service providers have limited ability to 
influence national decisions unless they publicly resist and contest a policy reform 
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and implementation and gain political and social attention. The MOH must therefore 
engage and negotiate more with private sector actors in policy decisions at national 
level and address conflicting issues early to avoid resistance to public policies as in 
the case of the private self-financing providers, and support the private not-for-profit 
providers in implementing the policies in rural and hard-to-reach communities. The 
MOH and private sector must compromise and find a common ground for the 
delivery of public health care (public goods). This is particularly important because 
the private (self-financing) service providers’ primary interest is to make profit and 
may oppose any public policy that threatens their business. 
A fourth implication is the effect of the interconnectedness of the different 
decision making processes domains identified and its possible consequence. 
Decisions made in the technical, public, institutionalised and political domains are 
interrelated and fluid in that maternal health policy issues can be discussed and 
decisions taken in more than one domain. As the case studies point to actions in one 
domain can lead to unintended (or intended) and unpredictable (or predictable) 
decisions taken in another domain. Policy actors working in these domains on 
different aspects of public policies to reduce maternal deaths are not only involved in 
formulating and influencing policies but are also involved in the national efforts to 
reduce maternal deaths. There is a potential for decisions taken on the same maternal 
health policy issue in different domains to contradict each other as was the case of 
primary care maternal health service under the per capita payment system (Koduah 
et al., 2016a). Such occurrences can lead to power clashes and impede policy 
implementation and reset or modify the policy agenda and accompanying policy 
contents. The ability of public policy decisions related to maternal health to 
contradict in these domains shows the complexity in formulating, sustaining and 
implementing policies that can work together to reduce maternal deaths. As a leader 
and coordinator of the health sector policies, the MOH needs to especially appreciate 
such happenings and build strategies to mitigate any unforeseen outcomes and 
actively scout for possible opportunities or threats within these different domains to 
formulate sustainable public policies for implementation to reduce maternal deaths. 
Recommendations for further research 
The dynamics of power relations among policy actors are less understood and 
require further investigation. The degree of control by policy actors within their 
collective influence to affect a decision is less clear. Political actors and policy 
influencers bring different forms of power to the network of influence, what is less 
understood is the relative weight and the ability of different power sources to control 
decisions and actions. For example the power relation between the donors and MOH 
is such that donor use financial resources and the MOH authority to control and 
maintain their relationship. What is less understood is how other sources of power 
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such as knowledge, experience and interpretation of facts weigh on either the donors 
or the MOH’s ability to control decisions and actions within their relationship, and 
access to other influencers within the Ghanaian health sector and beyond. I 
recommend further research to explain the policy actors’ power relations in light of 
the issues raised.  
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Appendix  
Appendix 1: Documents reviewed 
Document  Year  
Laws 
Ghana Health Service and Teaching Hospital Act 525 
Hospital Fees Act 387 – 1971 
Hospital Fees Ordinance CAP 82 (1897)  
Hospital Fees Decree, NLCD 360 
Hospital Fees Regulations, Legislative Instrument 
1277,1313 
National Health Insurance Act (650,852 ) 
National Health Insurance Regulations, Legislative 
Instrument 1809  
The 1992 Constitution of Ghana- Act 527 
 
1996 
1971 
1942 
1969 
1983,1985 
 
2003, 2012 
2004 
 
1992 
Reports 
Health sector Aide memoire 
Aligning exemption policy and practice with poverty 
reduction goals 
Annual programme of work 
Independent review of the annual programme of work  
Inter-Agency Leadership Committee report (April 2009) 
Health sector medium term development plan 
 
Pro-poor Agenda 
Report of the committee appointed to investigate 
hospital fees 
Review of the Exemption Policy 
The Health Sector response to Maternal Mortality  
 
2001-2013 
2003 
 
2002-2014 
2001-2013 
2009 
[2002-2006,2007-
2011, 2010-2013] 
2004 
1970 
 
2006 
2004 
Meeting records  
Health sector working group meetings 
 
 
 
 
Inter-agency leadership committee meeting 
 
 
Provider Payment Mechanism Technical Subcommittee 
 
[12 January 2012, 9 
February 2012, 3 
May 2012, 7 June 
2012, 5 July 2012] 
 
[9 March 2011, 1 
Dec 2011, 10 April 
2012] 
[2010-2012] 
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Media 
Ghana News Agency website 
Ghanaian Daily Graphic  
 
2008-2014 
1957- 2014 
 
 
Appendix 2: Meetings attended during field work  
Meetings  Dates 
Business meeting 17 August 2012 
20 November 2012 
2 May 2013 
20-21 November 2014 
Capitation evaluation meeting  12 February 2012 
DFID meeting on health sector budget support 15 November 2012 
Free family planning committee meeting 13 December 2012 
Health sector working group meetings  5 July 2012 
6 September 2012 
7 February 2013 
20 March 2014  
Inter-agency performance review meeting  16-17 August 2012 
12-13 September 2013 
4-5 April 2013 
20-21 August 2014 
MDG Acceleration Framework (MAF) regional 
(Central & Western) planning meetings  
8-12 October 2012 
MAF teaching hospitals and training institutions 
planning meeting  
3-5 January 2013 
MAF national monitoring and evaluation meeting  12 October 2012 
MOH budget committee meeting 5 September 2012 
MOH budget hearing at the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning 
20 September 2012 
MOH internal review meeting  7 August 2012 
21 March 2013 
Monitoring visit to Ashanti region; series of 
meetings  
6th-9th November 2012  
Multi-stakeholder health summit 29-30 April 2013 
National workshop with accountability framework 
with special reference towards women and 
3-4 October 2012 
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Meetings  Dates 
children’s health meeting 
NHIA stakeholder meeting  21 – 22 December 2012 
PPME general meeting  25 June 2012 
30 August 2012 
PPME unit heads meeting  10, 23 July 2012 
13 August 2012 
4, 10 September 2012 
15, 22 October 2012 
12,19 November 2012 
Pre budget review meeting  12 September 2012 
Pre business meeting  16 November 2012 
Pre health summit meeting 19th April 2013 
Provider Payment Mechanism Technical 
Subcommittee  
29 August 2014 
Stakeholder meeting on institutional mortality  27-28 March 2014 
 
Appendix 3: List of respondents   
Respondent type Number 
Government 
Ashanti regional health directorate 
Ghana health service headquarters 
Minister of Health 
Ministry of health former staff 
Ministry of Health 
National Health Insurance Authority 
Provider payment mechanism technical sub-committee 
Public health facility service provider in Ashanti region  
 
2 
5 
1 
3 
10 
4 
2 
4 
Non-government 
Christian Health Association of Ghana 
Coalition of non-government organization in health 
(National and Ashanti region representative) 
Donors 
Health professional bodies 
Opposition politician (former Minister of Health) 
Private not-for-profit service provider 
Private self-financing service providers 
 
1 
 
2 
8 
5 
1 
1 
3 
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Summary 
Maternal and neonatal deaths and morbidity still pose an enormous challenge for 
health authorities in Ghana, a lower middle income country. Despite massive 
investments in maternal and neonatal health and special attention through 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 4 and 5, Ghana still have high mortality 
rates. At national level, policy decision makers to improve maternal outcomes have 
over the years developed several public policies to increase financial and 
geographical access to maternal care; space child birth; provide essential obstetric 
care; expand midwifery coverage; make equipment available and many more. 
The problem of maternal mortality persist and this raises the question of what 
essentially goes into public policy making given the failure to achieve targets despite 
several maternal health policies developed for implementation. This thesis thus aims 
to advance our understanding of who makes maternal health policies and the agenda 
setting and formulation decision making processes through which they operate, in 
Ghana; and out of these understanding present potential lessons for policy actors to 
engage in making better informed policy decisions to improve maternal health. 
To understand factors and processes that influence national level maternal 
policy agenda and formulation decisions; we conceptualised that maternal policy 
decision making is predominately influenced by how policy actors within specific 
context use their power sources to define issues and frame accompanying course of 
action. The main research questions are: 
1. Which policy actors have been involved in maternal health policy agenda 
setting and formulation and what roles did they play and why? 
2. What are the decision making processes related to maternal health policy 
agenda setting and formulation? 
3. How did contextual factors influenced maternal health policy agenda setting 
and formulation and why? 
4. How did policy actors define maternal health issues and why? 
To investigate maternal policy agenda setting and formulation decision 
making in-depth, a multiple case study design with qualitative methods of data 
collection was used. The case study approach allowed me to look at maternal health 
policy decisions not merely as inputs and outputs but to better understand within 
context the processes and policy actors involved. Field work in the Ghanaian health 
sector, through observation and participation in the work of the Ministry of Health, 
steered the selection of the cases. Four cases: maternal (antenatal, delivery, and 
postnatal) fee exemption policy decisions, health sector programme of work maternal 
health policy decisions, free family planning as part of NHIS policy decision, and 
primary care maternal health service capitation policy decisions were investigated. 
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The field work was conducted between May 2012 and August 2014. Multiple data 
collection methods including document review, interviews and observations were 
used to collect historical and current information and contribute to the validity and 
reliability of the research findings. Data were analysed drawing on an analytical 
framework in which concepts of organizational power, context, policy actors and 
problem definition were central elements. 
Case 1 
Historical and contemporary fee exemption policies for maternal (antenatal, skilled 
delivery and postnatal) health services were explored. Specifically we ask: How have 
maternal user fee exemption policies evolved in Ghana since independence? Which 
actors have been involved in the policy agenda setting and formulation and why? 
What contextual factors influenced the process over time, how and why? Nine 
specific policies were identified along the pathway as, the policies evolved from user 
fee exemptions to national health insurance premium exemption. The policy was first 
introduced in 1963 and has remained on the government agenda over four and over 
decades in a fluid process of ebbs and flows rather than in a static fixed form. 
Contextual factors and various policy actors were the major influencers of the ebbs 
and flows. Contextual factors that influenced the ebbs and flows were: political such 
as Nkrumah’s ideology of free access to health care and education, changes in 
government, and presidential election year; economic crises and development 
partners’ austerity measures; worsening health and demographic indicators; 
historical events; social unrest; and international agendas such as the MDGs. These 
contextual factors served as a source of power for policy actors to sustain maternal 
fee exemption agenda over time. The case study showed that various categories of 
policy influencers (policy agenda advisers and advocates) and final decision makers 
(policy agenda directors and approvers) operated within these interrelated 
contextual factors, which sometimes worked as constraints and sometimes opened 
opportunities. These contextual factors shaped the timely manner in which policy 
content was formulated and level of deviation from the intended agenda at each 
specific decision period. For instance, contextual factors such as declined health 
budget allocation and high maternal mortality presented the ministry of health 
bureaucrats with an option to formulate the policy content in a less timely manner 
and away from the intended agenda of 1997 free maternal care presidential directive. 
Whilst, within the context of austerity measure and Ghana poverty reduction 
strategy, maternal fee exemption policy for four deprived regions was formulated in 
a timely manner and closely linked to the poverty strategy. 
Case 2 
The case explored how and why maternal health policy and programme agenda 
items appeared and evolved in the framework of the Ghanaian health sector 
programme of work agenda between 2002 and 2012. Our specific research questions 
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were: Which maternal health policies were prioritised? How did they evolve on the 
agenda and why? We examined decision maker’s problem definition and decision 
making processes, theorizing that a policy or programme’s appearance and fate on 
the POW agenda is predominantly influenced by how decision makers use their 
source of power to define problems and frame their policy narratives and 
accompanying course of actions. 
Ministry of health bureaucrats and donors used their power sources as 
negotiation tools to frame maternal health issues and design maternal health policies 
and programmes within the framework of the national health sector programme of 
work. The power sources identified included legal and structural authority; access to 
authority by way of political influence; control over and access to resources (mainly 
financial); access to evidence in the form of health sector performance reviews and 
demographic health surveys; and knowledge of national plans such as Ghana 
Poverty Reduction Strategy. Bureaucrats and donors used their power sources to 
define, frame and label issues for attention making some policies such as family 
planning long term fixtures on the agenda. They used labels such as ‘inadequate 
obstetric care’, ‘family planning unmet needs’, ‘maternal health a poverty issue’, and 
‘poor maternal health a national emergency’ – for actions and to ensure the 
continuous flow of donor and government funding. 
 
Case 3 
The case investigated how and why ‘free family planning as part of the NHIS’ policy 
attained a position on government agenda in 2012 but has not subsequently moved 
into formulation and implementation in Ghana. Relying on their power sources such 
as access to bodies of evidence; bureaucrats, donors, reviewers and reproductive 
health advocates framed inadequate budgetary allocation and disbursement for 
family planning and exclusion of family planning services from the national health 
insurance benefits package - as a major challenge to family planning contribution to 
maternal health care; and free family planning as potential life and cost saving. 
Drawing on their legal and structural access to institutionalized public policy 
processes in Ghana, they proposed the following policy options: include family 
planning service in the national health insurance benefits package and increase 
government and donor financial support. The interests of the supporting actors were 
two fold to eliminate out of pocket payments for family planning service and still 
sustain the financial needs of the family planning programme through the National 
Health Insurance Scheme. A window of opportunity opened when a Minister of 
Health receptive to these problem definitions and policy options publically voiced 
support for ‘free family planning as part of the NHIS; policy and therefore pushed it 
high and visibly onto the public policy /government agenda. However, the policy 
failed to move into formulation and implementation. Factors that influenced this 
failure included the lack of a stronger, broad based health sector actor support and 
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related inability to agree on and develop policy implementation guidelines; and 
maintain political access and interest in the issue after it was moved up the agenda. 
 
Case 4 
This case explored how and why less than three months into the implementation of a 
pilot prior to national scale up; primary care maternal services that were part of the 
basket of services in a primary care per capita national health insurance scheme 
provider payment system dropped off the agenda. During the agenda setting and 
policy formulation stages; predominantly technical policy actors within the 
bureaucratic arena used their expertise and authority for consensus building to get 
antenatal, normal delivery and postnatal services included in the primary care per 
capita payment system. Once policy implementation started, policy makers were 
faced with unanticipated resistance. Service providers, especially the private self-
financing used their professional knowledge and skills, access to political and social 
power and street level bureaucrat power to contest and resist various aspects of the 
policy and its implementation arrangements – including the inclusion of primary 
care maternal health services. Arenas of conflict moved from the bureaucratic to the 
public as opposing actors presented multiple interpretations of the policy intent and 
implementation and gained the attention of politicians and the public. The context of 
intense public arena conflicts and controversy in an election year added to the high 
level political anxiety generated by the contestation. The President and Minister of 
Health responded and removed antenatal, normal delivery and postnatal care from 
the per capita package. 
 
Conclusions 
The general findings of the thesis are: (1) policy influencers (donors and bureaucrats) 
and final decision makers (Minister and President) used their power sources and 
contextual factors to define problems, promote their vested interest and justify 
actions and inactions; through technical, institutionalised, public and political 
decision making domains. (2) Policy influencers and final decision makers’ collective 
actions and inactions through interactions and power relations influenced decisions 
to their benefit at different levels. They used their control over and access to 
knowledge, authority and financial, material and human resources to push their 
interest and influence decisions. Therefore, this thesis concludes that the findings can 
serve as lessons for policy actors to strategize and make better informed policy 
decisions. We are in need of a health sector that pays more attention to context, 
power sources and power relations of final decision makers and influencers and the 
varied decision making domains in any maternal health policy decision. 
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Population Association of 
America annual meeting, San 
Diego, USA. 
2015 1 
C) Career related competences/personal development 
Emerging Leaders Programme in Health Policy & 
Systems Research  
The University of Western Cape. 
South Africa       
2013-2014 4 
Accelerate project workshop  WUR 2012-2016 2 
Total    40.6 
*One credit according to ECTS is on average equivalent to 28 hours of study load 
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